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The status quo “peace” in the Taiwan Strait has been maintained primarily through the U.S. 
policy of deterrence and assurance.  Should war occur between the U.S. and China over 
Taiwan, the consequences would be disastrous.  The maintenance of peace and security in 
the Taiwan Strait, therefore, is of great importance for all the interested parties and beyond.  
The U.S. policy of deterrence and assurance has operated to maintain the status quo “peace” 
by deterring China from engaging in unprovoked attacks on Taiwan while assuring China that 
the U.S. would not support Taiwan’s official independence.   
 
However, the status quo maintaining the “peace” in the Taiwan Strait is shifting due to three 
major factors below:  
(1) China’s increasingly aggressive stance in the Taiwan Strait since the mid-2010s, 
grounded upon its “One China Principle”  and increased economic and military capabilities 
to take Taiwan by force;  
(2) Taiwan’s growing sense of self-identity may lead to a movement paving the way for its 
eventual official independence; 
(3) The longstanding adherence of the U.S. to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait has been 







To maintain the status quo “peace,” the U.S. must adjust its outdated engagement policy 
toward China to a stronger deterrence policy in the Taiwan Strait, to deter China more 
effectively.  The U.S. must also adopt a firmer assurance policy, to assure China that Taiwan 
is not considering proclaiming official independence.  At the same time, the U.S. must 
recognize Taiwan’s growing sense of identity and provide critical military, economic, and 
political support to ensure Taiwan’s success as an alternative model of development and a 
winning narrative toward China.   
 
The status quo “peace” in the Taiwan Strait is valuable but fragile.  It is not a true and enduring 
peace, which should be the ultimate objective for all parties involved.  A compromise 
between China’s nationalism based on the “One China Policy” and Taiwan’s growing self-
identity is likely a prerequisite for any type of long-lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait.  In its 
absence, a true long-lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait is likely to remain elusive. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
This study examines peace in the Taiwan Strait.  Some have opined that a war between 
the People's Republic of China and the U.S. is inevitable or highly likely.1  If this war were to occur 
between the two superpowers, it would most likely be over Taiwan.2  Considering the devastating 
aftermath of this scenario, it is in the world’s best interest to maintain the peace in the Taiwan 
Strait.3  This precarious political landscape has prompted the need for this study.  It is hoped that 
this examination will help readers understand the complex and difficult situations surrounding 
the Taiwan Strait and propose policy recommendations designed to maintain the peace.  The 
readers of this study are likely to be international relations policymakers and scholars, or general 
readers interested in the U.S.-Taiwan-China affairs.  This study avoids difficult jargon, and every 
technical term and concept is explained.  Even those without background knowledge in 
international relations should find the study helpful. 
Following Abstract and Acknowledgements, this study begins with Chapter I: Introduction, 
which explains the status quo in the region from each party’s subjective view among China, 
Taiwan, and the U.S.  Chapter II: How Has “Peace” Been Maintained and How Is It Shifting? 
attempts to answer what the “peace” may mean in the Taiwan Strait.  How has this status quo 
“peace” been maintained, and how is that status quo “peace” shifting?  This Chapter also 
 
1 See a discussion in Allison, Graham, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.  Also, Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, 
Penguin Random House, 1998. 
2 Other than Taiwan, the South China Sea is widely considered as another flash point between China and the 
United States.  
3 The horror of a war between the two nuclear armed superpowers is almost unthinkable.  It would be a tragedy 
because the war is unnecessary and preventable.   
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discusses in depth the pressing concerns and policies developed over the years to the present 
among the three major parties involved.   
Chapter III: The Theory, Key Findings of Survey of Experts, and Policy Recommendations 
for the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait explores this triangular relationship based on an existing 
“strategic triangle” international relations theory.  This Chapter also lists key findings that the 
author has distilled from a survey of some of the world’s top experts on the Taiwan Strait, and 
offers three key policy recommendations for the U.S.  Finally, Chapter IV: Conclusion: A New 
Status Quo “Peace” & A Long Lasting Peace concludes the study with a summary. 
There has not been a major military conflict in the Taiwan Strait since the Chinese 
Communist forces defeated the Chinese Nationalist forces in the Chinese Civil War in 1949.4  The 
Chinese Communist forces, supported by the Soviet Union, then founded the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949 with Beijing as its capital.  While the Communist victory was decisive in Mainland 
China, it was incomplete because the defeated Nationalist government, supported by the U.S., 
and the remaining Nationalist forces and followers fled Mainland China.  They, over a million in 
total, crossed the 180-kilometer (110 mile)-wide Taiwan Strait to the island of Taiwan.5  With its 
capital in Taipei in Taiwan, they hoped to return to Mainland China and launch a counter-attack 
against the Communists in the future.  
 
4 Around 1950, the Chinese Communists were preparing to launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, but that plan 
was aborted by the Korean War.  On two separate occasions during the 1950s, China bombed strategic islands 
controlled by Taiwan. The United States responded by actively intervening on behalf of Taiwan.  See “The Taiwan 
Straits Crisis: 1954–55 and 1958”, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of 
State. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/taiwan-strait-crises 
5 “The Taiwan Strait has an average width of 110 miles, while its narrow part is 81 miles wide. The Taiwan Strait 
sits on a continental shelf that runs along the entire stretch of the strait. The strait is relatively shallow...” Kiprop, 
Joseph, “Where Is the Taiwan Strait Located?’, WorldAtlas, May 14, 2018. 
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/where-is-the-taiwan-strait-
located.html#:~:text=The%20Taiwan%20Strait%20has%20an,entire%20stretch%20of%20the%20strait. 
- 3 - 
 
The Nationalists, after arriving in Taiwan around 1949, now joined the early settlers, who 
totaled over six million ethnic Chinese who had already settled in Taiwan for generations and a 
smaller group of non-Chinese aborigines who had settled in Taiwan even earlier.  This larger 
group of people in Taiwan, whose ancestors had started to move from China to Taiwan in waves 
since the 17th century and a smaller group of aborigines, found themselves in the midst of the 





6  Regarding the often-overlooked aborigines’ perspective on the status and future of Taiwan, see “Indigenous 
Peoples of Taiwan to President Xi Jinping of China, Joint Declaration by the Representatives of the Indigenous 
Peoples of Taiwan within the Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee”, January 9, 2019.  
《原轉會各民族代表：台灣原住民族致中國習近平主席》 
https://international.thenewslens.com/article/111667 
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Major military conflicts between the Communists and the Nationalists mostly ended in 
1949, but the bitter Chinese Civil War has not officially ended.  This “peace” among China, 
Taiwan, and the U.S. since 1949 in the Taiwan Strait has been maintained delicately mostly 
through the U.S. policy of deterrence and assurance.7 8 9  By way of this policy, the U.S. has largely 
deterred China from attacking Taiwan unprovoked while assuring China that it would not support 
Taiwan’s official independence.  While the U.S. policy has not resolved the underlying conflict 
between China and Taiwan, it has kept, at a minimum, the “peace” in the Taiwan Strait since 
1949. 
However, this “peace” has been challenged since the mid-2010s due primarily to Chinese 
leadership’s aggressive stance, equipped with rapidly developing economic and military 
capabilities, on the Taiwan Strait.  Moreover, a growing sense of Taiwanese identity separate 
from China that may pave the way for a call for official independence has been a notable 
development impacting the “peace”.  China has indicated its willingness to resort to force in the 
event that Taiwan proclaims its official independence, because Chinese leadership has always 
considered Taiwan a part of China.  While Taiwan’s de facto ally, the U.S., has sought to calibrate 
policy regarding the Taiwan Strait, the precarious circumstances surrounding this region, if not 
managed delicately, could trigger a direct confrontation between the U.S. and China.  The 
fundamental question then surfaces: What can be done to maintain this temporary “peace” for 
 
7 “Peace” here simply means the absence of war. 
8 Ross, Robert S, “Stability of Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait”: The National Interest, Fall 2001. 
9 Christensen, Thomas, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict” The Washington 
Quarterly, Autumn 2002.  Other scholars have used the phrase “dual deterrence” to explain the same policy.  
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the foreseeable future and to pursue a long-term peace in the Taiwan Strait in the distant 
future?10  
 
1. The Objective Status Quo 
Objectively speaking, the status quo on the Taiwan Strait has been an uneasy, and yet 
mostly “peaceful” stalemate between the two governments on both sides.  The authoritarian and 
nationalistic government to the west of the Taiwan Strait governs the continent-size country of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that is recognized by an overwhelming number of countries 
in the world to represent China.  The government to the east of the Taiwan Strait has evolved 
from an authoritarian dictatorship to a liberal democracy, and it governs the island of Taiwan and 
a few surrounding smaller islands with its official name as the Republic of China (ROC), a country 
that is recognized by only a handful of small countries in the world.11  It has insisted that the ROC 
has always been sovereign and is not subordinate to the PRC.  The ROC, however, cannot 
proclaim its official independence as a country of “Taiwan” without risking a  war with the PRC, 
which considers this a defiant act to break away from China. 
The separation of the two governments by the Taiwan Strait is the result of a Chinese Civil 
War that had been essentially suspended since 1949 but never officially concluded to this day.  
The U.S. had been supporting the ROC government both before its defeat in Mainland China and 
 
10 In this study, a long-lasting peace is defined as “a state or period of mutual concord between governments” or 
“a pact or agreement to end hostilities between those who have been at war or in a state of enmity”. Merriam-
Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/peace. 
11 In 2021, only 15 countries in the world recognize Taiwan as a country. 
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after its fleeing to Taiwan in 1949.12   After transforming into a true liberal democracy since the 
1980s, Taiwan began sharing with the U.S. values of freedom and democracy.  The U.S., however, 
had established official diplomatic relationships and recognized the PRC government in Mainland 
China (the de facto government governing Mainland China since 1949) and derecognized the ROC 
government in Taiwan in 1979.   
The U.S. recognition of the PRC was largely a result of the PRC-Soviet Union split and the 
need of the U.S. to withdraw itself from Vietnam with the PRC’s assistance.  Despite the U.S.’s 
formal diplomatic relationship with the PRC, the U.S. has maintained a strong informal de facto 
relationship with the ROC government in Taiwan.1314  The U.S. periodically sells arms to Taiwan 
to support its defensive capabilities to counter China, which arguably works to preserve the 
“peace” by preventing military conflicts through deterrence of China from invading Taiwan.  At 
the same time, the U.S. has assured China that it would not support Taiwan’s official 
independence.  The result has been an uneasy, but mostly “peaceful” stalemate between China 
and Taiwan since 1949, largely dictated by the balancing act by the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait.     
In reality, this objective status quo in the Taiwan Strait does not fully satisfy any of the 
parties involved, namely China, the U.S., and Taiwan itself.  Despite this, all three parties have 
 
12 The U.S., disillusioned with its involvement in the Chinese civil war, suspended its support for the Chinese 
Nationalist government briefly in 1949 but quickly resumed the support after the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950. 
13 To avoid confusion and for the purpose of clarification, the PRC will be referred to as China and the ROC will be 
referred to as Taiwan in this study.  Some in the PRC may object to this clarification since it implies Taiwan is not 
part of China.  Some in the ROC may also object since they think Taiwan should be addressed with its official name 
ROC or at least ROC Taiwan.  This possible objection is a clear indication of the complexity of the issue, starting 
with how various sides consider what the proper terminology should be.   
14 The U.S.’s recognition of the PRC government in China and derecognition of the ROC government in Taiwan as 
the legitimate government of China in 1979 created a crisis about Taiwan’s future immediately.  In response to this 
crisis, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Acts (TRA) and it was signed into law in 1979. The three joint 
U.S.-China Communiques were issued in 1972, 1979, and 1982, and supplemented by the Six Assurances in 1982.   
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had to accept this reality since 1949.  China has been particularly reluctant to accept this status 
quo because it considers its unification of China incomplete in the absence of Taiwan.  The 
objective status quo in the Taiwan Strait is not ideal and tensions remain, but all three sides have 
been unable (i.e., China at least until very recently and Taiwan) or unwilling (i.e., the U.S.) to alter 
the status quo.  Nevertheless, the status quo is never static and constantly changing, and it is the 
premise of this study that this status quo has been shifting fundamentally since the mid-2010s.  
As a result of this shift, the so-called “peace” in the Taiwan Straits is being threatened in a 
fundamental way.  
 
2. Subjective Status Quo 
The objective status quo, or the contours of the Taiwan Strait (i.e., the two governments 
on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait), is relatively clear.  The subjective status quo, however, is 
quite the opposite.  The status quo is hotly contested subjectively, and there is considerable 
controversy over it.  The parties involved, namely China, Taiwan, and the U.S. have advanced 
different and sometimes contradictory interpretations of the situation based on their own 
viewpoints.  For example, just within Taiwan itself, opposing camps have very different 
interpretations of some of the very basic political and social features of Taiwan.  For instance, 
some groups identify themselves as Taiwanese while others identify themselves as Chinese or 
Chinese/Taiwanese.  
  In fact, the situation in the Taiwan Strait reflects a “Rashomon effect,” a term derived 
from a 1950 Japanese classic film Rashomon describing a controversial situation (in the film, it 
referred to a criminal act) that is given contradictory interpretations by the various parties 
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involved.  The term refers to contested interpretations of or disagreements over a particular 
situation, and subjectivity versus objectivity in human perception.  As in the film, each party sees 
and describes the situation from one’s own perspective, which is often self-serving, incomplete, 
or biased.  Therefore, it is critical to understand the perception and perspective of each party 
involved, (in our case, whether it’s China’s, Taiwan’s, and the U.S.’s) to understand the complex 
and ambiguous situation before one can even explore possible solutions.  We will review each 
party’s view in turn. 
 
● China’s View  
First, Chinese leadership has not been familiar with or accepted the concept of status quo 
from the outset, and it rarely uses the term in its policies toward Taiwan.  Chinese leaders prefer 
the terminology of “preserving the peace,” rather than the status quo, in the Taiwan Strait.15  
Second, Chinese leadership has long been unwilling to accept the objective reality of the status 
quo in the Taiwan Strait because that reality is a China without Taiwan, which is, in their view, an 
incomplete China.  The objective reality in which the two governments occupy each side of the 
Taiwan Strait undermines Chinese leadership’s legitimacy and violates its subjective view of the 
status quo as expressed its political doctrine of “One China Principle.''  It provides that Taiwan is 
a part of China and that China has sovereignty over Taiwan, and this view has always 
characterized China’s definition of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.16   
 
15 Lin, Cheng-yi and Denny Roy (Editors), The Future of United States, China, and Taiwan Relations, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2011. P. 77.   
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b833/01d9a583ad099d94e074cc5b6db15bc7ed47.pdf 
16 Ibid., 77 to 78.  
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As the victors of the bitter Chinese Civil War that suspended in 1949, the Communist 
Chinese leaders long considered that China had been deprived of the prize of Taiwan but for the 
U.S. intervention.17  The inability to unify Taiwan, in their view, undermined their own legitimacy 
and authority to rule China.  Though highly dissatisfied, China found itself unable to alter the 
objective status quo and had little choice but to accept it.  Chinese leadership, however, has long 
taught Chinese citizens that Taiwan is a province of China, and that it is inevitable Taiwan will be 
unified by the “motherland” someday.  Since the mid-2010s, China has been accelerating its 
military capabilities to take Taiwan by force, thereby altering the balance of power in the Taiwan 
Strait.  While China has taken an increasingly aggressive and militaristic stance, it remains 
uncertain whether this will serve as a realistic option for Chinese leadership.  In other words, 
launching a full-scale military campaign will be an extremely risky endeavor entailing dire 
consequences and costs.  Despite this apparent cost-benefit analysis, Chinese leadership has 
nevertheless decided to adopt an aggressive posture in the Taiwan Strait since the mid-2010s to 
alter the long-standing status quo.  
 
● Taiwan’s View 
For Taiwanese, the status quo means Taiwan is neither a part of the PRC nor an 
independent sovereign state called Taiwan.18  Most Taiwanese seem to fall into two broad groups 
 
17 The TRA and the Six Assurances are the Chinese government’s most discussed “betrayal” by the U.S.  To Taiwan,   
the U.S.’s recognition of the PRC government in China and derecognition of the ROC government in Taiwan as the 
legitimate government of China in 1979 made the U.S. like an unreliable ally Taiwan could no longer count on.  It is 
a historical legacy that the PRC and the ROC governments both feel betrayed by the U.S. 
18 Neither part of the PRC or an independent country called Taiwan a reality as of 2021. However, many in China 
would like Taiwan to be a part of the PRC, and some in Taiwan would like to establish an independent country 
called Taiwan someday.   
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when it comes to understanding the status quo.  The first group is generally more “Taiwan-
centric,” sees Taiwan as a de facto independent country, and identifies themselves as 
Chinese/Taiwanese or, increasingly, solely Taiwanese.  Some in this group are willing to accept 
this uncertain status quo for as long as it lasts, some favoring official independence, but they all 
support the separation from the PRC.  As Taiwanese identity continues to grow in Taiwan, the 
first “Taiwan centric” group has been gaining traction, particularly among the younger 
generations.  The second group is generally more “ROC-centric” (“Republic of China'' as Taiwan 
is officially known), which considers Taiwan a part of the ROC and tends to identify themselves 
as solely Chinese.  Although some in this group support unification with the PRC in the distant 
future, they collectively oppose Taiwan’s official independence and support Taiwan’s current 
status as part of China (i.e., ROC).  For both groups, there seems to be a general consensus under 
a big tent of “maintaining the status quo,” at least for now.  Some within this tent do favor 
Taiwan’s official independence in the distant future, and their numbers have been growing 
notably since 2018.  Those who favor Taiwan’s swift official independence outside of the big tent 
of “maintaining the status quo” have also seen a modest growth since 2018.  
For Taiwan, the objective status quo is not ideal because it does not allow Taiwan to fully 
function as an independent country.  The ROC, as Taiwan is officially known, is only recognized 
by a handful of small countries in the world.  Most countries in the world, under pressure or 
coercion from China to choose between China or Taiwan, naturally choose China, a country with 
a population size of 1.4 billion and an enormous economic market over the small island of Taiwan 
with a population size of 24 million.  As a result, Taiwan has been isolated on the international 
stage as it has not been able to join most international organizations because it is not considered 
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by many as a “country.”  At the same time, Taiwan cannot proclaim its official independence as 
“Taiwan” without taking seemingly unreasonable risks of both losing U.S. support and provoking 
China.  As such, Taiwan has been grappling with this dilemma for decades, but it still has managed 
to grow and succeed as a thriving liberal democracy.  Nevertheless, few in Taiwan are fully 
satisfied with the objective status quo though most Taiwanese have learned to live with this less-
than-ideal reality.  Most Taiwanese have supported the status quo because they consider it the 
best possible realistic situation under the circumstances.  This general acceptance, however, does 
not indicate that they will readily sacrifice the values they have fought for, including peace, 
prosperity, democracy, and the ability to charter their own destiny.  
 
● The U.S.’s View  
The U.S. was not able to assist the Chinese Nationalists to prevent the Chinese 
Communists from winning the Chinese Civil War and taking over Mainland China in 1949.  
However, the U.S. succeeded in stopping the Communists from overrunning Taiwan.  Initially 
reluctant to intervene in the Taiwan Strait after its bitter experience in the Chinese Civil War, the 
U.S. deployed its 7th Fleet in 1950 to protect Taiwan following the outbreak of the Korean War 
to keep the Communist forces from crossing the Taiwan Strait.  Although the underlying conflicts 
and the tensions between China and Taiwan remain, this uneasy status quo has kept the “peace” 
from both sides and prevented further escalation, which would likely have drafted the U.S. into 
yet another unwanted war.  
The U.S. has accepted this objective reality of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, which 
has sustained the “peace” since 1950.  From the U.S. perspective, it has been in each party’s best 
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interest to maintain a delicate equilibrium, which has allowed both Taiwan and China to grow 
and prosper.  The U.S. has always strongly opposed any unilateral changes of the status quo in 
the Taiwan Strait by either China or Taiwan.  Having played a critical role from the outset in this 
conflict, the U.S. has changed its position several times regarding Taiwan’s legal status.19  While 
the U.S. has continued to provide Taiwan with critical support by way of frequent arms sales and 
other important political and economic assistance, the U.S. has strongly discouraged Taiwan from 

























19 Ibid., 81 to 83.  
20 Ibid., 84 to 85. Taiwan came dangerously close, from the U.S.’s perspective, to moving toward formal 
independence during Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s administration from 2000 to 2008.  
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Chapter II: How Has “Peace” Been Maintained in the Taiwan Strait and How Is It Shifting?  
 
 
1. The Status Quo “Peace” in the Taiwan Strait 
 
None of the parties involved—China, Taiwan, and the U.S.—is entirely content with the 
status quo in the Taiwan Strait, though China is the least receptive while the U.S. is likely the most 
receptive party to the current landscape, with Taiwan in between.  In practice, this objective 
status quo has offered “peace” for all three parties for over seventy years.  What does this 
delicately maintained “peace” mean?  It simply means the absence of war in the Taiwan Strait.  
More precisely, the “peace” here means the absence of a major military conflict in the Taiwan 
Strait irrespective of how fragile or precarious it may seem.   
This “peace” has been delicately maintained primarily through the U.S. policy of “strategic 
ambiguity” adopted during the early 1980s.21  The ambiguity lies in the intentionally vague 
commitment of the U.S. to provide military defense of Taiwan against China.  The policy is 
intentionally ambiguous because it delicately maintains the balance between China and Taiwan 
while maintaining the U.S. interest in preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.   
“Strategic ambiguity” is an apt phrase.  In the words of Thomas Christensen, a political 
scientist and former U.S. Department of State official, deterrence and assurance (or double 
deterrence as coined by other experts) has also described this characteristic of U.S. policy towards 
 
21 The U.S. and Taiwan had a mutual defense treaty which expired on Jan 1, 1980 so the U.S. Taiwan Strait policy 
was clear and unambiguous before then. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-united-states-and-taiwans-
defense-transformation/ 
However, Nancy Tucker traces the origins of strategic ambiguity to the mid-1950s. “It is clear that the 1954-55 
Taiwan Strait crisis had three fundamental, long-term effects on U.S.-Taiwan-China interaction…Washington’s 
difficulties controlling its ally and deterring its adversary produced the enduring if sometimes reviled, policy of 
strategic ambiguity.” See Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk: US-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, Harvard 
University Press, 2009, P.14. 
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Taiwan.2223  This term indicates that the U.S. has deterred China not to attack Taiwan unprovoked, 
but also assured China that it would not support Taiwan’s official independence. Taiwan is 
deterred from declaring official independence, avoiding a possible invasion from China which 
would unnecessarily draw the U.S. into an unwanted conflict in the Taiwan Strait.  The U.S. is 
dissuaded from altering the status quo that allows it to deal with China on a wide range of other 
important issues elsewhere.24  In fact, there is a “firm triangle of military deterrence and political 
dissuasion at work” among the three parties involved.25   Through this deterrence and assurance, 
the status quo “peace” has been delicately maintained.26   
The ways in which this deterrence and assurance has helped maintain the status quo 
“peace” and benefit the three parties involved have been multifold.  Since 1949, China, though 
it never abandoned its quest for the unification of Taiwan, has experienced dramatic domestic 
upheavals, emerging as a superpower in the early 21st century, at times challenging U.S. 
hegemony.  Taiwan, enjoying protection from the U.S. and the status quo “peace,” has been able 
to focus on its economic and social developments, growing into a sizable economic power and a 
vibrant democracy.  The U.S., following a decisive victory at the end of World War II, emerged as 
the undisputed superpower and the world’s hegemon well into the 21st century, without being 
drawn into a major military conflict in the Taiwan Strait.  Since 1949, crises in the Taiwan Strait 
 
22 In this study, I use Thomas Christensen’s words” deterrence and assurance” to describe the policy for it is a 
more precise description than “strategic ambiguity”.  
23 Some experts call this policy “double deterrence” but the concept it describes is essentially the same.  
24 Issues such as international terrorism and environmental issues. 
25 Ross, Robert S., “Stability of Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait”: The National Interest, Fall 2001, P. 69. 
26 Chang, Cordon H and He Di, “The Absence of War in the US-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 
1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?” American Historical Review, vol.98 no 5 (December 1993) pp 1500-
1524. 
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have been largely averted by all three parties coordinating with one another in maintaining the 
status quo “peace.”27   
Another contributing factor that helped maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait was 
the relative slow pace of China’s weapon modernization until the mid-1990s.  However, since 
around 1996, with a rapid weapon modernization program, the Chinese military forces became 
emboldened to challenge the U.S. forces in the Taiwan Strait.  This change in the balance of 
military power in the Taiwan Strait in China’s favor has enabled Chinese leadership to take a far 
more aggressive stance and shift and challenge the status quo.  China has always been willing, 
and militarily greatly increasing its capabilities to take Taiwan by force.28   For two decades from 
around 1996 to 2015, China’s military capabilities in the Taiwan Strait made significant and 
startling progress.29  On the other hand, the U.S. military capabilities to defend Taiwan continued 
to erode during the same period.  The U.S. has moved from “a situation in which it could 
dominate a Taiwan conflict in virtually all respects in 1996 to one in which it could be severely 
tested in a number of areas.”30  While these changing conditions do not spell an unchallenged 
invasion of Taiwan by China, they nevertheless offer Chinese leadership the confidence to pursue 
a highly aggressive stance in the Taiwan Strait.  
 
 
27 Chase, Michael, “Averting a Cross-Strait Crisis” Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 34, February 26, 2019. 
28 Many experts estimate that China has greatly increased these military capabilities to invade Taiwan based on 
the Chinese military hardware, personnel, and rapidly growing budget.  However, invading Taiwan involves a huge 
and complicated military operation so some experts have doubts about whether the invasion can be successful 
due to: (1) the Chinese forces’ experience and overall coordination, (2) the Taiwanese forces’ ability to defend, and 
(3) how quickly the U.S. forces can aid the Taiwanese forces.  Also, even if the invasion is successful, whether the 
Chinese forces can successfully occupy Taiwan is another issue.    
29 “Tallying the U.S.-China Military Scorecard, Relative Capabilities and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017” 
Rand Research Brief, 2015. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9858z1.html 
30 Ibid, 332. 





The status quo in the Taiwan Strait has been shifting fundamentally since the mid-2010s 
due to the shifts in three major underlying conditions.  First, a major factor for this fundamental 
shift is China’s new aggressive stance toward Taiwan.32 In addition to China’s rapid weapon 
modernization program described above since the mid-1990s, the Chinese leadership has 
adopted a highly nationalistic stance in the Taiwan Strait based on its “One China Principle” since 
the mid-2010s.  The most provocative military action initiated by China thus far has been the 
deployment of numerous warplanes near or circling Taiwan.   
 
31 In this chart and immediately under the heading Chinese Capabilities to the far right of the chart (next to the 
dark green box), “Major advantage” should have been “Major disadvantage”.  The “dis” is missing on the Chinese 
side of the color explanation.  
32 Almost all experts in Taiwan and the U.S. surveyed agree that China’s aggressive stance is the most important 
reason causing the shifting of the status quo.  However, a few experts in Taiwan and the U.S. and likely many in 
China consider Tsai’s non-commitment of the “One China” framework to be the most important reason.  
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Second, Taiwan’s growing self-identity may pave the way for a strong movement and 
impetus for declaring Taiwan’s official independence in the future.  Although Taiwan’s official 
independence is far from certain and the ultimate red line for China, even a growing degree of 
Taiwanese identity is seen by China as a challenge to its authority and therefore as something 
that must be contained.  This home-grown identity in Taiwan has been growing steadily, which 
has also played an important role and an important factor in shifting the status quo in the Taiwan 
Strait.  
Third, the U.S.’ long standing adherence to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is evolving 
and another important factor in shifting the status quo there.  Partly in response to China’s 
aggressive stance and Taiwan’s growing self-identity, the U.S. foreign policy circles are shifting 
toward stronger support for Taiwan.  The majority of U.S. policy makers and scholars still support 
maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by following “strategic ambiguity” entailing 
deterrence and assurance, but many disagree on the types and the extent of what an effective 
deterrence mechanism would require.  Many have called for a much tougher stand against China 
by significantly strengthening the de facto U.S.-Taiwan alliance, though the U.S. is still likely to 
continue to adjust its position within its “One China Policy” framework.  Some have openly called 
for conferring Taiwan official diplomatic recognition, though this approach is unlikely to 
materialize in the near future.33  The next step is to examine closely the respective history and 
policy of the three major parties surrounding the Taiwan Strait of. 
 
 
33 Everington, Keoni, “John Bolton Calls on US to Give Diplomatic Recognition to Taiwan”, Taiwan News, April 16, 
2020.  https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3917236 
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2.  China 
A. China’s Ideology and Ambitions 
First, a major factor for the fundamental shift of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is 
China’s new aggressive stance there, which is based on Chinese leadership’s highly authoritarian 
and nationalistic ideology, mainly its “One China Principle”.  Chinese leadership, particularly after 
Xi Jinping took power in 2012, has been promoting this ideology as an alternative to that of liberal 
democracy and free-market economy of the U.S.  Overall, this Chinese leadership has 
aggressively pursued a strategy of “dramatic centralization of authority under personal 
leadership; the intensified penetration of society by the state; the creation of a virtual wall of 
regulations and restrictions that more tightly controls the flow of ideas, culture, and capital into 
and out of the country; and the significant projection of Chinese power.”34  
This authoritarian and nationalistic ideology is rooted in Chinese history.  The traditional 
China Order formed and solidified in the Qin and the Han dynasties (221 BC to 220 AD), an 
imperial state of Confucian-Legalism claiming a Mandate of Heaven with authority to unify and 
rule the whole known world, dominated China’s thinking for much of the past two millennia.35  
Since its founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, despite its harsh rhetoric 
critical of the two millennia-long feudal imperial tradition and its claimed replacement with the 
“new” China, Chinese leadership continued to follow and reinforce this centralized and 
 
34 Economy, Elizabeth C. The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State, Oxford University Press, May 
3, 2018.  In a discussion about this book, Economy thinks there are mixed motivations such as Xi’s personal 
ambition,  China’s ambition, and Xi’s view of himself on par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping behind Xi’s 
aggressive actions.  See “‘The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State’ by Elizabeth C. Economy”, 
Council on Foreign Relations, May 17, 2018.  https://www.cfr.org/event/third-revolution-xi-jinping-and-new-
chinese-state-elizabeth-c-economy 
35 Wang, Fei-Ling, The China Order: Centralia, World Empire, and the Nature of Chinese Power, SUNY Press, 
September 2017. 
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authoritarian tradition on the basis of the Chinese Communist ideology.  Since 1949, China has 
been an authoritarian state ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), ultimately concerned 
with its own survival and maintenance of its monopoly over China.36     
Since the early days of the 1930s and 1940s, the CCP adopted Leninist dogmatism to unify 
the Party and consolidate its power.  Through aggressive purges, thought control, and coercive 
tactics, the CCP reorganized the Party’s upper structure.37  When the CCP was caught in a bitter 
power struggle within the Party and with other forces, such as the Chinese Nationalists and later 
the U.S., the CCP leadership believed it was living in a world of “You-Die, I-Live.”  The leadership 
believes that gaining and keeping absolute power is essential to operate in what they view as a 
brutal world, and the CCP relies on control of personnel, propaganda, and the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) to do so.38 These have continued to define China’s contemporary style of governance 
and leadership.    
Other than authoritarianism, a major source of legitimization of CCP authority that 
dictates China’s foreign policy is nationalism.39  In particular, there is a top-down Chinese 
nationalism promoted by the CCP, which has sought to convince the Chinese people that the CCP 
has extricated China from a "century of humiliation" by foreign powers.  After the Tiananmen 
Square crackdown of the democracy movement in 1989 and being concerned with its legitimacy 
being challenged, the CCP intensified its campaign to indoctrinate its type of traditional 
 
36 McGregor, Richard, The Party, The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers, Harper, June 8th 2010.  
37 Gao, Hua, How the Red Sun Rose: The Origin and Development of the Yan'an Rectification Movement, 1930-1945 
Chinese University Press, Jan 29, 2019.  
38 Eleanor Albert, Eleanor, Beina Xu, Lindsay  Maizland, “The Chinese Communist Party”, Council on Foreign 
Relations, June 6, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party  
For example, the PLA, rather than China’s national army, is actually CCP’s own private armed forces.   
39 Garver, John W. China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations for the People’s Republic of China, Oxford 
University Press, 2016.  Chapter 28. 
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nationalism.  After 1989, Chinese leadership concluded that the biggest mistake the CCP had 
made in allowing the democracy movement to take place in the first place was paying inadequate 
attention to the ideological education of Chinese youth.  Subsequently, the key theme that 
Chinese youth had to learn was “how China had been humiliated by the foreign imperialist 
powers in the old days before 1949 . . . The CCP mandated a curriculum of patriotic and national 
defense education to inoculate young Chinese against peaceful evolution by Western capitalist 
powers led by the U.S.”40  Announced in 1991 and functional by 1994, Chinese leadership initiated 
patriotic education to revive patriotism with the themes of “Chinese tradition and history, and 
national unity and territorial integrity” to replace the “diminishing socialism and fulfil the 
ideological vacuum.41  Some analysts believe the CCP’s “Patriotic Education Campaign” of the 
1990s and 2000s spurred a rise of regime-sponsored Chinese nationalism.42  This campaign 
gained traction and helped lay the groundwork for nationalism that exists in China today.   
Moreover, by the mid-1990s, a bottom-up Chinese nationalism first took its shape that 
was “a genuine and vibrant nationalism which was independent of the regime, and though 
generally supportive of the regime, at times became critical of it.”43  This partly spontaneous, and 
partly government-fed Chinese nationalism enjoys widespread support among Chinese youth.  It 
is to be noted that this type of populist nationalism is a double-edged sword, which may operate 
to garner public support for a nationalistic confrontation against the U.S., or for unifying Taiwan. 
 
40 Ibid, 476. 
41 Chen, Rou-lan, “Chinese Youth Nationalism In a Pressure Cooker” in Dittmer, Lowell (Editor), Taiwan and China, 
Fitful Embrace, University of California Press, October 2017, P. 103.  
42 Shirk, Susan, China: Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise, New York, 
pp. 164-165. 
43 Garver, John W. China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations for the People’s Republic of China, Oxford 
University Press, 2016, Chapter 28. 
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What are China’s ambitions on the heels of its authoritarian and nationalistic ideology?  A 
popular “global ambitions” view is that China’s general ambitions based on its ideology are global 
and not limited to the Asia-Pacific region only.  As a rapidly growing economic and military 
powerhouse since the 1990s and particularly under the current leadership since 2012, China has 
tightened its grip on the internal system and pursued a new international order to serve its 
interests.  This authoritarian and nationalistic leadership style has resulted in a confrontational 
stance on multiple fronts, including Xinjiang, India, the South China Sea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Japan over such various issues as trade, technology, public health, finance, and international 
organizations.  China’s aggressive stance on these areas of concern has caused a deep distrust 
and painted a negative view of China on the international stage.44 
Meanwhile, Chinese leadership has argued not only that China has the "right to 
development," but also that the current model of global governance led by the West is 
deteriorating and should therefore be replaced by a Chinese model of generating wealth without 
a democracy.  The Chinese concept of a “community of common destiny” offers a “China 
solution,” which China claims is a more effective pathway to the future than liberal democracy.  
China has also sought to export facial recognition, policing, and crowd control technologies aimed 
 
44 Silver, Laura, Kat Devlin, Christine Huang,  “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries, 
Majorities say China has handled COVID-19 outbreak poorly”, Pew Research Center, October 6, 2020. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-
countries/?fbclid=IwAR3lnBnCv6F9TIIJWRByL0qmAVLYJ6xuA7464w5Cq3sIjUVtBV5QQSyDtW4  However, many in 
the survey consider China (not the U.S.) to be the dominant economic power. 
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at helping other authoritarian regimes resist calls for change and remain in power.”4546  Xi has 
made clear that his ambitions do not stop at the Asia-Pacific region, and that he is looking to 
remake a global order—the rules of the road—in ways that suit China more.47   
On the other hand,  a “regional ambitions” view, not inconsistent with the “global 
ambitions” view that focuses more on ideology and propaganda, is that China’s ambitions are 
mainly regional and focus more on sovereignty and territories.  This more limited view argues 
that China’s ambitions are in many ways dangerous, but that its sovereignty and territorial 
ambitions are limited to the Asia-Pacific region, or within China’s own periphery only.  This view 
posits that some in the U.S. have exaggerated China’s threats and misjudged its intentions.48  
Under this perspective, while Chinese leadership has practiced "offensive realism" and focused 
on nationalism and worldwide propaganda, its main objective has been to ensure CCP’s survival 
and legitimacy, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  CCP General Secretary Xi may 
be overly ambitious, but this does not mean that the CCP regime is essentially a militant and 
expansionary regime that seeks to communize the world.  With strengthened national power, Xi 
believes that China now has the power to counteract the West and bring back the benefits that 
 




46 Harold, Scott W., Winning the ideological competition with China, The ASAN Forum, March - April 2020 Vol.8, 
No.2. http://www.theasanforum.org/winning-the-ideological-competition-with-
china/http://www.theasanforum.org/winning-the-ideological-competition-with-china/ 
47 Eleanor Albert, Eleanor, Beina Xu, Lindsay  Maizland, “The Chinese Communist Party”, Council on Foreign 
Relations, June 6, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party  
48 Nathan, Andrew, “What Now?” China File, August 5, 2020. 
 https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-now 
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China should have reaped.  This view provides that Xi simply seeks to consolidate the rule of the 
CCP to prevent the West’s attempt to affect a regime change in China.49 
Regardless, China’s regional ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region are clear and “nearly as 
consequential” as its global ambitions.50 51   While China’s sovereignty and territorial ambitions 
may only be regional, though the Asia-Pacific region is a big region, it does not mean that the 
surrounding situations are any less volatile, particularly for Taiwan.  China’s grand strategy, 
expanded under Xi’s leadership, is to undermine U.S.-Asian alliances and replace the  U.S. with 
China as the regional hegemon in East Asia.  Chinese leadership uses various geoeconomic tools 
to influence or coerce weaker regional powers. For instance, it has unveiled the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), modernized its military forces to threaten its neighbors and push the  U.S. beyond 
Japan and the Philippines, and ignored international law to construct artificial islands in the South 
China Sea.52  As former Prime Minister and elder statesman of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, put it, 
China has “a culture 4,000 years old with 1.3 billion people, many of great talent . . . How could 
they not aspire to be number 1 in Asia, and the world?”53 
 
49 Deng, Yuwen, “The Trump Administration's Strategic Misconceptions of the CCP”, New York Times (In Chinese, 
Translated by the author of this study), August 31, 2020.  https://cn.nytimes.com/opinion/20200831/trump-ccp-
strategic-misjudgement/zh-hant/?fbclid=IwAR0esKrhBkNUf8u9EDLBNbWq8SNQb69SLrIWZcPCY2L9W2yb-
DW5PIfeKWM  
50 Mastro, Oriana Skylar, “The Stealth Superpower: How China hid its Global Ambitions”, Foreign Affairs, 
January/February 2019. 
51 Ronkin, Noa, “FSI’s Incoming Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro Discusses Chinese Ambitions, Deteriorating 
U.S.-China Relations”, 2020. 
https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/news/fsi%E2%80%99s-incoming-center-fellow-oriana-mastro-discusses-chinese-
ambitions-deteriorating-us-china 
52 Blackwill, Robert D, “Trump’s Foreign Policies Are Better Than They Seem”, Council of Foreign Affairs, April 2019, 
P. 9.   https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/CSR%2084_Blackwill_Trump_0.pdf 
53 Lee Kuan Yew, quoted in Graham Allison and Robert Blackwill, Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on 
China, the United States, and the World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013): 2. 
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This handout photo taken and released on February 10, 2020 was a Taiwanese F-16 fighter jet flying next to a Chinese H-6 bomber (top) in 
Taiwan's airspace [File: Handout/Taiwan's Defense Ministry/AFP] 
 
B. Why Has China Sought to Alter the Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait?   
A major factor for the shifting of the status quo on the Taiwan Strait has been Chinese 
leadership’s aggressive stance there since the mid-2010s.  But why has China sought to alter the 
status quo there?  China’s regional ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region are clear and dangerous, 
and its most important sovereignty objective is Taiwan, for which they have always indicated  
their willingness to use force if necessary.  
Chinese leadership has long considered Taiwan an inalienable part of China.  Unifying 
Taiwan has been a sacred mission for Chinese leaders since the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949.  There are signs that Chinese leadership is growing impatient and “believes the 
world will sit by if China invades Taiwan.”54  The leadership was impressed by Russian President 
Vladimir Putin’s seizure of Crimea, which met little resistance from the West.  Many among 
China’s elites and even ordinary citizens have embraced China’s military actions in the Taiwan 
 
54 Gries, Peter and Tao Wang, “Will China Seize Taiwan? Wishful Thinking in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington Could 
Spell War in 2019”, Foreign Affairs, February 15, 2019. 
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Strait.55  Dissatisfied with the U.S.-led status quo and armed with a growing economic and military 
power, China has been increasing its pressure to neutralize the  U.S. influence in the region and 
further isolate Taiwan, threatening the “peace” in the Taiwan Strait.5657  
Since the mid-2010s, Chinese leadership appears to speed up its unification timetable for 
Taiwan toward the leadership’s unfinished “mission”.  In addition to taking non-military actions 
hostile to Taiwan to isolate Taiwan internationally, the most provocative and dangerous military 
action taken by Chinese leadership has been its decision to deploy numerous warplanes near or 
circling Taiwan on an almost daily basis.   Occasionally, these warplanes even crossed the “median 
line,” an unofficial center line in the Taiwan Strait established to prevent accidents and reduce 
risks as understood by both sides and then denying a median line ever existed.  The scale and 
audacity of these military actions has been the most brazen action in the Taiwan Strait in decades.   
Chinese leadership’s ideological basis to unify Taiwan rests on the “One China Principle,” 
which provides that (1) there is only “One China''; (2) the PRC is the only legitimate government 
representing China; and (3) Taiwan is a part of China.  In short, there is only one China and Taiwan 
is an inalienable part of it.  The “One China Principle” is a political doctrine Chinese leadership 
has long advocated as part of its desire to unify Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, with total 
legitimacy over “all of China.”  It is rooted in the CCP’s notion and preoccupation of “One China,” 
which largely ignores Taiwan’s own distinct “Chinese” (ethnic Chinese) history and identity, let 




57 “With the World Distracted, China Intimidates Taiwan”, The Economist, April 8, 2020. 
https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/04/08/with-the-world-distracted-china-intimidates-
taiwan?fbclid=IwAR23j1Xu1yYRoqkl5MmV-TeiuuCSV7KSqCOO-LJqMPOG251HeHJf4Uh95dw 
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Chinese did.58  The “One China Principle'' has been ingrained quasi-religiously into the CCP/PRC 
psyche and considered untouchable and nonnegotiable.  It is a political doctrine elevated to a 
“principle” based on the nationalistic notion advanced zealously by the CCP.   
The “One China Principle” is consistent with China’s national strategy and its ambitions to 
create a favorable international environment. Chinese leadership seeks international conditions 
that are conducive to its continued development and compatible with its aspirations for its 
rejuvenation as a “great modern socialist country.” As the leaders view a divided China as a weak 
China, they argue that “full reunification”—unification with Taiwan on Beijing’s terms and 
completing the integration of Hong Kong and Macau by the end of 2049—is a fundamental 
condition of national rejuvenation.”59   
Chinese nationalism claims that Taiwan under the “One China Principle,” has been China’s 
inseparable territory from ancient times and will always be a part of China.  Taiwan was indeed, 
from 1887 to 1895, a province of China’s Qing Dynasty.  After the First Sino-Japanese War in 
1894–95, the Qing Dynasty in 1895 ceded Taiwan to Japan, which ruled the island for 50 years 
until its defeat in World War II in 1945.  After being a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945, Taiwan 
was returned to China under the Republic of China in 1945.  However, Taiwan has never been a 
part of the People’s Republic of China founded in 1949.  Nevertheless, as far as Chinese 
 
58 “Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan to President Xi Jinping of China,  
Joint Declaration by the Representatives of the Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan within the Indigenous Historical 
Justice and Transitional Justice Committee”, January 9, 2019 
https://international.thenewslens.com/article/111667 
59 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020 Annual Report to Congress”, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, P.3 https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-
CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF 
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nationalism is concerned, Taiwan has always been an inalienable part of China, and it is China’s 
sacred mission to unify Taiwan and bring it back to the “motherland.”    
 
● Obsession Over Taiwan 
For generations, school children in China have been taught that Taiwan is part of the 
“motherland.”  Taiwan, the treasure island, has been characterized as one of China’s “core 
interests,” worth pursuing at almost all costs, even if it means being involved in a direct conflict 
with the U.S.  It then begs the question why Taiwan holds such a stronghold in Chinese 
leadership’s psyche. One analyst construes as follows: “There are four key reasons.  Firstly, 
Taiwan holds historic importance . . . Secondly, because the leadership has put such gravity on 
reunification . . . Thirdly, Taiwan holds strategic importance . . . Lastly, the People’s Liberation 
Army’s primary mission-focus has been on Taiwan for the last 15 years, creating concerns that a 
failure to bring Taiwan to heel could cause the PLA to exert authority over the civilian leadership, 
setting back years of reforms and driving China into isolation.”60  Thus, Taiwan’s historical, 
cultural, and strategic importance has driven China’s blatant obsession over Taiwan.  
The public and official position taken by Chinese leadership and virtually all Chinese 
scholars on Taiwan has been that Taiwan’s unification with China is “historically inevitable.”61   
 
60 Zhu, Feng, “Why Taiwan Really Matters to China” China Brief, Volume: 4 Issue: 19, September 30, 2004. 
61 “When the global power landscape truly enters an era in which the "two powers" of China and the United States 
are running neck and neck, it is inevitable that the United States will once again "abandon" Taiwan as a "strategic 
high-risk asset.” ""Strategic high-risk assets": the power landscape, U.S.-China relations, and the transmutation of 
Taiwan's strategic role" By Xin Qiang, head of the Fudan University Taiwan Research Center 信强：复旦大学台湾
研究中心主任，教授 - Source: Journal of Taiwan Studies, 2020, No. 4. - 信强：“战略高危资产”：权力格局、中
美关系与台湾战略角色的嬗变_爱思想  
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Proponents of this deterministic view are often firm believers of offensive realism.62  The 
argument is typically first framed within the context of the power competition between the U.S. 
and China.  Next, it claims that China either has gained or will gain enough economic and military 
prowess to overtake the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait and unify Taiwan sooner or later. China has 
sought to alter the status quo because the U.S. has either lost or will lose its capabilities and 
willingness to defend Taiwan.  Espousing such a view that Taiwan's unification with China is only 
a matter of time, unifying Taiwan is, to China, simply historically inevitable.   
On the other hand, a relatively small number of Chinese scholars apparently do not share 
this official and deterministic view.63  They are less confident about China’s economic and military 
capabilities and willingness to take Taiwan by force due to the prohibitive costs it will require, let 
alone having to oversee Taiwan’s democratic population of over 23 million.64  
Is Chinese leadership’s and Chinese policy makers/scholars' confidence in unifying Taiwan 
justified?  What are the expected benefits and costs for China to unify Taiwan under the “One 
China Principle'' by force?  The expected costs range from very high to unacceptably high.  
However, under the “One China Principle'' taken at its face value, costs are of no concern to 
China.  The leadership has tried to indoctrinate the general public that its “One China Principle '' 
should be pursued at all costs.  In fact, China is said to be willing to risk a war with the U.S. over 
Taiwan, even in a war that China knows that it will lose.  One leading analyst finds that “Chinese 
leaders believe that, if they were to let Taiwan go independent and not respond, they would 
 
62 There are notable exceptions such as Yan, Xuetong, but he is considered by many and himself to hold the 
minority view.   
63 Interview conducted by the author through telephone in the summer of 2020 with an anonymous Chinese 
international relations scholar at a leading University. 
64 A few Chinese military analysts have expressed their concern about the PLA’s capabilities to invade Taiwan from 
a purely military perspective, but they fall short of discussing the inevitable view of Taiwan’s fate. 
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probably be overthrown by their own nationalistic people.  Therefore, I think they would be 
willing to engage in what we might call "self-defeating military adventures'' in order to prevent 
that result, even if they knew they were going to lose.”65  In short, the Chinese leaders may be 
more prone than initially believed to take an irrational decision to go to war with the U.S. over 
Taiwan, regardless of its costs and the prospect of likely defeat.  
Rationality, as defined in international relations, posits that nation states “have 
consistent, ordered preferences, and they calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of 
action in order to maximize their utility in view of those preferences.”66  “[W]e put ourselves in 
the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain 
circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman 
may choose . . . and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under 
these circumstances, is likely to choose.”67 In short, leaders are expected to carefully evaluate a 
given preference’s expected costs and benefits to decide whether it is rational before reaching 
their executive decision.  Under this rational framework, it does not appear rational for China to 
go to war in the Taiwan Strait.  
Of course, a country may still “rationally go to war even though it was certain it would 
lose.  First, the country could value fighting itself, either as an ultimate goal or as a means for 
improving man and society.  Second...the state might choose war because of considerations of 
 
65 Excerpts from David Lampton, “Why the Taiwan Issue is so Dangerous”, Frontline, PBS, 2014. 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/china/experts/taiwan.html 
66 Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
Princeton University Press, 1984, P. 27. 
67 Morgenthau, Hans J, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, Revised, (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 4-15. 
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honor, domestic politics, or international reputation.”6869  In this regard, Chinese leadership could 
conceivably value fighting for the motherland’s honor.  Nevertheless, risking a war with the U.S., 
the country with the strongest military power across the globe, with Chinese leadership’s very 
own survival at stake, still renders it an ill-considered and irrational political decision.   
Nevertheless, Chinese leadership, at least publicly and rhetorically, appear not sufficiently 
concerned with the costs of enforcing the “One China Principle” in the Taiwan Strait.  One finds 
“little in the public domain to indicate that the Chinese political leadership has given this matter 
the attention it deserves.”70  Under this principle, Taiwan appears to be an end in itself, China’s 
“Holy Grail,” and rationality appears to play no or little part in the leadership’s policymaking and 
public discussion. 
How does one explain the leadership’s seemingly irrational position on Taiwan based on 
its “One China Principle''?  One explanation is tactical and argues that the purpose of its harsh 
rhetoric is simply to exaggerate the issue’s importance and enhance the leadership’s self-
confidence in deterring Taiwan and the U.S.   
Another explanation is cultural and Constructivist and argues that “One China” is not 
merely important because it is an important objective fact, but also because it has cultural 
significance to the Chinese.  Material facts acquire meaning through human cognition and social 
interaction, and this meaning is constructed from a “complex and specific mix of history, ideas, 
 
68 Jervis, Robert, “War and Misperceptions”, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, (Spring, 1988),  
P. 677. 
69 Fearon, James D. “Rationalist Explanations for War”, International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), 
pp. 379-414. 
70 Gompert, David C, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Cristina L. Garafolam “War with China, Thinking Through the 
Unthinkable”, The RAND Corporation, 2016, (P. x). 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1140/RAND_RR1140.pdf 
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norms, and beliefs’ exploited by the leadership.71  One must gain this cultural and historical 
understanding to explain China’s behavior toward Taiwan.  The concept of “One China” and the 
political doctrine of “One China Principle” form Chinese leadership’s ideological foundation 
regarding China’s territorial completeness, national greatness, and historical inevitability.72   
 Territorial completeness is likely the most prominent features of the “One China” 
concept.  Translated into modern terminology, territorial completeness can be rephrased roughly 
as state sovereignty valued highly by Chinese leadership, which considers it incomplete without 
having state sovereignty over Taiwan.  For example, the norm of state sovereignty has “created 
a predisposition for non-interference that precedes any “cost analysis States may undertake.”73  
It is not that Chinese leadership is not concerned about the costs and benefits of taking Taiwan 
by force, but the explanation should be based more on China’s constructed beliefs about state 
sovereignty rather than on just a rational pursuit of objectives.  The application of the “One China 
Principle” seems irrational from a rational perspective of costs and benefits.  When viewed from 
the new viewpoint that is cultural and Constructivist, however, it appears more non-rational than 
irrational.  
 
71 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, International Relations, Principal Theories in: Wolfrum, R. (Ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) E. Constructivism 
https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/slaughter/files/722_intlrelprincipaltheories_slaughter_20110509z
g.pdf 
72 The closest concept in U.S. history is perhaps manifest destiny, the nineteenth-century doctrine or belief that 
the expansion of the U.S. throughout the American continents was both justified and inevitable. 
https://americanexperience.si.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Manifest-Destiny-and-U.S-Westward-
Expansion__.pdf  In this study, ideology is defined as “a set of beliefs or principles, especially one which a political 
system, party, or organization is based.” Cambridge Dictionary.  
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/ideology 
73 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, International Relations, Principal Theories in: Wolfrum, R. (Ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) E. Constructivism. 
https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/slaughter/files/722_intlrelprincipaltheories_slaughter_20110509z
g.pdf 
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C. China’s Taiwan Policy in Practice 
  
Provided that China’s Taiwan policy based on its “One China Principle” is “non-rational” 
in principle, this policy in practice is more rational and pragmatic.  Since the early 2000s, Chinese 
leadership has adopted a “dual track” strategy toward Taiwan through which it deterred Taiwan 
from proclaiming official independence with “hard” military actions, but also sought to win the 
hearts and minds of Taiwanese people with “soft” social and economic incentives.74  With this 
“soft” and “hard” (or “carrots” and “sticks”) policy as a background, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office 
issued a statement in 2004 for the first time that the prevention of Taiwan’s official independence 
was China’s top priority for its Taiwan policy.  At the time, China realized that “a policy aimed at 
reunification was unrealistic under the current circumstances and would conflict with its efforts 
to build up the image of a peaceful rising power.  On March 14, 2005, this policy was formalized 
by the Anti-Secession Law passed by the third conference of the Tenth National People’s 
Congress.”75   
Until around 2016, China’s policy of preventing Taiwan’s official independence and 
maintaining the status quo was consistent with the long-standing U.S. policy in the Taiwan Strait.  
Both China and the U.S. effectively prevented Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan’s president from 2002 to 
2008, from further pursuing Taiwan’s official independence, though he came close.  This policy 
also allowed Taiwan’s president from 2008 to 2016, Ma Ying-jeou, to pursue his policy of 
 
74 Templeman, Kharis, “China’s Military Incursions Around Taiwan Aren’t a Sign of Imminent Attack”， The 
Diplomat, October 22, 2020. 
https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/chinas-military-incursions-around-taiwan-arent-a-sign-of-imminent-
attack/?fbclid=IwAR05alC0OfVIjopUuz2cvzNEs-L6KutmcxyWiUmhc_BWiDLUcdz0dzaDY5M 
75 Huang, Jing, Taiwan and China, Fitful Embrace by Lowell Dittmer (Editor), October 2017 
P.240. https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520295988/taiwan-and-china 
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advocating Taiwan to remain in the “One China” framework and pursue a peaceful breakthrough 





From 2012 to 2016, the current Chinese leadership continued the previous leadership’s 
“dual track” strategy with both “soft” and “hard” approaches toward Taiwan.  It continued to 
prevent Taiwan from reaching official independence by further reducing Taiwan’s international 
recognition while providing various economic incentives to win support for the general public in 
Taiwan.  Rather than pressuring its reunification with China, it pursued a policy of preventing 
Taiwan’s official independence.  Ma, the President of Taiwan, was also serving his second term 
during the same period, and Taiwan's relations with China were relatively stable and predictable.  
 
76 Ma’s “One China” framework is the so-called “1992 Consensus”, which is different from China’s “One China” 
framework based on the “One China Principle”.  For the well-known “1992 Consensus”, see Chen, Yu-Jie,  Jerome A. 
Cohen, “China-Taiwan Relations Re-Examined: The “1992 Consensus” and Cross-Strait Agreements” U. Pa. Asian L. 
Rev., v.14. (2019). 
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However, Ma was unable to approve any political agreements or trust-building measures to 
improve Taiwan’s relationship with China due mainly to his own rapid decline of support at home 
in Taiwan.77 China, preoccupied with its changing relations with the U.S. and other priorities, 
appeared willing to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait during that period. 
However, the situation in the Taiwan Strait began to change dramatically after 2016.  Tsai 
Ing-wen, representing the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan and a 
former international trade attorney and law professor, defeated the Nationalists’ candidate and 
was first elected as Taiwan’s president in 2016 and reelected in 2020.   Chinese leadership had 
doubts about Tsai’s commitment to the “One China” framework, and Tsai’s inaugural address for 
her first term in 2016 reflected her moderate China policy.78  However, her insistence on the non-
commitment to the “One China” framework has angered Chinese leadership, which then 
suspended formal communication with Taiwan altogether since 2016.  They have repeatedly 
stressed that Taiwan must accept the “One China” framework to resume communication.   
Dissatisfied with Tsai’s non-commitment to the “One China Principle” or the One China 
framework, Chinese leadership implemented a series of aggressive actions to punish the Tsai 
Administration.79  Since 2016, China sought to isolate Taiwan diplomatically, divide Taiwan 
internally, and threaten Taiwan militarily.  China has maintained its diplomatic pressure on 
Taiwan and reduced Taiwan’s international space by thwarting its efforts to participate in 
international organizations such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil 
 
77 Huang, Jing, Taiwan and China, Fitful Embrace by Lowell Dittmer (Editor), October 2017 
P.242. https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520295988/taiwan-and-china 
78 Paal, Douglas, “China, the U.S. and the Coming Taiwan Transition”, The Diplomat, Dec. 29, 2015. 
https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/china-the-u-s-and-the-coming-taiwan-transition/ 
79 Some in Taiwan’s opposition are also upset about Tsai’s non-commitment to the “One China” framework. 
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Aviation Organization, and the International Criminal Police Organization, and decreasing the 
number of countries that officially recognize Taiwan.80 “It restarted the competition for 
diplomatic recognition, eventually flipping seven of Taiwan’s 22 formal allies, and forced 
international organizations to kick Taiwanese observers out. It stepped up pressure on foreign 
companies, including American-based ones, to list Taiwan as part of China on their websites.“81  
Chinese leadership continues to provide assistance to Taiwan’s opposition and deploy warplanes 
repeatedly to circle Taiwan and violate Taiwan’s airspace.   
Chinese leadership’s position toward Taiwan was made clear by Xi in his January 2, 2019 
address about Taiwan.82  He emphasized that unification of Taiwan to China is the ultimate goal, 
and the model for Taiwan will be “One Country, Two Systems,” the very model which proved a 
disaster in Hong Kong.   Anticipating Xi’s speech about Taiwan, Tsai rejected the model almost 
immediately in her own speech given a few hours later in that same afternoon on January 2, 
2019.  Tsai said that “[t]his morning, China's President Xi Jinping delivered a speech 
commemorating the 40th anniversary of the so-called "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," 
proposing further exploration of a "One Country, Two Systems" scenario for Taiwan . . . I want to 
reiterate that Taiwan absolutely will not accept "One Country, Two Systems." The vast majority 
of Taiwanese also resolutely oppose "One Country, Two Systems," and this opposition is also a 
"Taiwan consensus."”83  Xi’s speech backfired terribly in Taiwan, and Tsai’s rebuttal speech 
 
80 In 2019, China convinced the Solomon Islands and Kiribati to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan.  
81 Templeman, “China’s Military Incursions Around Taiwan Aren’t a Sign of Imminent Attack”. 
82 Xi, Jinping, “Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation 
and Advance China’s Peaceful Reunification” Speech at the Meeting Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Issuance 
of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” January 2, 2019. 习近平在《告台湾同胞书》发表40周年纪念会上的讲话（英文
稿）http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/m/news/201904/t20190412_12155846.htm 
83 President Tsai issues statement on China's President Xi's "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" January 2, 2019 
https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5621 
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quoted above started her dramatic rebound from her party’s dismal performance in the 2018 
local elections.  She was reelected as Taiwan’s president in a landslide victory in the 2020 
election.   
Despite China’s aggressive actions toward Taiwan since 2016, its options appear to be 
limited.  The Taiwan Strait continues to present significant practical obstacles for Chinese 
leadership to take further military actions without risking a full-blown conflict other than the 
frequent deployment of warplanes near or circling Taiwan.  The leadership has banned virtually 
all Chinese tourists from visiting Taiwan and Chinese students from studying in Taiwan.  It has 
“thrown away most of its non-military leverage in a fruitless effort to compel [Tsai’s) endorse its 
one China principle”.84   
China’s aggressive stance toward Taiwan may have backfired because it has quickly 
hardened the de facto alliance between the U.S. and Taiwan militarily, economically, and 
politically.  China itself is locked in an intense competition with the U.S. on multiple fronts.  Other 
than Taiwan, the U.S. is seeking to form a stronger and more structural alliance with its formal 
and de facto allies, such as Japan, Australia, India, and more to counteract China’s advances.  In 
short, Chinese leadership’s Taiwan policy appears to have positioned Taiwan further away from 
unification more than ever.  The leadership’s Taiwan policy, with its “dual track” with a mixture 
of soft and hard approaches, has not worked well.85  Thus far, China has not yet shown its ability 
to respond to the growing sense of Taiwanese identity among the general public of Taiwan. 
Instead, armed with significant and growing economic and military powers, the Chinese leaders 
 
84 Templeman, “China’s Military Incursions Around Taiwan Aren’t a Sign of Imminent Attack”. 
85 “China’s Half-Loving, Half-Threatening Pitch to Taiwan Doesn’t Work”, Economist, Oct. 22, 2020. 
https://www.economist.com/china/2020/10/22/chinas-half-loving-half-threatening-pitch-to-taiwan-doesnt-work   
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seem to believe that the best approach to deal with this growing Taiwanese identity is doubling 
down on its pressure.  
To take Taiwan by force, China does not have to be in a “peer competition” or even a 
“near peer competition” in the global military strength scale to compete with the U.S. , because 
China just has to be competitive in the Taiwan Strait.86  The Chinese leaders simply need to 
convince themselves that the U.S. cannot or will not be able to defend Taiwan effectively.   First, 
it is difficult logistically for the U.S. military to effectively defend Taiwan because it is spread thin 
across many strategic locations worldwide.87 Geographically, the Taiwan Strait is next to China 
and the closest U.S. base from the region is in Okinawa, Japan, still hours away from the Taiwan 
Strait.   Second, China’s military power has been approaching that of the U.S., and China may 
believe that the U.S. lacks the will to defend Taiwan because China considers Taiwan a “core 
interest” while the U.S. does not.   
If China is convinced that the U.S. cannot and will not be able to defend Taiwan effectively, 
what are its options to take Taiwan by force?  A World War II D-Day style of direct amphibious 
invasion is almost certain to be costly and uncertain both militarily and politically.88  Such a direct 
invasion is a huge gamble which can potentially topple Chinese leadership itself.  Perhaps more 
importantly, this D-Day style direct invasion of Taiwan or other less direct military options are 
 
86 Christensen, Thomas, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security 
Policy“, International Security, Spring 2001. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/posing-problems-without-
catching-chinas-rise-and-challenges-us-security-policy 
87 However, US forces have been moving back to the Indo-Pacific Theater. 
88 There are other military options for the Chinese forces which seem less costly such as Air and Maritime 
Blockade, Limited Force or Coercive Options, and Air and Missile Campaign.  However, these other options are 
perhaps more complicated politically for an extended blockade are more likely to invite other countries to 
intervene, not to mention significantly increase the likelihood of a successful US military intervention. 
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-
FINAL.PDF, pp.113-114.  
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likely unnecessary for China to address the essence of the Taiwan issue, because it is more about 
sovereignty than about territorial conquest for Chinese leadership.  No one in Chinese leadership 
shows “any desire to run Taiwan’s day-to-day affairs, nor do they have any pretense that would 
know how….Beijing merely needs Taiwan’s return to an abstract ‘one China’ policy.”89 Therefore, 












89 Christensen, Thomas,“Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security 
Policy“, International Security, Spring 2001, P. 23. 
90 Bowe, Alexander, “China’s Overseas United Front Work Background and Implications for the United States”, 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, August 24, 2018, P.18. 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China's%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20Ba
ckground%20and%20Implications%20for%20US_final_0.pdf 
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2.  Taiwan 
A. What is a Taiwanese identity and what it may lead to?  
What is a Taiwanese identity?  Identity refers to a sense of distinctiveness from one group 
to another.  Taiwanese identity refers to a sense of distinctiveness derived from a Taiwanese 
group rather than from another group (e.g., Chinese), and Taiwanese identity has been growing 
in Taiwan.  Taiwan’s march to consolidate a national identity that is more Taiwanese than Chinese 
is clear.  This trend is particularly evident for an “exclusive Taiwanese identity” (i.e., identifying 
oneself as solely Taiwanese rather than both Taiwanese/Chinese) since 2018.91   
Not only a Taiwanese identity is growing among the Taiwanese in Taiwan, it is likely 
prevalent or growing among the Taiwanese in China.  For over a million of Taiwanese who have 
settled down in China, “Taiwanese are for the most part settled and can easily blend in (in China), 
but they refuse to identify themselves as ‘Chinese.’”92  Many Taiwanese who have settled in China 
for years and could easily blend in still persistently refuse to be assimilated as “Chinese” because 
they feel a sense of distinctiveness, or “Taiwanese identity.”93   
Although the Taiwanese share many cultural traits with the Chinese, the two groups have 
been separated by historical forces over decades and centuries, and they typically lack a common 
set of experiences or values.  Taiwan, an island off the coast of Mainland China, has long been 
inhabited first by indigenous peoples not culturally and ethnically connected to the Chinese.   
 
91 See https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/upload/44/doc/6961/TaiwanChinese.jpg  However, it isn’t clear whether “Chinese” 
refers to a citizen of the PRC or an ethnic Chinese. 
92 Liu, Gang and Weixu Wu, “Mingling but Not Merging: Changes and Continuities in the Identity under 
Reconstruction”, Dittmer, Lowell (Editor), Taiwan and China, Fitful Embrace, October 2017, P. 64.  The survey was 
conducted some time ago and maybe somewhat outdated.  
93 Ibid, 69, but there may be a variation among the Taiwanese settling in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. 
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From the latter period of China’s Ming Dynasty and throughout the Qing Dynasty around 1683-
1895, waves of ethnic Chinese immigrants settled in Taiwan.  In 1887, Taiwan became a province 
of the Qing Dynasty.  In 1895, after the Qing forces were defeated by the Japanese in the first 
Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan was ceded in full sovereignty to Japan and became a Japanese colony 
until the end of World War II in 1945.   Therefore, both the indigenous population and the ethnic 
Chinese immigrant population lived as subjects of the Japanese Empire from 1895 until 1945. 
Before Japan was defeated in World War II in 1945 by the U.S.-led allied forces, U.S. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, facing the possible issue of the future of Taiwan in the early 
1940s, made the decision to support the return of Taiwan to China.  At the time, the Chinese 
Nationalist government-controlled China as the Chinese Communists were a growing guerilla 
force.  Roosevelt did so without giving his decision serious consideration and considering whether 
Taiwan at large wanted to be incorporated into China.94 
After the Chinese Nationalists were defeated by the Chinese Communists and fled 
Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949, Taiwan underwent democratization in the 1980s and 1990s 
during which Taiwan was ruled by a small group of defeated Chinese Nationalists seeking to 
recover Mainland China from the Communists.  The Chinese Nationalists naturally considered 
themselves Chinese and were using Taiwan as a strategic base from which to launch a 
counterattack during the Chinese Civil War, which did not end formally.  It was not until the 1980s 
when Taiwan transformed from an authoritarian state into a democracy, which changed the 
perception of the general Taiwanese public of democratic political values.  
 
94 Bush, Richard C., At Cross Purposes: U.S.—Taiwan Relations since 1942, University of Hawaii Press, 2014, 
Chapter 2.  
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Despite the growing Taiwanese identity, separate from a solely Chinese or jointly 
Taiwanese/Chinese identity, it is unclear whether this growing identity will translate into a 
Taiwanese nationalist movement in the path of Taiwan’s official independence.  Although the 
general public in Taiwan has increasingly identified themselves as solely Taiwanese, this organic 
home grown identity does not necessarily indicate the presence of support for Taiwan’s official 
independence.95  For decades, there has been solid support from the general public in 
maintaining the status quo, namely de facto independence, as opposed to official 
independence.96  This is likely because Taiwan’s general public is “acutely aware that moving 
toward independence swiftly might invite a Chinese military invasion.”  While the public support 
for an independence movement is at its highest in history, “maintaining the status quo forever” 
and “decide later” still enjoyed over 50 percent of support among the public until around 2018.97 
However, starting in 2018-2019, public opinion in Taiwan began to shift dramatically for 
there has been a sharp increase in support for Taiwan’s official independence at a later date and 
a modest increase for official independence as soon as possible.98  The events in Hong Kong that 
discredited China's model of “One Country, Two systems” for the general public in Taiwan is likely 
the cause for this dramatic uptick.99  
 
95 Rigger, Shelley, “Taiwan’s Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and Taiwanese Nationalism” The East-West 
Center Washington, 2006.  
96 Hsiao, Russel, “New Polling Data Reflect Deepening Taiwanese Identity” Commonwealth Magazine, August 2, 
2019.  https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=2502 
97 Chen, Fang-Yu, Austin Wang, Charles K.S. Wu, Yao-Yuan Yeh, “Why Taiwan Continues to Fear a Chinese 
Invasion”, The National Interest, June 26, 2020.  
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-taiwan-continues-fear-chinese-invasion-162879 
98 https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167# (The green line says “move toward independence” in 
Chinese but “maintain status quo, move toward independence” in English).  
99 Wang, Austin, Yao-Yuan Yeh, Charles K.S. Wu, Fang-Yu Chen, “Oppression of Hong Kong Will Make Taiwan 
Further Away From China” 壓迫香港會讓台灣更遠離中國, Apple Daily, November 24, 2020.  
https://tw.appledaily.com/forum/20201124/KPISNAX2LJGL3PHIPCYZNM6D24/?utm_source=Facebook_PicSee&fb
clid=IwAR3IxbBiUOVQ2OL3PAjnYjT2Ldx-OncM4V9m0D-kpf7WubVIuexOlE2k_ag 
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A Taiwanese identity is not only growing, but it is providing the necessary cornerstone on 
which Taiwanese nationalism could advance its appeal among the public.  Taiwanese nationalism 
generally attempts to define a primary Taiwan-centric polity distinct from other polities, 
particularly one that is China-centric.  Taiwan’s official independence, on the other hand, is a 
political movement that aims to establish a sovereign and independent Taiwan state to replace 
the current ROC framework to govern Taiwan.  Taiwan’s official independence is in direct conflict 
with China’s “One China Principle” and China’s ultimate redline.  As a result, virtually all experts 
on the Taiwan Strait agree it is highly provocative to China and is the easiest way to lead to war.  
It remains uncertain whether the growing Taiwanese identity would eventually pave the way for 
Taiwan’s official independence eventually.    
 
(Taiwan’s National Chengchi University's Election Study Center images) 
Against this backdrop, Chinese leadership regards this growing Taiwanese identity as  
creeping independence and suspicious development that must be curtailed at the outset.  The 
emergence of a growing sense of Taiwanese identity worries Chinese leadership because it 
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represents a significant obstacle to China’s efforts to win Taiwan’s hearts and minds to eventual 
reunification.  If this growing Taiwanese identity advanced into a true Taiwanese nationalist 
movement with the goal of eventual official independence, it would be a direct challenge to 
China’s national goal of unifying Taiwan.100  Consequently, this organic homegrown Taiwanese 
identity has begun to alter the status quo “peace” in the Taiwan Strait.   
 
B. Taiwan’s China Policy Since 2016 
 
When Tsai Ing-wen was first elected and sworn in as President of Taiwan in 2016, she 
stated she would promote the following political foundations in her inaugural address: (1) the 
historical fact of the 1992 meeting between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, (2) the ROC’s current 
Constitutional regime, (3) the achievements resulting from negotiations of both sides of the Strait 
over more than two decades, and (4) Taiwan’s democratic principles and popular will.  This 
framework suggested that she was taking a moderate position and would be willing to work with 
China in a pragmatic manner.101 102  However, China described Tsai’s inaugural address as an 
“incomplete test answer” since she did not clearly commit to the “One China” framework.  Since 
then, the Chinese government has terminated any official communication with Taiwan and taking 
an increasingly hardline and nationalistic position toward Taiwan. 
 
100 Brown, David G., “Rising Taiwan Consciousness: A Challenge for China?” in SAISPHERE, Dec. 2006 (5).  
101 Full Text of President Tsai's Inaugural Address, CommonWealth Magazine (vol. 597), May 20, 2016.  
https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=90  
102 Chen, Yu-Jie,  Jerome A. Cohen, “China-Taiwan Relations Re-Examined: The “1992 Consensus” and Cross-Strait 
Agreements” U. Pa. Asian L. Rev., v.14. (2019), P. 16. 
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Reacting to China’s aggressive stance toward Taiwan, Tsai has generally managed the 
situation in the Taiwan Strait in a controlled manner to prevent further destabilization.103  She 
has continually pledged to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and called for China to 
respect Taiwan’s democracy.104  Tsai, a former minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan’s 
cabinet-level agency planning and implementing policies with China, is experienced and skillful 
in sensitive dealings with China.  She is walking a fine line between idealism and practicality.  Her 
objective is to guard Taiwan’s sovereignty and avoid being boxed in by China’s One China 
framework, a policy that is “Pro-Sovereignty, Anti-annexation.”105  At the same time, she is also 
cautious not to provoke China.  
Tsai apparently has been in charge of Taiwan’s China policy herself and manages the 
hyper-sensitive Taiwan/Beijing/Washington triangular relations though her relatively small circle 
of trusted advisors and aides.  She has been mindful to signal to China that Taiwan does not 
intend to unsettle the Taiwan Strait, while reassuring Washington that Taiwan is a predictable 
and reliable partner.106107  She has not advanced the agenda of Taiwan’s official independence, 
disappointing some hard line Taiwan independence supporters of her own political party.108  At 
 
103 However, Chinese leadership and many Chinese scholars have accused Taiwan under Tsai has engaged in 
salami slicing creeping de jure independence, see 金灿荣：李登辉病亡后的新形势里，台海局势会走向武力冲突吗？
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TZF0OWZXlK8 
104 Tsai arguably has changed the status quo somewhat if the status quo for Taiwan is to be in the One China 
framework, whether based on China’s or Taiwan’s own formula under former President Ma’s so-called “1992 
Consensus”.  Tsai has refused to be restricted within the One China framework. 
105 Chen, Fang-Yu, Austin Wang, Charles K.S. Wu,Yao-Yuan Yeh, “Why Taiwan Continues to Fear a Chinese 
Invasion”, The National Interest, June 26, 2020.  
106 Taiwan's military has reportedly followed an order to its pilots "not to fire the first shot" to avoid any possible 
unintended escalation of conflicts with China. 
107 Tsia’s Minister of MAC (Chen, Ming-tong) was her deputy when she was the Minister of MAC herself, and she 
has sent her trusted confidant (Hsiao, Bi-khim) as Taiwan’s representative to the U.S. 
108 However, some in Taiwan have accused Tsai’s government is engaging in creeping independence.  For example, 
the new Taiwanese passport cover will emphasize “Taiwan” rather than “Republic of China”.  But this apparently is 
the result of growing public pressure that many Taiwanese do not, when they present their passport, to be 
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the same time, she also has not committed to the “One China” framework, which has offended 
Chinese leadership and invited criticism from some in Taiwan, particularly from those in the 
opposition party.109 
 
C. Taiwan’s China Policy in the Future 
 
Although Taiwan was never part of the PRC, it is almost certain that Taiwan’s future will 
involve the PRC in a significant way.  Deng Xiaoping, the de facto leader of China from the mid-
1970s to the early 1990s, has proposed a well-known reunification model called “One Country, 
Two Systems.”  Initially the model was designed for Taiwan, but it was first implemented in Hong 
Kong, a British Colony returned to China in 1997.  Hong Kong presents a rare and valuable 
opportunity for China to show how this model might work for Taiwan.   
The Taiwanese, on the other hand, mistrustful of Chinese leadership in general, have 
always been skeptical of the “One Country, Two Systems” model.  They overwhelmingly rejected 
this model after problems began to surface in Hong Kong in the 2010s and the prospect for its 
implementation in Taiwan came to an end in 2020.110  What can Taiwan learn from Hong Kong 
to formulate its policy approach toward China?  
 
confused with Mainland Chinese, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic.  Tsai’s government at least has not 
engaged in official Taiwanese independence systematically under President Chen Shui-bian’s government from 
2000-2008. 
109 According to this study’s survey, a few experts think Tsai’s non-commitment to the “One China” framework 
contributes significantly for the shifting of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. 
110 89% of Taiwanese oppose China's “One Country, Two Systems”, Taiwan News, August 7, 2020. 
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3982562 








● The Hard Lessons of Hong Kong 
Hong Kong presents three simple but hard lessons for Taiwan in dealing with Chinese 
leadership in the future: (1) an authoritarian political system and a liberal legal tradition is likely 
inherently irreconcilable; (2) China’s “One Country, Two Systems” model will be ineffective and 
unworkable in Taiwan; and (3) the current Chinese leadership has proven untrustworthy and 
oppressive, and not a leadership with which Taiwan can expect to forge a cooperative 
partnership. 
Lesson (1): Chinese leadership’s violation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, Hong 
Kong’s Basic Law, and the concept of the rule of law is a lesson of how incompatible an 
authoritarian political system and a liberal legal institution can be.  The Sino-British Joint 
Declaration, a legally binding international treaty signed in 1984 whereby the United Kingdom 
agreed to return Hong Kong to China in 1997, and the Hong Kong Basic Law, enacted by the 
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Chinese National People’s Congress in 1990 to function as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” are 
products of a political compromise.111  Rather than as enforceable legal instruments setting out 
a system of rules designed to regulate the actions of member states, the two documents were  
products of a political compromise between China's political system and Hong Kong’s legal 
tradition.112  Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping needed Hong Kong to maintain its capitalist economy 
as an international financial center, which would be instrumental to the success of his reforms 
and opening policy in China.  However, Deng did not want Hong Kong’s liberal tradition to affect 
China’s political system, and a compromise had to be made.  In the Joint Declaration, the Chinese 
government agreed to “pre-commit itself to democracy.”113  The Chinese government, with a 
weak tradition of the rule of law, voluntarily gave up its own power and granted the people of 
Hong Kong the rights that the Chinese in Mainland did not have.  The Chinese government 
promised to give Hong Kong a “ high degree of autonomy.”  It went even as far as stating “[t]he 
socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 
years.”114   
 
111 The Sino-British Joint Declaration entered into force on May 27, 1985 and was registered at the United Nations 
by the Chinese and British Governments on June 12, 1985.  The Declaration contains no enforcement or dispute 
provisions.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which both the UK and China are States Parties, 
provides only for the suspension of the operation of a treaty in the event that it is breached.   
112 The Oxford English Dictionary defines politics as “the activities associated with the governance of a country or 
area, especially the debate between parties having power.”   Law, meanwhile, is defined by the Oxford English 
Dictionary as “the system of rules which a particular country or community recognizes as regulating the actions of 
its members and which it may enforce by the imposition of its penalties.” 
113 H.C. Kuan, “Escape from Politics: Hong Kong’s Predicament of Political Development '' (1998) 21 International 
Journal of Public Administration 1423, p. 1444. 
114 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, 
https://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd2.htm 
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The Basic Law was also a compromise that the Chinese government had to make to 
appease Hong Kong’s general public and the outside world.  However, the underlying tension 
between the authoritarian Chinese system and the liberal Hong Kong tradition reflected in the 
Basic Law rendered it an unworkable legal instrument to govern.  Nowhere is this tension more 
evident in how the Chief Executive of Hong Kong is selected.  The Basic Law’s Article 45 provided 
as follows: “The Chief Executive shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally 
and be appointed by the Central People's Government. The method for selecting the Chief 
Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in Hong Kong[.]”  Although the 
ultimate aim of the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a 
broadly represented nominating committee is in line with democratic procedures, Chinese 
leadership, preoccupied with political control, was concerned that universal suffrage would 
produce a Chief Executive they would not approve of.  Therefore, the wording of the Article was 
made vague, and the tension has been inherent and evident, which would surface dramatically 
in the years to come. 
Another example of this tension is reflected in the Basic Law’s Article 158: “The power of 
interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress (NPC) . . . authorize the courts of Hong Kong . . . to interpret on their own . . . When the 
Standing Committee makes an interpretation of the provisions concerned, the courts of the 
Region, in applying those provisions, shall follow the interpretation of the Standing Committee.”  
Article 158 provides the NPC Standing Committee the power to authorize the Hong Kong courts 
to interpret their own laws. However, the courts are required to follow the NPC Standing 
Committee’s interpretation.  The uneasy tension between the Hong Kong courts and the NPC 
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Standing Committee has never been resolved.  The incidents since 1997 have demonstrated that 
the Basic Law is a largely ineffective legal instrument, far short of a successful “mini constitution.”   
This underlying tension and incompatibility are also Irreconcilable.  In the first few years 
following the 1997 return of Hong Kong to China, the elections by the election committee for the 
Chief Executive and the LegCo took place in accordance with the Basic Law.115  However, Hong 
Kong government’s attempt to enact a national security law was aborted after a march of an 
estimated half a million people in opposition to the bill.116  After a failed political reform in 2005, 
a compromise was made between the Hong Kong government and the opposition resulting in a 
successful reform in 2010.  Therefore, the Hong Kong government has shown its willingness to 
make compromises if necessary.  However, the key difference between Beijing’s position and the 
opposition's universal suffrage for Hong Kong’s Chief Executive is that Chinese leadership wants 
to make sure that the candidates are all “acceptable” from Beijing’s views.  And the opposition is 
firmly opposed to any “screening” by the nominating committee as this would result in “fake” 
universal suffrage from their view.117   The difference between the two camps lies not just in who 
should be the candidate for the Chief Executive of Hong Kong and its selection processes, but 
also in their fundamental disagreement on key concepts such as “autonomy” and 
“democracy.”118  “An authoritarian regime that seeks to instill a democracy is an inherently 
unstable regime, because it will be taken to task to deliver.”119  As such, an authoritarian political 
 
115 Chen, Albert HY., The Law and Politics of Constitutional Reform and Democratization in Hong Kong, 
unpublished manuscript, November 2014. P. 7 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid, 18. 
118 Ibid., 20. 
119 Kuan, H.C., “Escape from Politics: Hong Kong’s Predicament of Political Development” (1998) 21 International 
Journal of Public Administration 1423, p. 1444. 
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system has proven unable to coexist with a liberal legal tradition in this instance due to their 
inherent incompatibility.   
Lesson (2): China’s gross failure of implementing the “One Country, Two Systems” model 
in Hong Kong is a lesson of how ineffective and unworkable this model will be if implemented in 
Taiwan.  Deng’s “One Country Two Systems,” initially designed for Taiwan, was first adopted in 
Hong Kong as a model of compromise to reconcile the differences between the Chinese socialist 
system and the British capitalist system.  The Joint Declaration and the Basic Laws have been 
ineffective governing legal instruments in Hong Kong.  A series of events, started with the 
moderate Gandhi inspired 2014 “Occupy Central” and the subsequent more radical “Umbrella 
Movement,” the period from 2019 to 2020 witnesses widespread protests triggered by the 
introduction of the Fugitive Offenders amendment bill.  In addition, the 2020 passage of a 
national security law for Hong Kong is a repeated reminder of how ineffective and unworkable 
the “One Country, Two Systems” framework can be. 
In fact, the national security law passed by China’s National People’s Congress in Beijing 
on June 30, 2020, ahead of the 23rd anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover from the British to the 
Chinese on July 1, 1997, effectively dismantled the “One Country, Two Systems” model.  China 
imposed the national security law on Hong Kong, and Chinese leadership did not even pretend 
there were two systems, one in Hong Kong and one in Mainland China, anymore.  Instead, China 
opted for one country and one system.    
Lesson (3): Chinese leadership, if not the CCP itself, has proven unreliable and oppressive, 
particularly when it feels its authority is being challenged.  Chinese leadership, even if may have 
had an initial  intention to honor both the letter and the spirit of the Joint Declaration and the 
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Basic Law, has indicated that the ultimate goal of the political system is no longer the election of 
Hong Kong’s Chief Executive by universal suffrage.  It has no intention to respect the rule of law, 
and its previous promise “One Country, Two Systems” for Hong Kong has not been kept.  China 
expressed in 2017 that the Joint Declaration was simply a “historical document that no longer 
had any practical significance,” dismissing it altogether as a valid international treaty.120  All in all, 
Hong Kong is a “democracy that might never come.”121  
Unlike Deng’s promise that Hong Kong’s “capitalist system and way of life shall remain 
unchanged for 50 years,” Hong Kong’s way of life has changed in a fundamental way, particularly 
since the 2010s.  Time after time, the differences between a large segment of the Hong Kong 
population and the Hong Kong government could not be resolved in a satisfactory manner.   
Chinese leadership, directly or indirectly through the Hong Kong government, has issued legal 
rulings that disqualified democratically elected legislators, kidnapped booksellers and 
businessmen, suppressed press and academic freedoms, expelled foreign journalists, jailed 
prominent dissidents, and used disproportionate and often violent measures against largely-
peaceful protestors.  Furthermore, not only has Chinese leadership repeatedly misjudged and 
mishandled the situations in Hong Kong, it has blamed the West, particularly the U.S., for the 
unfolding crisis in Hong Kong, indicating their misguided perception and lack of responsibility.122   
 
120 “China says Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong no longer has meaning”, Reuters, June 30, 2017. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-anniversary-china/china-says-sino-british-joint-declaration-on-
hong-kong-no-longer-has-meaning-idUSKBN19L1J1 
121 Hgok, Ma, Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society, Hong Kong University 
press, 2007, P. 225. 
122 Nathan, Andrew, “How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis, The Real Reasons Behind Beijing’s Restraint”, Foreign 
Affairs, September 30, 2019. 
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Most Taiwanese have always been skeptical about Chinese leadership in general, and the 
leadership’s proposed model of “One Country, Two Systems” for Taiwan in particular.  The events 
in Hong Kong, first began in the 2010s and culminating in 2020, have simply proven many 
Taiwanese’s skepticism well-founded.  In turn, it suggests that Taiwan’s rejection of China’s 
proposed model of “One Country, Two Systems” has been a prudent one.  There is an inherent 
and irreconcilable incompatibility between China’s authoritarian political system and Taiwan’s 
liberal legal institution.  Furthermore, the lessons learned provide that, in dealing with China's 
current leadership, Taiwanese leadership must always remain vigilant.  Any and all proposals 
from Chinese leadership should be met with a healthy degree of skepticism until Chinese 
leadership can convince the international community that, as former British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher famously said about the reform-minded CPSU General Secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev, it is a leadership that others can “do business with.”  
 
●  Taiwan’s Dilemmas and Uncertain Future 
 
The first dilemma facing Taiwan is having to work around or with Chinese leadership that 
will likely remain unreliable and oppressive.  China plays an important role with Taiwan both 
economically and socially.  China is Taiwan’s biggest trading partner and home to over a million 
or more Taiwanese living and working there.   With Chinese leadership’s increasingly tight 
control over its own economy and society, it is virtually impossible for Taiwan to deal with China 
only economically and socially without being embroiled in difficult political landmines.  
The second dilemma facing Taiwan is the delicate balance of power implicated in the 
triangular U.S-China-Taiwan relationship.  Taiwan’s relationship with both countries will likely 
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continue to operate as a subset of the U.S.-China superpower relationship and competition.  
Given the primarily competitive nature of the U.S.-China relationship, it will remain difficult for 
Taiwan to stay neutral that some in Taiwan have been advocating.  As a result, Taiwan may have 
to choose to take sides with or lean toward either superpower.  Because the U.S. will likely seek 
to position Taiwan closer to its oversight for strategic and ideological reasons, including for 
counterbalancing China, the U.S. will likely continue to offer Taiwan military and economic 
assistance so long as it does not severely undermine its “One China Policy” framework. 
Taiwan’s short-term goal should be to reduce the growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait 
and maintain the status quo “peace.” Any belligerent military threats should be deterred 
effectively.  Taiwan is not well-positioned to deter China, so it will have to partner closely with 
the U.S. because the success of any viable deterrence policy will rely heavily on U.S. policy.  The 
U.S. policy of deterrence and assurance has been capable of sustaining this “peace” for decades.  
Given its history, a stronger application of this approach should remain a sensible option.  
Taiwan can play an important role in these dynamics.  China is a primary and conditional 
revisionist that considers Taiwan’s official independence the primary determining condition.  
Therefore, Taiwanese leadership can continue to emphasize its desire to maintain the status 
quo “peace,” and that Taiwan is already an independent country, so it has no plans to pursue 
official independence.  This will allow Chinese leadership to better deal with the zealous 
nationalism in China favoring a hardline position toward Taiwan.  Taiwan’s mid- and long-term 
goals, however, will largely depend on the direction in which the triangular relationship will 
unfold in the future, particularly the all-important U.S.-China relationship that drives the 
triangular relationship.  Three possible scenarios can be drawn as follows:  
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● First Scenario, the U.S./China Relationship Staying the Course: The U.S. and China 
compete against each other in general and even confront each other in such areas as 
technology and trade, but they sometimes cooperate in a few issues, including climate 
change and counterterrorism.  The U.S.-Taiwan relationship will continue to stay warm, 
albeit inconspicuously, and will likely stay within the U.S. “One China Policy'' framework.   
● Second Scenario, the U.S./China Relationship Shifting Toward More Competition and 
Confrontation: If China continues to be aggressive on multiple fronts surrounding the 
Taiwan Strait, and Taiwan stays non-provocative, then the prospect of warming up of the 
U.S.-Taiwan relationship will grow even further.  The U.S. may gradually shift away from 
its “One China Policy,'' which can lead to more international space and respect for Taiwan, 
and even official recognition of Taiwan from the U.S.  This will be welcomed by many but 
also objected by some in Taiwan, particularly those who favor maintaining the status quo 
and neutrality.  This once unthinkable policy shift will further deteriorate the Taiwan-
China relationship and escalate the conflict in the Taiwan Strait.  Therefore, this scenario 
can entail significant benefits as well as greater risks for Taiwan. 
● Third Scenario, the U.S./China Relationship Shifting Back to More Cooperation and Less 
Confrontation: The U.S. and China may decide to chart out a path for more cooperation 
and less confrontation.  The U.S-China relationship will stabilize and improve gradually. 
Over time, Chinese leadership may become less authoritarian, less aggressive, and less 
revisionist about the Taiwan Strait.  Meanwhile, the prospect of warming up of the U.S.-
Taiwan relationship will decrease accordingly, which will encourage Taiwan to remain as 
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neutral as possible to either superpower.  Therefore, this scenario can entail fewer 
benefits but also fewer risks for Taiwan. 
From the 2020s onward, it appears that the first and second scenarios are more likely 
given China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy and oppressive agenda.  Xi has abolished his term limits, 
chosen not to designate a successor, and plans to stay in power beyond 2022.  The U.S.-China 
relationship is likely to remain primarily competitive or even confrontational, with occasional 
cooperation, in the years to come.  Regardless, Taiwan’s mid-term goal should focus on 
strengthening its military and economic power.  Since the imbalance of military power between 
China and Taiwan is palpable, Taiwan should continue to drive its “Overall Defense Concept” 
(ODC) policy with support from the U.S. to deter and defeat the invading forces 
asymmetrically.123  Taiwan’s primary military objective is likely no longer winning an all-out war 
with China in the Taiwan Strait, but to defend itself from further encroachments from China.  
The defense becomes effective when launching a military attack on Taiwan would impose 
unacceptably high costs on China.  Under this defense policy, Taiwan will likely purchase 
advanced reconnaissance systems and low-cost and mobile defense systems with sea mines, 
among others.  Instead of expensive and offensive items such as advanced aircrafts, Taiwan 
should focus mainly on more affordable and practical items that make more military sense for 
Taiwan.  Furthermore, Taiwan needs to form a de facto strategic alliance with other 
democracies, such as the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India against China.   
 
123 Lee, Hsi-min, Eric Lee, “Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, Explained”, The Diplomat, November 3, 2020. 
 https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/taiwans-overall-defense-concept-explained/  
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Economically, Taiwan needs to strengthen its economy with the U.S. through a free trade 
agreement with the U.S. and other regional partners.  Politically, unless a dramatic shift occurs 
with the U.S. from the “One China Policy,'' Taiwan should remain patient to make policy 
adjustments accordingly.   
Taiwan’s long-term goal, on the other hand, should be about resolving its underlying 
conflict with China and seeking a long-lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait.  Taiwan, along with the 
U.S., needs to convince China that a military solution is unacceptably costly and dangerous, 
particularly to the leadership’s own survival, and therefore that a diplomatic settlement is a 
much more preferable option.  Although this more pragmatic approach will be tested early by 
China’s “One China Principle” and nationalism, such difficulties will need to be addressed with 
sound diplomacy and deterrence.  This is particularly important considering that China’s “One 
Country, Two Systems'' implemented in Hong Kong will indeed be unworkable in Taiwan.   
In order for this pragmatic solution to emerge as a viable path, Chinese leadership needs 
to control the aggressive aspect of Chinese nationalism and fundamentalism that existed in China 
since the mid-1990s.  This belligerent type of Chinese nationalism is disruptive because it strongly 
supports a hardline and inflexible stance on the U.S.-led democratic alliance and Taiwan.  Taiwan 
has developed a liberal democratic model that has proven successful for its people and earned 
respect of the international community.  As Taiwan continues to garner more respect and success 
through its cosmopolitan style of development, it can also serve as an additional layer of 
deterrence against China’s aggression, contributing to the long-lasting peace.  Absent these 
preconditions, both ongoing and future conflicts between China and Taiwan will likely render the 
ultimate goal of long-lasting peace an elusive one.  
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3.  The United States  
 
 A. Why Can’t the U.S. Simply Give up on Taiwan and Not Get Involved?     
 
A third major factor in shifting the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is the U.S. 's evolving 
Taiwan Strait policy.  But why can’t the U.S. simply give up on Taiwan and not get involved in the 
Taiwan Strait?  Taiwan, due to its central location and strategic role as the U.S. Pacific first island 
chain, presents a critical geopolitical value to the U.S.  Ever since the U.S. and China began 
engaging in an increasingly intense strategic and ideological competition on multiple fronts, 
particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan, a democratic and Chinese speaking country also 
provides an important ideological value to the U.S.   
Taiwan occupies an important location in the middle of the first island chain of the U.S., 
and it has been China’s foe and the de-facto ally of the U.S. since 1949.  Abandoning a key de 
facto ally such as Taiwan would seriously undermine the U.S.’s defensive position and credibility 
to other allies in the region such as South Korea and Japan.  Also, Taiwan’s democracy, free 
market economy, and support for universal values such as freedom of speech and the rule of law, 
in stark contrast to authoritarian China, elicits strong support from the U.S.  However, some are 
concerned that strong ties between the U.S. and Taiwan may serve to encourage Taiwan’s official 
independence and intensify U.S. rivalry with China.  Others are concerned that Taiwan is being 
used as a “pawn” by the U.S. in a superpower rivalry with China. 
 






Nevertheless, the long-standing U.S. and Taiwan de-facto alliance appears durable, 
particularly if China and the U.S. continue on their competitive race against each other, and China 
remains aggressive toward Taiwan.  Overall, as U.S.-China competition intensified drastically in 
the late 2010s, U.S-Taiwan relations have been bolstered unprecedentedly.  In this regard, the 
four main factors that drive U.S. efforts to fortify its relations with Taiwan are: (1) tug-of-war 
between China and the U.S. to alter or sustain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; (2) Taiwan’s 
strategic geopolitical value for the U.S. to counterbalance China’s advances; (3) Taiwan’s 
democracy, free market economy, and support for international norms are valued by U.S. 
leadership; and (4) strategic assessment by the U.S. that its de-facto alliance with Taiwan imposes 
additional costs and pressure on China.124 Furthermore, Taiwan’s Tsai administration has made 
continuous efforts to remain a predictable, cooperative partner for the U.S. 
 
124 Sutter, Robert, “The US and Taiwan Embrace Despite China’s Objections, But Will it Last?” Pacific Forum, 
PacNet #58, November 12, 2019 https://mailchi.mp/pacforum/pacnet-58-the-us-and-taiwan?e=dece426278 
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On the contrary, some of the main concerns regarding the U.S.-Taiwan partnership or 
alliance can be summarized as follows: (1) improved ties between the two countries will intensify 
the rivalry between the U.S. and China; (2) U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan will upset U.S. allies 
in the region; (3) Taiwanese leaders may leverage greater U.S. support to move provocatively 
toward official independence; and (4) China’s rising power could prompt strong Chinese 
reactions.125   
As a result, some U.S. scholars and policy makers have advocated curtailed U.S. 
commitment to Taiwan to reduce tensions with China.  This proposed “grand bargain” between 
the U.S. and China is that the U.S. would end its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for China's 
acceptance of the U.S.’s security presence in East Asia.  Proponents of this view argue, 
controversially, that the proposal would reduce the key conflict, namely Taiwan, between the 
U.S. and China and increase trust between the two superpowers.126  Opponents of this “grand 
bargain” proposal consider the proposal difficult to enforce, damaging to the reputation of the 
U.S., and dangerous for the Taiwan Strait as it will likely produce a destabilizing effect on the 
Taiwan Strait.127  
Also, a small number of U.S. and a large number of Chinese officials, scholars, and 
policymakers argue for a view that the U.S. needs to reconsider or abandon its “unsustainable” 
commitment to Taiwan.  They argue the U.S.’s commitment to Taiwan will be increasingly and 
 
125 Ibid. 
126 Chen, Ping-Kuei, Scott L. Kastner, William L. Reed, “A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with Taiwan and 
the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait”  in Dittmer, Lowell (Editor), Taiwan and China, Fitful Embrace, 
University of California Press, October 2017, P. 223. 
127 Chen, Ping-Kuei, “A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the 
Taiwan Strait” P. 223-224. 
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eventually unsustainable since (1) Taiwan is China’s (and not the U.S.’s) “core interest”; (2) 
Chinese pressure on Taiwan and economic and military power will only continue to grow to a 
level at which the U.S. will not be able to match and (3) the U.S. will no longer be able to afford 
or find it worthwhile to defend Taiwan from China, and Taiwan will eventually succumb to China’s 
aggression.128  
Opponents of this “unsustainable” view argue: (1) Taiwan is a significant U.S. interest 
especially in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry in which the U.S. will be able to contain China129; 
(2) despite China’s significant economic and military power, China’s growth is slowing down and 
it may be vulnerable to an economic crisis, and the U.S. will likely remain the dominant player in 
the region; and (3) China’s rigid, unsustainable leadership and political system will undergo an 
internal transition, which will allow Taiwan to operate more independently from China’s control.  
Overall, as of early 2020s, China and the U.S. appear to continue on their competitive race for 
the foreseeable future, and China remains aggressive toward Taiwan. The long-standing U.S. and 





128 John J. Mearsheimer argues that the U.S.’s security commitment to Taiwan will be increasingly unsustainable, 
and Taiwan’s options are limited in his famous article “Say Goodbye to Taiwan”, The National Interest, February 2, 
2014, https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931.  However, he seems to have backtracked his 
position somewhat in 2015 when he met Tsai Ing-Wen, DDP’s Chairwoman at the time who was later elected 
Taiwan’s president in 2016.  He is reported as saying, “The U.S. should neither ‘say goodbye to Taiwan’ nor give up 
on Taiwan”. See “DPP Chairwoman Meets 'Taiwan's Dire Straits' author in Chicago”, Taiwan News, June 2, 2015.  
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/2747743.   More recently, Mearsheimer thinks the U.S. will and will be 
able to contain China.  See “Mearsheimer: 'The US Won't Tolerate China As Peer Competitor'”, DW, September 23, 
2020.  https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-rise-and-conflict-with-us/a-55026173     
129 Ibid. 
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B.  U.S. Policy Toward China 
 
The relationship between the U.S. and China, the two countries with the largest economy 
and military capabilities on the globe, has emerged as the single most important international 
relationship in the world by the early 21st Century.  While the evolution of this complicated 
relationship is beyond the scope of this study, it explores U.S. policy toward China in the context 
of the Taiwan Strait, followed by an overview of U.S. policy toward Taiwan.    
● Engagement and Hedging 
From the 1990s to the mid to late-2010s, U.S. policy (strategy, tactic, or paradigm as 
labeled by some) toward China has generally been that of “engagement.”  It broadly means 
defining a shared vision for the future of their relationship, continuous dialogue at various levels, 
promotion of greater economic and societal interdependence, and integrating China into the 
U.S.-led international order, as exemplified by China’s entry into the World Trade Organization 
in 2000.130  This engagement policy was designed to cultivate a Chinese commitment to the U.S.-
dominated liberal order and, ultimately, to liberalize or even democratize China’s political 
system.  The George H.W. Bush administration openly followed and encouraged the engagement 
policy, as did Clinton and successive administrations.  
 
130 Harding, Harry, “The U.S. and China From Partners to Competitors” to be included in Evan S. Medeiros (ed.), 
Managing Competition: Rethinking U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century, to be published by Georgetown 
University Press. This is a revised version of a paper originally presented to a conference marking the fortieth 
anniversary of the normalization of U.S.-China relations at the Carter Center in January 2019.  The author is deeply 
grateful to Professor Harding’s generosity of sharing this essay. 
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However, the U.S.-China relations have deteriorated steadily and turned competitive over 
time.131  The deterioration can be attributed to the two countries’ glaring differences, such as 
fundamentally different cultures, values, interests, worldviews with particular respect to China’s 
place in the world, and visions about international organizations and norms.  Even in areas where 
these differences do not and should not affect as much as other areas of concern, such as climate 
change, public health, and counterterrorism, the U.S. and China have disagreed frequently on 
how to cooperate.  As a consequence, by the early 2010s, the U.S. adjusted its “engagement” 
policy to one that “engages China while hedging other possibilities,” particularly in strategic areas 
such as Northeast Asia, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait.132  This revised engagement 
and hedging strategy, while continuing to engage and integrate China into the international 
system, added a component to “develop military capabilities to deter, dissuade, and defeat 
Chinese hostility.”133  Engagement was only one part of this two-prong “engage and hedge” 
strategy adopted by the U.S. in response to the rise of China and the growing conflict with China.   
● Failure of Engagement 
After serving as the U.S.' primary approach to its foreign policy toward China for at least 
two decades, the “engagement” policy was regarded, by the mid-2010s, as a partial or complete 
failure.134  Most U.S. analysts and policymakers agree that it has been a failure but disagree on 
the extent of this perceived failure.  Some go as far as claiming that it has been one of the worst 
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or the single worst failure in modern U.S. foreign policymaking.135136   All in all, “engagement” 
proved overly optimistic due to the following reasons: (1) consistent resistance by Chinese 
leadership to counterbalance U.S. influence to loosen its monopoly of power and to liberalize 
China; (2) economic freedom did not lead to political freedom; and (3) even if economic freedom 
does sometimes lead to political freedom, the type of engagement strategy toward China 
employed by the U.S. did not assert enough pressure to pursue liberalization and 
democratization.  
Whether the U.S. policy of engagement is one of the worst foreign policy failures or not, 
it is full of colorful and at times personal stories at the leadership level which provide valuable 
lessons for policymakers and scholars of today.  The interactions between George H.W. Bush of 
the U.S. and Deng Xiaoping of China are particularly instructive.  They capture the nature of the 
U.S.-China relationship, often concealed in a false atmosphere of cooperation.  This case offers 
insights and lessons for future generations of scholars, officials, and policymakers in guiding the 
U.S.’ approach to dealing and working with China in the future. 
U.S. President George H.W. Bush considered himself an old China hand.  For him, China 
had always been a special place.  He served as a bomber pilot in the Pacific theater during the 
Second World War, fighting the Japanese when China was an ally of the U.S.  “Like his mentor 
Richard Nixon, George Bush Senior wanted to improve Sino-American relations as a potential 
counterweight to the Soviets and, also like Nixon, he considered himself an expert on the 
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country.”137  He served for about a year from 1973-1974 as the Head of the U.S. Liaison Office in 
China, the de facto U.S. Ambassador to China, as China began to emerge on the international 
scene.  He cultivated firsthand understanding of China and its values.  Most importantly, he 
developed a friendship with Deng Xiaoping, the de facto leader of China at the time.  “‘I’d love to 
return to China before Deng leaves office entirely.’ . . . ‘I feel I have a special relationship 
there.’”138  The term, lao pengyou in Chinese, meaning an old friend, had a particular meaning, 
applied only to influential foreigners with long experience of working with the Chinese.  Bush 
himself was proud to be called one and said, “I take this whole relationship very personally.”139  
A Bush scholar, Jeffrey Engel, has noted that the president's "near monopolization of China policy 
during the first real crisis [referring to the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989) of his administration 
stands in sharp contrast to the more diffuse managerial style he typically employed."140   
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Scowcroft, A World Transformed, Sep 07, 1999, P. 105. 
140  Engel, Jeffrey A, "A Better World . . . but Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H.W. Bush 
Twenty Years On," Diplomatic History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 2010), pp. 37-38. 
- 65 - 
 
 
U.S President George H.W. Bush exchanges a toast with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.  Photo: AP 
 
Of course, Bush was not naive about Chinese leadership, but judging the direction in 
which U.S. foreign policy unfolded during his term, it appears that he allowed his personal 
feelings to affect his dealings with Deng and China after 1989.  After interacting with Chinese 
leadership for years, he later noted that “‘I do have a relationship there; there is warmth,’” he 
explained. ‘But those kinds of welcomes, those over-the-top words, they’re for show; it’s what 
they do.’”141  It is likely that President Bush overestimated his personal relationship with Deng, 
whom Bush considered an old friend, and he underestimated the regime’s determination to cling 
to its power, ideology and rigid nationalism.  If he thought Deng was an old friend, Deng certainly 
did not treat him as one.  The day after the July 4, 1989 Tiananmen crackdown of the democracy 
movement, President Bush, under pressure from Congress and other Western leaders, 
announced the imposition of modest sanctions as an expression of U.S. disapproval of the 
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violence taking place in Beijing.  At the same time, “Bush attempted to telephone Deng Xiaoping 
to explain that the moral sentiments of the American people made unavoidable some expression 
of US displeasure.  This was the first time an U.S. president has attempted a direct telephone call 
to a Chinese leader.142   
However, Deng refused to take Bush’s call.  Having failed to reach Deng by telephone on 
June 5, Bush sent him a handwritten letter on June 21 stating his firm conviction of good relations 
between China and the U.S., and proposing to send a representative on a secret mission to Beijing 
in July, just after six weeks since the Tiananmen crackdown.143  Bush’s calculation rested on the 
premise that preserving the relations, particularly the economic relations between the U.S. and 
China, would be beneficial for both countries in the long run.  After the Tiananmen crackdown  in 
1989, Bush could only preserve relations with China through backchannels, which he maintained 
throughout his tenure.  Bush hoped that this continuum of relationship with China alongside the 
international community may pave the way for democracy in China: “I believed that the 
commercial contacts between our countries had helped lead to the quest for more freedom. If 
people have commercial incentives, whether it's in China or in other totalitarian systems, the 
move to democracy becomes inexorable.  For this reason, I wanted to avoid cutting off the entire 
commercial relationship. Instead, I decided to suspend military sales and contacts.”144  On the 
other hand, the U.S. press and Congress lobbied for a much tougher approach because they did 
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not find Bush’s conciliatory line acceptable, instead favoring a much more openly, punitive 
route.145 
Meanwhile, China expected “no real countermeasures” from the Bush administration, 
which likely lowered the costs and risks on China in taking a military action.  The CCP was accurate 
in its assessment of what the U.S. response would be, and whether President Bush chose a wise 
course of action is debatable.  Supporters of his China policy claim that the U.S. had only a few 
means of shaping events inside China, so the “preservation of an important relationship was the 
only realistic option[.]” Opponents of his policy, however, counter that the White House deprived 
“the U.S. of a potential source of leverage” by signaling clearly to Beijing that it had nothing to 
worry about from Washington” 146  In turn, Deng underestimated the negative response from the 
international community for its use of military force in squashing the Tiananmen Square protests.  
Shortly before June 4, Deng told his Politburo members that “international negative reaction to 
the use of military force to re-establish control could last a mere few months and dissipate.”  In 
fact, “the moral onus of the Beijing Massacre would continue to nag China for decades.”147   
After the June 1989 event, the Bush administration was strongly criticized for its handling 
of relations with China.  Bush “spent more time and far more space in his memoir reaching out 
to the Communist dictators in China who had murdered their pro-democracy demonstrators in 
1989, than to the Communist reformer in Moscow who had refused to do so.”148  This was a time 
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when U.S. support for the Soviet reformist leader Gorbachev lied more in its appearance than in 
substance.149  Conversely, U.S. support for Deng seemed more in substance than in appearance.  
As New York Times reporter Nicholas Kristof put it, "the White House is subordinating human 
rights to its friendship with Beijing."150  Rumors reportedly circulated "on China's oral network of 
'alleyway news'" describing "a Deng Xiaoping who gloats over his ability to manipulate naive 
American presidents."151  Evaluating the Bush administration’s response to the Tiananmen 
crackdown, a leading China expert Orville Schell opined that “Bush et al. deported themselves in 
a manner so supplicating, so disconnected from what had just occurred, one might think the U.S. 
not China was the offending and inferior power.  But I also felt grudging admiration for Bush’s 
commitment to keeping a channel open...Bush bent over backwards to show deference. He 
flogged his “friendship” with Deng, begged Beijing to remember the critical nature of “the 
relationship.” . . . One can fault Bush for giving too much too soon or even for making America 
responsible for ceding ground to “save the relationship”—a posture that would endure through 
subsequent decades.152 
Was Bush giving too much too soon to China after 1989 just to “save the relationship” 
between the two countries?  After the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, Bush sought to preserve 
relations with China through backchannels, which arguably allowed China to grow economically 
and continue its political oppression. Bush continued “engagement” with China, which the U.S. 
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has continued to maintain following his administration.  If the “engagement” policy towards 
China has been a failure, is Bush at least partly responsible for its failure?  Is Bush partly 
responsible for the existence of China’s highly authoritarian government today? No, for China, 
and not any U.S. president including Bush senior, should be responsible for China’s government.  
However, Bush did seem to have miscalculated after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989 by 
overestimating his personal relationship with Deng and underestimating the Chinese regime’s 
determination to cling to its power.  He did not have to go out of his way to show deference to 
the regime that violently suppressed the pro-democracy demonstrators.  Although Bush was 
hardly alone in his approach, his faith in the engagement strategy and “that markets and trade 
ineluctably would lead to more open societies has held up poorly over the ensuing three decades, 
especially under Xi Jinping and his increasingly militant “China Dream.”153 
 
● Failures of the Failure of Engagement154  
 
Some analysts, on the other hand, have argued that the type of “engagement” policy 
adopted by the U.S. has never been the type that would induce China to change politically.155   
The “engagement” policy inducing China to liberalize and democratize has never been a priority 
of the U.S.  They claim that human rights and democratization have never been a “prominent 
element in the practice of U.S. engagement policy, and little external pressure has been applied.” 
– counter to what Bill Clinton at least claimed[.]156 Engagement should at least encourage political 
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freedom, but the type of engagement various U.S. presidents followed would unlikely lead to 
political freedom.  The fact that China did not become a liberal democracy is not the failure of 
the policy.  Chinese society and economy did become more open in many ways and “purposeful 
diplomatic engagement with the Chinese government has, in fact, brought benefits to the peace, 
security, and prosperity of the U.S.”157 
This “engagement” policy also rests on the counterfactual claim that, had the U.S. never 
adopted the policy, the U.S. would have been better off because it would have been better 
prepared to compete with or contain China earlier.  Without “engagement,” however, the U.S. 
would likely have faced a “hostile, nuclear-armed China alienated from a range of international 
institutions and norms, kept global markets, and with limited societal/cultural exchanges.”158  
Then, was there a better strategy than “engagement”?159 
The answer is not clear, but the “engagement” policy clearly has not been effective since 
it has failed to serve, and arguably worked against, the interests of the U.S.160  The policy has 
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largely failed to change China’s direction or at least alter its aggressive behavior, let alone leading 
China to democratize and liberalize.  Although the Chinese society and economy have become 
more modern and freer in many respects, China clearly has not moved an inch closer to a liberal 
democracy.  China was ruled by authoritarian leadership before the “engagement” policy to 
begin with, but it is now controlled by a much more powerful authoritarian leadership, partly due 
to the “engagement.”  Therefore, the consensus in Washington is that the outdated policy needs 
to be upgraded or replaced outright, particularly at a time when China and the U.S. are constantly 
engaging in intensifying competition and confrontation.   
What is the realistic objective of the U.S. policy toward China?  It is to at least influence 
China’s behavior to be more consistent with international rules and norms.  An increasingly 
authoritarian and powerful China is dangerous to the liberal and democratic international order.   
While a well-defined, updated U.S. China policy has not been formulated with clarity, there has 
been broad acceptance in Washington that the U.S. should stand for values of the liberal order 
characterized by freedom and democracy against China’s oppressive authoritarianism and rigid 
nationalism.  Scholars and policymakers in Washington, liberals and conservatives alike, agree 
that “competition with China requires a vision of the norms, values, and regional order for which 
the US stands . . . a set of values and goals for the region focused on good governance, 
transparency, openness, the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms.”161  Former 
U.S. National Security Adviser and a renowned historian H.R. McMaster believes that “[t]he CCP 
has no intention of playing by the rules associated with international law, trade, or commerce. 
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China’s overall strategy relies on co-option and coercion . . . as well as on concealing the nature 
of China’s true intentions. What makes this strategy potent and dangerous is the integrated 
nature of the party’s efforts across government, industry, academia, and the military.”162  
Moreover, it is widely accepted that China has been infiltrating and influencing U.S. Congress, 
state and local governments, the Chinese American communities, universities, think thanks, 
media, corporations, and technology and research institutions.163  China’s ideological advances 
to the U.S. appear to be more widespread and extensive than commonly believed.164     
Furthermore, as China continues its aggressive and hardline advances, particularly since 
the late 2010s, the U.S. has sought to respond with an incoherent strategy toward China.165166  A 
more coherent and effective U.S. policy toward China is in dire need, especially given China’s 
increasingly offensive stance on multiple fronts.  Facing an increasingly authoritarian and 
aggressive style of Chinese leadership, the U.S. must revise its “engage and hedge” strategy and 
adopt a proper mix of tough and soft tactics toward China, and not repeat the mistakes made by 
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● The Long Shadow of Taiwan 
Taiwan casts a long shadow over the relationship between the U.S. and China.  Both the 
U.S. and China consider their relationship the single most important international relationship 
they each have with any other country.  At the heart of this all-important relationship is the issue 
of Taiwan, considered by China one of the most important and sensitive issues.167 168 “The three-
way relationship among the U.S., China and Taiwan is potentially explosive and figures 
prominently in the calculus for every U.S. president's China policy.”169   
The U.S. has long supported and recognized the Nationalist government in Taiwan as the 
legitimate government of China, even after the Communists, who defeated the Nationalists, 
founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949.  The Nationalist government, having been 
defeated and fled to Taiwan after 1949, still claimed to represent the entire China and was 
recognized by much of the world for decades despite controlling only Taiwan.  This was possible 
only because the U.S. government recognized the Nationalist government as a legitimate 
government of China.   
However, the split between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets that began in the 
1950s set the stage for the U.S. and China to seek a rapprochement, leading to mutual recognition 
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between the two countries.  U.S. President Richard Nixon was determined to pull the U.S. forces 
out of the Vietnam War and improve relations with Beijing to pressure North Vietnam.  For the 
U.S., Beijing was no longer the enemy and China played an important role in counterbalancing 
the Soviet Union and extricating the U.S. from Vietnam.  In 1979, the U.S. officially recognized 
the People’s Republic of China government in Beijing as the legitimate government of China and 
derecognized the Republic of China government in Taipei.  Despite the existing mutual official 
recognition between the U.S. and China, Taiwan remains the key unresolved issue.  The U.S. 
understood China’s desire to be treated as an equal and its sense of historical mission to achieve 
a total civil war victory by unifying Taiwan.  China’s uncompromising stance on Taiwan, however, 
still caught the U.S. by surprise.  
The U.S.’s recognition of the PRC government in China and derecognition of the ROC 
government in Taiwan in 1979 resulted in an immediate crisis about Taiwan’s future.  At stake 
was not only the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan, but also Taiwan’s own survival itself.  
Taiwan depended principally on the U.S. militarily, economically, and politically, and it felt 
abandoned and betrayed by the U.S.’s derecognition.  This sentiment was shared by much of the 
general public in the U.S. as well as many in the U.S. government.  In response to the crisis, U.S. 
Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Acts (TRA), signed into law in 1979.  Along with the three 
joint U.S.-China Communiques in 1972, 1979, and 1982 (the U.S.'s “One China Policy”), and 
supplemented by the Six Assurances in 1982, it formed a solid albeit at times inconsistent, 
foundation of the U.S. policy in the Taiwan Strait.   
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Over the last 40 years, the TRA has worked beyond expectations of many and “stands as 
one of the U.S.’s most durable and successful laws ever established to guide a relationship with 
any foreign power”.170  The TRA allowed the U.S. to maintain a substantive, and yet unofficial 
relationship with Taiwan.  The essence of the TRA is that it established Taiwan’s security and an 
official channel through which the U.S. sold arms to defend Taiwan.  This secured Taiwan’s 
survival and allowed Taiwan to develop its democracy and prosperous economy without 
provoking China. 
At the same time, the U.S.’ commitment and continued selling of arms to Taiwan has been 
a constant source of tension between the U.S. and China.  Taiwan has been a leading customer 
of U.S. weapons to this day, and with critical assistance from the U.S., has been able to maintain 
the military balance of power in the Taiwan Strait until the mid-2010s.  Since then, however, the 
military advantage, both quantitatively and qualitatively, has been tipping in favor of China, the 
trend of which will likely continue in the future.  However, the U.S. has been upgrading its sales 
of arms to Taiwan based on the TRA to address and reduce the further imbalance of military 
power.171  
In addition to the TRA, the U.S. has made inconsistent gestures of commitment in the 
Taiwan Strait through the three joint U.S.-China Communiques signed in 1972, 1979, and 1982 
and the Six Assurances issued in 1982 (declassified in 2020).  The three Communiques are more 
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favorable to China because they were based partly on China’s perspective.  Chinese leadership 
has used these Communiques to strengthen its legitimacy and sovereignty over Taiwan.  The 
intention to normalize relations between the U.S. and China was set forth in the 1972 Shanghai 
Communiqué.  The normalization of relations was then announced in the second communiqué 
in 1979, in which the U.S. “acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and 
Taiwan is part of China.” This language specifically expressed the U.S. position that it 
acknowledges the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China.  This second communique also 
stated that the U.S. recognizes (does not merely acknowledge) that “the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China,” but it will maintain “cultural, 
commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” The third communiqué, 
issued in 1982, stated a conditional pledge of the U.S. to gradually decrease both the quantity 
and quality of arms sales to Taiwan.  
Although the U.S. 's “One China Policy” does echo China’s political doctrine of “One China 
Principle”, the Policy contains a critical distinction from the Principle, the U.S. Policy 
acknowledges (not recognizes) China’s position that Taiwan is part of China, the essence of the 
Principle.  Also, the U.S. insists that the dispute between China and Taiwan be resolved 
peacefully. “The U.S. concern for peaceful resolution is emphasized in all three Joint 
Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Action, and U.S. policy since then.  In a sense, the U.S. ‘One 
China Policy’ might be better called the U.S. ‘Cross-Strait Peaceful Resolution Policy.’”172 
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China has interpreted that the U.S. in the second communique signed in 1979 has 
recognized that Taiwan is part of China.  The U.S., on the other hand, has clearly stated in the 
second communique that it merely acknowledges (not recognizes) the Chinese position.  
However, the U.S. has also stated that it would not “challenge” China’s position in the second 
communique.  Although the U.S. does not challenge China’s position, the distinction between the 
word acknowledge and the word recognize in the Policy is critical because the U.S. policy stops 
short of fully endorsing or agreeing with China’s position.  As a result of this one-word distinction, 
China’s “One China Principle” and the U.S.’s “One China Policy” do not take the same position on 
the critical issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty.  The U.S. has, once again in 1979, after sending its 7th 
Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to defend Taiwan in 1950, effectively denied China’s claim of 
sovereignty over Taiwan.173  Although the distinction is clear, Chinese leadership and the media 
often state or imply, either purposefully or not, that the U.S. has agreed to China’s claim of 
sovereignty over Taiwan.   
Further, China has since interpreted the third communique signed in 1982 to mean that 
the U.S. has made an unconditional commitment to reduce arms sales to Taiwan.  On the other 
hand, the U.S. has always considered any reduction of arms sales as conditional on the third 
communiqué’s subsequent clause emphasizing that both governments “will make every effort to 
adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the thorough settlement of this issue.” Since 
China’s military threat to Taiwan increased substantially in subsequent years, the U.S. has not 
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considered “conditions conducive” to reducing arms sales, particularly given the intent of the 
TRA.174 
Finally, the U.S.’s Six Assurances, about the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, which are more 
favorable to Taiwan. The Six Assurances are a result of the communications between the 
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the de facto U.S. Embassy in Taiwan, and Taiwan’s President 
Chiang Ching-kuo in 1982 shortly before the release of the third communique.  They were to 
provide reassurance that the U.S.-PRC negotiations on the communiqué would not harm 
Taiwan’s interests. The precise text of the Six Assurances was declassified in 2020.175  The Six 
Assurances are that the U.S.: 
▪ Has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan;  
▪ Has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan;  
▪ Will not play a mediation role between Taipei and Beijing;  
▪ Has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act;  
▪ Has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and  





174 “Toward a Stronger U.S.-Taiwan Relationship”, Center of Strategic and International Studies, October 21, 2020,  
P. 6.  https://www.csis.org/analysis/toward-stronger-us-taiwan-relationship 
175 Ibid. 
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C. The U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan Since the 1980s 
 
As indicated in the aforementioned section, the Taiwan Relations Acts (TRA), the three 
joint U.S.-China Communiques which is the U.S.’s “One China Policy,” and the Six Assurances 
collectively formed the foundation of the U.S. policy in the Taiwan Strait to this day.  After 1979, 
when the U.S. established formal diplomatic relations with China, the U.S. nevertheless 
maintained a strong unofficial relationship with Taiwan.   Under the TRA, the U.S. is required to 
assist Taiwan in defending itself by making defensive weapons available to Taiwan. China 
continues to claim Taiwan as its sovereign territory, while the U.S. continues to view Taiwan’s 
status as undetermined. This delicate balancing act allowed the U.S. and China to build a peaceful 
relationship, for the most part, and Taiwan to become a prosperous democracy.   
Over time, the U.S. found that it needed to respond to the changing circumstances, 
including the democratization of Taiwan in the 1980s, the emergence of a Taiwanese identity, a 
growing Chinese military capability to take Taiwan by force, and pressure for modifications of the 
U.S. policy.  The U.S. has repeatedly emphasized that its “One China Policy” would not support 
Taiwan’s official independence or Taiwan’s membership in international organizations whose 
membership was restricted to sovereign states, and adopt a “two-China” (i.e., a dual recognition 
policy).  However, the U.S. also clarified that it would not place quantitative and qualitative limits 
on its arms sales to Taiwan.176 
 
176 Harding, Harry, “Change and Continuity in America’s Taiwan Policy,” presented at a conference on Taiwan and 
regional integration, SOAS Taiwan Programme, University of London, May 2018, revised for conference volume 
edited by Robert Ash and Dafydd Fell, pp. 5-6. The author is deeply grateful for Professor Harding’s sharing of this 
article.   
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 As one of the most salient issues in the U.S.-China relations for decades, Taiwan’s role 
has become even more prominent in the increasingly intense U.S.-China rivalry since the late 
2010s.  Under the highly combative and controversial Trump Administration from 2016 to 2020, 
the U.S. has quickly reinforced its relationship with Taiwan in an unprecedented manner with a 
series of Taiwan-friendly legislations passed by Congress.  In addition, U.S. President Trump 
promoted numerous rounds of arms sales consistent with the “One China Policy.”  However, 
“some argue for an even closer relationship with Taiwan . . . Supporters of this position see 
Taiwan as increasingly important in the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific region’ . . . Others argue that 
the rise of Chinese military power makes the American commitment to Taiwan’s security 
increasingly costly and risky . . . Still others believe that America’s present policy allows enough 
room for flexibility and that any change in either direction would introduce an undesirable level 
of uncertainty.”177 
● Strategic Ambiguity v. Strategic Clarity 
Within its “One China Policy” framework, the U.S. policy toward Taiwan since the 1980s 
is known as “strategic ambiguity.”  The ambiguity lies in the U.S.’s intentional vague commitment 
about when and how it will defend Taiwan militarily if invaded by China unprovoked.  As China 
poses a difficult challenge in the Taiwan Strait, scholars and policymakers in Washington are 
engaging in a heated debate whether the long-standing “strategic ambiguity” policy is outdated.  
 
177 Lin, Syaru Shirley, “Xi Jinping's Taiwan Policy and Its Impact on Cross-Strait Relations”, China Leadership 
Monitor, June 2, 2019, pp. 7-8. http://www.shirleylin.net/publicationsblog/2019/6/4/xi-jinpings-taiwan-policy-and-
its-impact-on-cross-strait-relations 
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“Strategic ambiguity” has been the guiding U.S. policy toward Taiwan since the 1980s, but 
some U.S. analysts have openly advocated replacing it with “strategic clarity,” a clear and nearly 
unconditional commitment to defend Taiwan.178  This change in policy gained support as stronger 
deterrence against China emerged as the new consensus in Washington by the late 2010s.  Other 
analysts claim this significant change in policy “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity” is 
counterproductive and may make the Taiwan Strait more unstable.  
Proponents of “strategic clarity” argue “strategic ambiguity” has run its course and 
“ambiguity is unlikely to deter an increasingly assertive China with growing military capabilities.  
The time has come for the U.S. to introduce a policy of strategic clarity: one that makes explicit 
that the U.S. would respond to any Chinese use of force against Taiwan unprovoked.  Such a 
policy change should strengthen the US.-China relations in the long term by improving deterrence 
and reducing the chances of war in the Taiwan Strait.”179   These analysts argue that “strategic 
ambiguity” is dangerous because it lacks certainty and predictability.  It would be safer if either 
China or Taiwan, or both know what can and cannot be done and where the red lines are, much 
like successful, mutual deterrence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  
Surprisingly, some policymakers and scholars in both Taiwan and China agree with this 
assessment and support “strategic clarity,” which both sides believe will make the Taiwan Strait 
more stable and secure.  Under this view, ambiguity is likely to cause misconceptions and 
 
178 Haass, Richard, David Sacks, “American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous”, Foreign Affairs, September 
2, 2020.   https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-
unambiguous?fbclid=IwAR3kr-jROe47RdCJDJ3YolRgH8KE7uaHGSOHtFmvXvRg74gNXjpMom8YWnw 
179  Ibid. 
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accidents, and clarity is better.180  In turn, proponents of this approach provide that it can allow 
both Chinese and Taiwanese leadership to take rational and pragmatic steps.  
Opponents of “strategic clarity” who advocate the continued adherence to the long-
standing “strategic ambiguity” policy argue that ambiguity has maintained “peace” in the Taiwan 
Strait and worked remarkably well for the past 40 years.  China’s only true fear is Taiwan’s official 
independence, and there is no imminent danger for such in the Taiwan Strait.  Clear red lines are 
dangerous for both China and Taiwan because both sides can be encouraged to take a series of 
provocative actions just short of what is perceived as red lines.  For example, the Chinese leaders 
may take further military actions if they know where the red lines are, increasing the chance of a 
U.S.-China confrontation in the Taiwan Strait.  It could also be seen as a blank check for Taiwan, 
giving it more ammunition to inch closer to declaring official independence.  The U.S. “cannot, 
however, make its willingness to defend Taiwan unconditional. Rather, the U.S. should reserve 
the latitude to judge whether Taipei’s policies are consistent with U.S. interests—and with the 
region’s peace and security.”181  These policymakers argue that Chinese leadership is not 
particularly anxious about Taiwan despite engaging in occasional belligerent statements and 
military exercises, but they are expected to undergo a sensitive period of transition in the early 
2020s.  Therefore, according to them, introducing “strategic clarity,” at least in the early 2020s, 
can be provocative and dangerous.   
 
180 Yan Xuetong, a well-known Chinese international relations scholar and Chiou I-jen, a key Taiwanese policy 
maker and a DPP co-founder both agree that ``strategic clarity” is better.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Nwpy9s-
Pt4&feature=share&fbclid=IwAR1TpMj7xHjBxhe8KJIEvOs8USRDXfDbwrKt-RmoQs2QMwwyWwS7-_MJzNo 
181 Glasser, Bonnie S., “Dire Straits Should American Support for Taiwan Be Ambiguous?”, Foreign Affairs, 
September 24, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-09-24/dire-straits 
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However, in the late 2010s, the U.S. appeared to be moving away from “strategic 
ambiguity” and toward “strategic clarity.”  In the early 2020s, the U.S. appears to have stopped 
short of reaching “clarity” and maintained its existing “ambiguity” policy.  During this period, 
however, the substance of this policy eroded or evolved.  This gradual policy shift is a reaction 
and adjustment to China’s aggressive military stance in the Taiwan Strait and a result of 
advocating for stronger support for Taiwan.  Support for Taiwan in the U.S. has grown steadily 
due to the escalation of the U.S.-China conflict and respect for Taiwan's vibrant democracy and 
open civil society.  “Beijing’s relentless hostility toward Tsai has raised support in Congress and 
the Trump administration for rolling back some of the long-standing restrictions on high-level 
visits — and made Beijing’s objections to new US arms sales ring hollow.”182  Taiwan’s exemplary 
handling of the Covid-19 public health crisis and successful Taiwan lobbying in Washington also 
likely contributed to this policy evolution.   
Due to the U.S.’s own complicated relationship and intense competition with China 
surfaced clearly in the late 2010s.  Particularly under the highly combative and controversial 
Trump Administration, Taiwan’s role became more prominent in the U.S.-China competition.  The 
U.S. has quickly upgraded and reinforced its relationship with Taiwan with a series of 
unprecedented Taiwan-friendly legislations passed by Congress and several rounds of arms sales 
to Taiwan consistent with the “One China Policy” of the U.S.   The extent to which this U.S. 
support for Taiwan will change the dynamics in the Taiwan Strait remains to be seen.  Most 
 
182 Templeman, Kharis, “China’s Military Incursions Around Taiwan Aren’t a Sign of Imminent Attack“, The 
Diplomat, October 22, 2020.  https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/chinas-military-incursions-around-taiwan-arent-a-
sign-of-imminent-attack/?fbclid=IwAR05alC0OfVIjopUuz2cvzNEs-L6KutmcxyWiUmhc_BWiDLUcdz0dzaDY5M 
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Taiwanese generally want their country to earn the respect of the international community as an 
independent country with assistance from the U.S.  Would the U.S. support re-recognition of the 
ROC or even go as far as endorsing Taiwan’s official independence?  Any steps toward such a 
direction would almost certainly invite more U.S.-China confrontation and Chinese aggression 



























183 Harding, Harry, “Change and Continuity in America’s Taiwan Policy,” presented at conference on Taiwan and 
regional integration, SOAS Taiwan Programme, University of London, May 2018, revised for conference volume 
edited by Robert Ash and Dafydd Fell, P. 9. 
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Chapter III: The Theory of “Strategic Triangle”, Key Findings of a Survey of Experts, and 
Policy Recommendations for the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait 
 
1. The Theory of “Strategic Triangle” Explaining the Triangular Relationship 
Among the United States, Taiwan, and China 
 
A. Three patterns: the ménage à trois, the stable marriage, and the 
romantic triangle 
 
The triangular relationship among the U.S.,  Taiwan, and China is unusual in the 
international arena and not easily explained through conventional international theories or 
models.184  This peculiar triangular relationship in which a lesser power (i.e. Taiwan) is caught 
between the two great powers (i.e. the U.S. and China) is explained aptly by political scientist 
Lowell Dittmer’s theory of “strategic triangle.”185  This theory analyzes the internal logic of the 
relationship among three parties, and a “strategic triangle” is a sort of highly complex, but not 
formalized, transactional game among three international parties.  The parties may not even be 
aware that they are playing a game, and may choose to adhere to or disregard its rules at will.  
Yet, as long as they remain “in the situation described by the game,” their policy options will be 
“circumscribed by its constraints and opportunities to some degree.186  In other words, as long 
as the parties remain in the game, the choices available to them will be more or less limited by 
the conditions and rules of the game.  
The “strategic triangle” theory is valuable in understanding and explaining the complex 
triangular relationship of U.S.-Taiwan-China.  However, as acknowledged by Dittmer, the 
 
184 Christensen, Thomas, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict” The Washington 
Quarterly, Autumn 2002. 
185 Dittmer, Lowell, "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis." World Politics, Vol. 33, No. 
4, 1991, pp. 485-515. 
186 Ibid, 486. 
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application of the theory “does not incorporate the sort of formal game theory” developed and 
accepted by many scholars; it is simply an “exploratory venture designed to generate hypotheses 
and perhaps to stimulate more systematic strategic thinking.”187  Nevertheless, it provides a basic 
and useful theoretical foundation on this important triangular relationship, which has not been 
approached from a theoretical way.188 
Based on this theory, a triangular relationship consists of two preconditions and three 
patterns.  The two preconditions are that (1) each party recognizes the strategic condition of the 
three parties, and that (2) the relationship between any two will be affected by each party's 
relationship to the third.  “Within the triangle, there are three distinct patterns: the ménage à 
trois, consisting of mutually positive relationships among all three; the stable marriage, consisting 
of a bilateral relationship excluding the third; and the romantic triangle, consisting of one pivot 
player playing off two suitors.”189   
                                    China (Party C)                                 The United States of America (Party A)                        
                                                                          Taiwan (Party B) 
                                                    Strategic Triangle in the Taiwan Strait 
 
187 Ibid, 485. 
188 Bau, Tzong-Ho, Yu-shan Wu (editors). Revisiting Theories on Cross-Strait Relations 《重新檢視爭辯中的兩岸關係
理論》, Taipei: IPSAS & Wu Nan Publisher, 2009, Preface. https://www.ipsas.sinica.edu.tw/article.php?id=970519 
189 Dittmer, 485.  Ménage à trois is an arrangement in which a married couple and the lover of one of them live 
together. Definitions from Oxford Languages.  Actually, there can be a fourth pattern where all three parties are 
fighting with one another, but it is not applicable to our China/US/Taiwan scenario.  
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B. Three relationships: China and the U.S., China and Taiwan, and the US and 
Taiwan 
 
The first and the third patterns, ménage à trois and romantic triangle, respectively, are 
unlikely to happen in the near future.  The first pattern, ménage à trois, consists of mutually 
positive peaceful relationships among the three parties.  This is the most peaceful and desirable 
pattern of all.  However, it is unlikely due to the rapidly deteriorating relationship since the late 
2010s between China (Party C) and the U.S. (Party A), not to mention the strained relationship 
between China (Party C) and Taiwan (Party B) during the same period.190 191  The third pattern, 
romantic triangle, consisting of one pivot player (presumably the U.S. as Party A, or Taiwan as 
Party B) playing off two suitors (presumably China and Taiwan as Parties C & B, or China and the 
U.S. as Parties C & A) is also unlikely due to the same reason.  
On the other hand, the second pattern, stable marriage, consisting of a bilateral positive 
relationship between the U.S. (Party A) and Taiwan (Party B) excluding the third (China, Party C) 
continues to exist within the U.S.’s “One China Policy” framework.  However, this second pattern 
is generally unstable due to the tension between China (Party C) and the U.S. (Party A), and 
between China (Party C) and Taiwan (Party B).  Moreover, deteriorating relationships among the 
parties can quickly lead to an escalation. 
 
190 Foot, Rosemary, King, Amy. “Assessing the deterioration in China–U.S. relations: U.S. governmental 
perspectives on the economic-security nexus”, China Int Strategy Rev. 1, 39–50 (2019). 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-019-00005-y 
191 Visconti, Beatrice, “Cross-Strait Relations - Unification, Deterioration or Reconciliation”, European Institute for 
Asian Studies, May 2, 2019. 
https://www.eias.org/news/cross-strait-relations-unification-deterioration-or-reconciliation/ 
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In the first pattern, the ménage à trois, which consists of mutually positive relationships 
among all three parties, is an optimal condition for a long-lasting peace.192  Although its prospect 
is dim in the near future, the goal of the U.S. (Party A) and Taiwan (Party B) should be to transform 
the negative relationship between the U.S. and China, as well as between Taiwan and China in 
the long run.  This will be challenging since China (Party C), under the current Chinese leadership 
which took power in 2012, has become increasingly aggressive, toward both the U.S. (Party A) 
and Taiwan (Party B).  However, the first pattern remains the most desirable and peaceful 
pattern.   
Since “there is little prospect for a meaningful improvement in U.S.-China relations” in 
the near future, the tensions between China (Party C) and the U.S. (Party A) are likely to 
remain.193   “Chinese militarization of the South China Sea and exercises around Taiwan will 
continue, eroding the fragility of the current status quo and raising the likelihood of diplomatic 
missteps . . . The U.S. would probably have no choice but to engage more forcefully, such as in 
the South China Sea.”194  Also, the tensions between China (Party C) and Taiwan (Party B) are also 
likely to remain, and the prospect of an improvement is likewise dim in the near future. Given 
the enduring tensions, the second pattern, stable marriage that consists of a positive relationship 
between the U.S. (Party A) and Taiwan (Party B) at the exclusion of China (Party C) is likely to 
remain durable in the foreseeable future.  On the other hand, the first pattern, ménage à trois 
 
192 This relationship is ideal but rare and fragile in reality.  The author’s email exchange with Professor Dittmer, 
November 14, 2020.   
193 US-China relations under a Biden presidency, A report by the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020. 
194 Ibid, 7.  
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that consists of mutually positive peaceful relationships among all three parties, and therefore 
the most desirable pattern of all, will likely remain elusive.195  
2. Key Findings of a Survey of Experts on the Taiwan Strait 
 
This study examines primary sources and secondary sources, and a survey of experts on 
the Taiwan Strait (see Appendix I).  Most of these 24 experts are based in the U.S. and Taiwan.  
16 out of 24, or 66% of them, possess a doctoral degree and three experts lead Taiwan-related 
professional or business associations.  A few are former or current key policymakers in the U.S. 
or Taiwan.  9 are former or current government officials or military officers.  9 out of 24 work in 
think tanks, 10 out of 24 are professors in colleges and universities, and all 24 of them work in 
Taiwan or Taiwan-related fields professionally.  
The author has surveyed expert opinions on the past, current, and future state of the 
Taiwan Strait.  The survey examines expert opinions on causes of the recent changes in the 
Taiwan Strait.  I asked the experts eight open-ended questions and solicited their responses and 
own opinions about the questions asked (see Appendix I: Section 3. Survey Questions and 
Selected Responses).  A few responses have been edited for stylistic consistency, and some have 
not been disclosed per their request.  Below are the survey’s key findings.  
 
 
195 Professor. Dittmer agrees with this statement, but he is not optimistic because there are few successful 
menages and they are “fragile to hold together”.  The author’s email exchange with Professor Dittmer, November 
14, 2020.   
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● On the status quo of the Taiwan Strait:  
● All experts recognize there are two governments on two sides of the Taiwan Strait to 
be the objective status quo.  Almost all recognize that the status quo is fluid.  Most 
think the status quo is shifting and consider Chinese leadership to be the sole or at 
least the primary revisionist of the status quo.  A few consider the Taiwanese 
leadership as the primary revisionist. 
● On peace in the Taiwan Strait:   
● Almost all define peace to mean no war and that Taiwan is free from China’s coercion.  
Most think peace is difficult to achieve in the Taiwan Strait.  A few of them consider 
peace to mean no war and no conflict, and believe the PRC will have to abandon claims 
to Taiwan and renounce the use of force to achieve that. 
● On what international relations theory finds useful in explaining this 
China/US/Taiwan triangular relationship:  
● Many consider balance of power, realism, spiral model, and constructivist theories to 
be applicable.  On the other hand, a few consider these theories not as useful and 
seek a new applicable theory. 
● On why China has wanted to alter this triangular relationship in the Taiwan Strait 
since Xi took power in 2012:  
● Almost all recognize that China considers Taiwan a part of China and a “core interest” 
for which it is willing to pay a very high price.  Most consider China’s “One China 
Principle” to be the guiding principle of China toward Taiwan.  
● On whether the U.S. policy in the Taiwan Strait still maintains the status quo: 
● Almost all think the objective of U.S. policy is still to maintain the status quo.  Some 
think it serves every party’s interest, particularly that of the U.S.  A few think the policy 
is changing or may change in the future to that of “One China, Two Governments.”  At 
least one thinks the U.S. policy is to change the status quo. 
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● On whether the growing Taiwanese identity necessarily develops into Taiwanese 
nationalism?  Will Taiwanese nationalism necessarily develop into de jure/official 
Taiwanese independence:  
● Almost all believe that Taiwanese identity is growing, and Taiwanese nationalism is 
either already here or emerging.  However, that does not necessarily lead to de 
jure/official Taiwanese independence.  Most consider the Taiwanese to be pragmatic 
and will not risk de jure/official Taiwanese independence. 
● On whether the U.S. and Taiwan have the same interests in the Taiwan Strait:  
● Many consider the two’s interests are the same or similar enough that there are no 
fundamental differences.  A few think that while the two’s interests are not identical, 
there are no irreconcilable differences between the two.  
● On whether there is any peace solution that would satisfy all three parties: China, 
the U.S., and Taiwan and why does a long-lasting peace remain elusive: 
● Many consider a peaceful solution difficult to achieve and some are quite pessimistic 
about China’s flexibility.  At least one has suggested “One Country, Two Governments” 
to be a model.   
 
 
3. Policy recommendations for the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait   
 
The primary strategic objective of the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait, at least in the short run, 
should be effective deterrence against China to maintain the status quo “peace” in the Taiwan 
Strait.  In practice, one must decide how much deterrence, aided by some assurance, is needed 
to maintain the status quo.  The U.S. “needs to be able to balance two positions: (1) clear, credible 
commitments to transfer defensive capabilities to Taiwan and, if necessary, to intervene on 
Taiwan’s behalf; and (2) political reassurances that the U.S. does not plan to use it superiority 
now or in the future to harm Beijing’s core security interests by promoting the independence of 
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Taiwan.”196  In other words, the U.S. needs to continue its success in deterring China from 
invading Taiwan and assuring it will not support Taiwan’s official independence.   
About deterrence, it is critical to assess the type of Chinese leadership that the U.S. is 
dealing with because different types of leadership will require different types of response.197  In 
general, the status quo actors should be assured because they are defensive and may be 
provoked into a conflict.  “Revisionist actors, on the other hand, should be robustly deterred, for 
they will exploit enemy weakness and initiate conflicts.”198  On the international stage, whether 
China is a status-quo state generally satisfied with the international order is of considerable 
debate.  In the specific theater of the Taiwan Strait, it is clear that China is dissatisfied with the 
status quo.  Based on Chinese leadership’s track record since the mid-2010s in particular, the 
evidence suggests that China is more of a revisionist than a status quo actor in the Taiwan Strait. 
However, categorizing China’s Taiwan policy as simply either status quo or revisionist is 
likely an oversimplification.   Chinese leaders are likely to be conditional revisionists with Taiwan’s 
official or “creeping” independence as the primary conditions.  They are unlikely to be 
undeterrable ideologues in practice, though their harsh and nonrational rhetoric about unifying 
Taiwan at all costs may paint a different picture.199  China, in reality, is likely to be deterrable and 
should therefore be deterred skillfully.   For the U.S. to continue effectively deterring China from 
taking Taiwan by force, the U.S. needs to remain capable of defending Taiwan.   One of the main 
 
196 Christensen, Thomas, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict” The Washington 
Quarterly, Autumn 2002, P. 8. 
197 Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Press, 1976,  
198 Christensen, Thomas, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict”, P. 8. 
199 See Ibid., 9 about undeterrable ideologues and conditional revisionists. 
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driving forces that China is altering the status quo there is its determination that U.S.’s deterrence 
is no longer credible.  To address this growing perception, the U.S. needs to prove, both 
symbolically and substantively, that it can effectively defend Taiwan and deter China.  If the 
Chinese leaders are conditional revisionists and the main determining condition is Taiwan’s 
official declaration of its independence, the second position that the U.S. should take is firm 
assurance. Under this framework, the U.S. would not support the official independence of 
Taiwan, the condition that likely would turn China into a revisionist state.  Therefore, the U.S. 
needs to balance these two positions.200 
Public policy debates regarding deterrence versus assurance tend to be a false one 
because effective deterrence requires a proper mix of credible threats and sincere assurances.201  
Those who believe in deterrence are often concerned that deterrence is not strong enough to be 
effective, and those who believe in assurance are concerned that deterrence can lead to direct 
conflicts.  A successful policy is not exact science but a work of art, which requires a proper mix 
of deterrence and assurance.  As China becomes more aggressive in the Taiwan Strait to erode 
the U.S.’ deterrence there, the question becomes how to determine the right mix of deterrence 
and assurance for the U.S. and Taiwan.  The consensus is that the U.S.’ deterrence against China 
must be stronger to retain its credibility, but also not too provocative.  
In the early 2020s, Chinese leadership appears reluctant to further advance its military 
agenda in the Taiwan Strait.  None of the three sides, at least in the foreseeable future, seems 
 
200 Ibid, 8. 
201 Ibid, 10. 
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interested in unfolding a war there.202  However, most experts expect that Chinese leadership 
will keep up the pressure in the Taiwan Strait, and accidents do happen.  Therefore, the objective 
for all three should be to prevent an accident that could lead to an escalation.  The immediate 
goal for the U.S. and Taiwan is to reduce the present tensions in the Taiwan Strait.  A stronger 
dose of deterrence and firmer assurance from the U.S. will likely be a prerequisite for effective 
management of the complex Taiwan Strait circumstances.  
In light of the above, the following three policy recommendations can be summarized as 
follows.  These recommendations are based on these premises about the current Chinese 
leadership:       
(1) The leadership places staying in power as its top priority.  It is preoccupied with domestic 
issues such as public health, through which it has been trying to maximize the propaganda value 
of its handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, reviving the economy, and intense competition with 
the U.S., among others on multiple fronts;203  
(2) The leadership is aggressive with a typical “double down” style.  Therefore, measures and 
theaters must be carefully chosen to prevent a series of further countermeasures from China, 
which could lead to a classic tit for tat;204 
 
202 Roy, Denny, “Rumors of War in the Taiwan Strait”, The Diplomat, March 20, 2021.  
https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/rumors-of-war-in-the-taiwan-strait/?fbclid=IwAR3G7BUG0kxVRbX4sysf-
WZEYEbV4uxLAB-MqDS-HxQjsKt7CYLsj_5fbSw 
203 Eleanor Albert, Beina Xu, and Lindsay Maizland,The Chinese Communist Party”, Council on Foreign Relations, 
June 9, 2020.  https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party 
204 Glaser, Bonnie S., Matthew P. Fnaiole, “The 19th Party Congress: A more assertive Chinese foreign policy”, The 
Interpreter, October 26, 2017.  https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/19th-party-congress-more-
assertive-chinese-foreign-policy 
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(3) The leadership is deceptive.  Though aggressive, China may appear compromising at times as 
a manipulative gesture disguised in a false atmosphere of cooperation to hide its true intentions 
of buying time to gain or regain an advantage;205 
(4) The leadership is a deterrable leadership despite its tough rhetoric.  It can be deterred at 
times, particularly when facing a superior and credible show of force.  Recent events have 
demonstrated this in selective theaters (e.g., trade, finance, and sanctions etc.), where the U.S. 
has a clear advantage and China is unable to retaliate effectively.  For example, during the U.S.-
China trade war, the U.S. threatened to raise rates on March 2, 2019, if no deal was reached, but 
later extended the deadline after reporting it was making “substantial progress” in trade 
negotiations. Subsequently, China accepted the U.S.’s proposal.206207 
(5) The leadership will undergo a particularly sensitive period soon.  While its term is due to expire 
in 2022, it has abolished term limits, inviting many criticisms inside and outside of China.  As a 
result, the leadership is expected to be particularly vulnerable in the early 2020s, which presents 
the U.S. a window of opportunity to deter;  
(6) The leadership feeds an increasingly nationalistic population but may not always be able to 
control this zealous nationalism the leadership has helped created.  However, it is important to 
 
205 This point is perhaps less familiar and more difficult for American readers in general since it clashes with their 
basic values of honesty and fair play.  Individual Chinese diplomats can be sophisticated, civilized, and professional, 
but the decision makers often employ different tactics.  See Bernstein, Richard, Ross H. Munro, The Coming 
Conflict with China, Penguin Random House, 1998.  Pye, Lucian, Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain. 1982. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Blackwill, Robert D, Trump’s Foreign Policies Are Better Than They Seem, Council of Foreign Affairs, P.11  
https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/CSR%2084_Blackwill_Trump_0.pdf 
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make a distinction between the leadership and the ordinary Chinese people not responsible for 
the leadership’s action; and  
(7) The leadership may look for excuses to take actions in the Taiwan Strait by portraying the 
U.S.’s actions as an interference with China’s internal affairs preventing China’s rise.208   
 Policy Recommendations 
● The U.S. must upgrade its Taiwan Strait policy by means of stronger deterrence against 
Chinese leadership.  The objective is to maintain the new status quo “peace” in the 
Taiwan Strait by effective deterrence.   
○ The U.S., along with Taiwan, needs to send an unambiguous signal to Chinese 
leadership that a military solution in the Taiwan Strait is costly, dangerous, and 
uncertain, which may affect the leadership’s own survival.  A diplomatic 
settlement is far more preferable.  
○ The U.S., along with Taiwan, should suggest that the common goal is to build a 
“common security framework” with a median line, which is also the red line, to 
avoid the spiral model of “unintended and undesired consequences'' and the 
security dilemma of “overestimating the hostility of the other.”  This would 
counter Chinese leadership’s provocative behavior where it deploys warplanes 
regularly circling Taiwan and occasionally crossing the “median line” in the Taiwan 
Strait.  
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○ If China does not comply, the U.S. should consider measures, with its regional 
allies, to deter the leadership by adopting a tougher China policy in the Taiwan 
Strait.  Since the U.S. and China are engaged in intensive competition in many 
theaters, with the Taiwan Strait being one of the most volatile areas, the U.S. 
should adopt a primarily non-military and whole of the government approach for 
deterrence, particularly working with its regional allies.   
○ The U.S. should carefully select an effective non-military measure where the U.S. 
has a clear advantage to deter China’s provocative behavior.  For example, the 
U.S. can,  in coordination with its allies, consider imposing economic and financial 
sanctions against near top-level CCP Taiwan policymakers and agencies, which 
may include but not limited to, the use of U.S. currency, U.S. visa restrictions, 
freezing of U.S. assets of these officials and their direct family members.209 210 211 
○ The retaliation by the U.S. should be credible and forceful, as in the classic 
deterrence model.  To maximize the retaliation’s effectiveness, retaliation should 
not necessarily be predictable or proportional.  Despite the U.S.’s controversial 
 
209 U.S.’s Trump Administration has repeatedly sanctioned high level Chinese officials/CCP members over Hong 
Kong, and the Biden Administration has maintained that approach.  See “Biden’s First Hong Kong Sanctions 
Maintains Trump’s Approach”, Stratfor, March 17, 2021.   
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/biden-s-first-hong-kong-sanctions-maintains-trump-s-approach 
210 Blackwill, Robert D. and Philip Zelikow, “The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War”, 
Council of Foreign Relations, February 2021. CSR90 The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent 
War (cfr.org).  The authors of this report argue “the issue is not whether the United States would react strongly to 
a Chinese assault on Taiwan. Of course, it would—with political denunciations, diplomatic offensives, economic 
sanctions, UN Security Council debates, and so forth.”  I recommend the U.S. to consider employing some of these 
measures now since Chinese warplanes have been crossing the “median line” in the Taiwan Strait or circling 
Taiwan provocatively on an almost daily basis for some time.   
211 “Treasury No. 2 Adeyemo Sees Sanctions as Strong Policy Tool For Years to Come”, Reuters, April 1, 2021. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-treasury-sanctions-idUSKBN2BP02D 
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and confrontational style adopted in the late 2010s into the early 2020s, some of 
its unpredictable and disproportionate tactics have been successful in pressuring 
and deterring China.   
● The U.S. must upgrade its Taiwan Strait policy by assuring China firmly that Taiwan is 
not considering official independence.  The objective is to maintain the new status quo 
“peace” in the Taiwan Strait by firmer assurance but also to help Taiwan ensure its 
continued success. 
○ The policy of stronger deterrence is likely to be more effective with firmer 
assurance.  The U.S., working with Taiwan, should assure China that all three sides 
are committed to maintaining the “peace” in the Taiwan Strait and that Taiwan is 
not considering official independence.  This assurance can also help pacify Chinese 
nationalism and prevent Chinese leadership from turning the U.S.’s retaliation into 
a propaganda tool.  
○ However, the U.S. must also adjust its Taiwan policy by recognizing Taiwan’s 
growing identity and providing critical military, economic, and political support 
(without overly provoking China) to ensure Taiwan’s success as an alternative 
model of development and a winning narrative toward China.   
○ The U.S. needs to continue to strengthen Taiwan’s military defensive capabilities 
by supporting Taiwan’s sensible “Overall Defense Concept” (ODC) policy, which 
focuses on more affordable and practical rather than expensive and flashy items.  
Also, the U.S. needs to help Taiwan enter into a de facto strategic alliance with 
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other democracies, strengthening its role and strategic value as the center of the 
U.S.’s first island chain. 
○ The U.S. needs to sign a free trade agreement to strengthen Taiwan’s economy.  
The U.S., working with its allies, needs to support Taiwan’s position in 
international organizations that do not require statehood for membership.  
Finally, the U.S. should assist Taiwan to present itself as a small but successful 
ethnic Chinese society that is liberal and democratic, with the rule of law which 
brings significant ideological value to the U.S.-led democratic alliance. 
● The U.S. should engage in dialogue with China to encourage Chinese leadership to be 
pragmatic and innovative about Taiwan’s future, and to elicit compromises to help 
achieve a long-lasting peace, regardless how elusive this may be. The objective is to 
derive a compromise between China’s nationalism based on the “One China Principle” 
and Taiwan’s growing identity.  
○ Since Chinese leadership in the future will still likely remain a product of the CCP 
loyal to the rigid Chinese political system, it will likely cling to strong Chinese 
nationalism based on China’s “One China Principle.”  As a result, there will remain 
a palpable conflict between this aggressive Chinese nationalism and the growing 
Taiwanese identity.   
○ The current “One China Principle '' doctrine and the associated “One Country, Two 
Systems” are in direct conflict with the growing Taiwan identity, which will prove 
incompatible and unacceptable for Taiwan.   
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○ Chinese leadership needs to control the aggressive and fundamentalist form of 
Chinese nationalism, which supports a hardline position toward the U.S.-led 
democratic alliance and Taiwan.  
○ The U.S. should engage in dialogue with China, and encourage Chinese leadership 
to be pragmatic and innovative about Taiwan’s future, though this may be fruitless 
in the short run.  Not only will a military solution by Chinese leadership almost 
certainly be costly, dangerous, and uncertain, China will almost certainly not be 
able to govern Taiwan by force.  
○ Taiwan has developed a liberal democratic model that is successful for its people, 
respected in the world, and can be inspiring for China.  The U.S. should encourage 
Taiwan, with its own growing self-identity, to be open and not exclude its Chinese-
ness.  The U.S should also encourage Taiwan to be pragmatic about its own future, 
including its realistic, liberal, and democratic values.  Absent these conditions, a 
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Chapter IV: Conclusion: A New Status Quo “Peace” and A Long-Lasting Peace in the Taiwan 
Strait 
 
The triangular relationship among the U.S., Taiwan, and China is one of the world’s most 
important, complex, and explosive international relationships.  A delicate balancing act is 
required for all three parties to achieve a state of equilibrium and the objective status quo to 
sustain the “peace” in the Taiwan Strait.  The premise of this study is that this “peace” in the 
Taiwan Strait is being threatened and the status quo is being shifted primarily due to China’s 
aggressive posture, Taiwan’s growing identity, and the reactive and evolving Taiwan Strait 
policy of the U.S. 
However, this temporary and fragile “peace” is not a true and enduring peace for the 
Taiwan Strait, and conflicts and tensions will likely not be eliminated altogether.   Peace, a long-
lasting one, is an ideal permanent condition without wars and underlying conflicts.  Yet the 
Taiwan Strait, even after seven “peaceful” decades, remains a dangerous flashpoint because 
these conflicts remain.   Many experts assess that a true peace would not arrive until Taiwan is 
free of China’s coercion, a tactic often used by Chinese leadership to impose its will to resolve 
differences on both sides.  If taking Taiwan by force is simply not a rational option for China, 
what other realistic options are available?  On the other hand, if Taiwan’s official independence 
is simply not an option for Taiwan without taking great risks, what other realistic options are 
available?  Also, how can the U.S. encourage a peaceful resolution of this stalemate?  A long-
lasting peace should be the ultimate objective, regardless how elusive it may be.  
 Such a long-lasting peace is likely to remain elusive for some time.  The first step to a 
long-lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait likely requires the two conditions:  (1)  China not to use 
force against Taiwan and (2) Taiwan not to declare official independence.  However, China has 
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increased its threat to use force against Taiwan, and a growing Taiwanese identity may lead to a 
movement leading to official independence of Taiwan.  The U.S. and Taiwan currently enjoy a 
warm positive relationship, and the challenging goal for both should be to seek a positive 
relationship with an increasingly aggressive China.  Therefore, either the U.S. or Taiwan must 
accept China’s more aggressive position which seems highly unlikely, or they will have to 
pressure China further back, perhaps even to its pre-2012 position, jeopardizing their relations 
with China in the process.  All in all, a compromise between China’s nationalism based on the 
“One China Principle” and Taiwan’s own growing identity will have to be made before the 
prospect of a long-lasting peace can take its nascent form.  Until then, a true long-lasting peace 
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Appendix I:  The Research Plan 
 
The research plan evaluates primary sources, secondary resources, and a survey of 
experts.  The research plan seeks to investigate how to maintain the status quo “peace” and 
seek a long-lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait and provide a set of policy recommendations. 
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3. Survey Questions and Selected Responses  
● Question (1) STATUS QUO: What is the status quo in the Taiwan Strait? Has the 
status quo shifted since 2016? If so, is it because of China's aggressive stance, the 
US's changing views, Taiwan's growing identity/independence movement, or/and 
other reasons? 
Selected Responses:  
● “We often talk about a “status quo” as though we were trying to maintain a 
situation that had existed for a long time, but looking back I would have to say that 
change is the norm... Beijing does not seem to recognize that its pressure campaign 
is sparking US support and encouraging a separate Taiwanese identity. I see US 
moves as basically reactive to comprehensive and increasing PRC pressure. Taiwan’s 
growing self awareness is foremost the result of their successful, independent 
society, although fear of Chinese invasion is an increasingly relevant shared factor.” 
● “I would say there are at least three status quos: diplomatic, economic, and military. 
Diplomatically the status quo is mutual nonrecognition, China claims full sovereignty 
over Taiwan while Taiwan no longer claims sovereignty over the Chinese mainland 
(Taipei attempted to drop this claim but Beijing insisted it retain it). The military 
status quo is that the mainland has placed massive military assets across the 
Strait ….. Taiwan has now arguably lost qualitative superiority. The economic status 
quo is that there is flourishing trade and investment across the Strait, and this has 
steadily grown over time. Both sides have benefited Taiwan perhaps more because it 
has a consistent trade surplus, but Taiwan is also more dependent on the mainland. 
Taipei has attempted to reduce this dependency by shifting investment to South and 
Southeast Asia, but with only limited success. 
● “There is no status quo in the Taiwan Strait...the environment is constantly 
changing.” 
● “The two sides have become two sovereign states since 1949...Status quo is always 
changing, while mostly changed by China. Since Xi Jinping took power, he has 
become more aggressive toward Taiwan. The speech in Jan 2nd 2019 marked the 
significant and explicit change of the status quo. In particular, the “one-country-two-
system for Taiwan” （一國兩制的台灣方案）becomes the core element of China’s 
rhetoric toward Taiwan. Also, the status quo is changing because China is now 
challenging the global leading role of the US. The US-China relations have turned into 
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competition and no longer quasi-alliance relationship. The dynamics between two 
major powers mostly shape the cross-strait relations.” 
● “China and Taiwan are near collision - a sea change from 2016...All three actors - the 
US, China, Taiwan - share responsibilities. Trump and Tsai are both revisionists in 
their policies toward China...China's aggressive stance is consistently aggressive, and 
at the very beginning of Trump's administration, the relation between China and the 
US is stable. In my opinion the variable is the attitude of the Administration of 
Taiwan.” 
● “The status quo in the domestic politics of each of the three above mentioned actors 
has been changing. For both Washington and Taipei, a threatening China is essential 
to the internal manipulation for the sake of partisan benefit. Taiwan appeared to be 
the only vulnerable point of the Xi Jinping regime in 2016. His internal as well as 
external rivals could easily exploit the Taiwan issue to challenge his leadership.” 
● “The definition of the status quo is contested. Each party has its own definition. 
Objectively, both Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ying-wen, responding to the status-quo 
preference of the TW public, have done nothing to challenge China's fundamental 
interests. China ... is increasingly using coercion to undermine TW's autonomy. Its 
aggressive stance is changing the status quo.” 
● “The cross-Strait status quo is that Taiwan is neither formally independent nor part 
of the PRC. The status quo has changed, because Beijing has pressured the 
administration of Tsai Ing-wen to accept its preferred version of the one China 
principle, and Tsai has refused to make that commitment. The change is due almost 
entirely to pressure from China.” 
● “ Taiwan remains self-governing, and its future decided peacefully by both parties 2. 
Status quo has not changed. 3. The status quo could come under increased under 
pressure due (1) PRC political, diplomatic, economic, military coercion, (2) changing 
demographics and identity on Taiwan (3) deterioration of US-PRC relations.” 
● “The status quo is the existence of two legitimate governments on both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait. One an autocracy (PRC) and the other a government that has evolved 
into a liberal democracy.” 
● “Status quo is a misleading description. From which angle? The world itself is 
dynamic.” 
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● “The shift in the cross-Strait status quo began before 2018 and can be mostly 
attributed to the PRC's increasingly aggressive behavior towards Taiwan.” 
● “The "status quo" is the notion that Taiwan will not declare de jure independence and that 
the PRC will not use force or other coercive means to compel Taiwan to be unified with it. 
The "status quo" has shifted over the years due to the rapid modernization of the Chinese 
military; while Taiwan has not moved toward de jure independence under President Tsai, 
social attitudes favoring independence or de facto independence has also undermined the 
viability of the "status quo." US support for Taiwan serves to reinforce the "status quo" and 
Taiwan's de facto independence.” 
● Question (2) PEACE: What does peace in the Taiwan Strait mean for you? If the 
Taiwan Strait is a flash point, why has there been no major military conflict there 
since 1949? Is this “peace” possible because of China's lack of military capabilities 
until recently, the US's policy of strategic ambiguity, choices made by Taiwan, 
or/and other reasons?" 
Selected Responses:  
● “A Taiwan free of coercive behavior by the PRC. ... While Taiwan remained an 
important issue for the CCP and its legitimacy, the focus was economic renewal and 
an aversion to external political conflicts that may undermine that goal. 2013-today 
– Xi’s arrival and a retrenchment to a renewed commitment to communist/Maoist 
doctrine wrapped in the role of the party as the guarantor of the country’s primacy. 
Taiwan re-emerged, for the first time since the 1950s, as a core issue that needed to 
be resolved sooner rather than later coupled with the potential means to accomplish 
that goal. China’s military is now a threat to end the civil war in the favor of the 
communists. Is this “peace” possible because of China's lack of military capabilities 
until recently, the US's policy of strategic ambiguity, choices made by Taiwan, or/and 
other reasons? There are myriad factors as noted above.” 
● “Peace to me means the PRC allowing Taiwan to set its own policy free from 
coercion...It is appropriate to call the Taiwan Strait a “flashpoint” because the PRC is 
continually building a comprehensive capability to capture Taiwan by force with the 
Strait being key terrain for such a struggle...” 
● “Peace means the absence of major conflict to resolve Taiwan's status...Why no 
major conflict 49-now? (1) It has not been in interest of China up to now since it has 
had larger national security objectives (this could be changing) (2) US military 
deterrence against China (some say this is weakening) (3) PLA lack of real ability to 
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attempt take island by force (this is changing) (4) Cautious Taiwan policies (this could 
change...remember Chen Shui-bian)” 
● “Peace means no war. Peace has been maintained in the Strait since 1949 thanks to 
the preponderance of US power and skillful management, including but not limited to 
"strategic ambiguity." China's rapid rise, especially its military modernization, eroded 
the basis for peace. But Taiwan's pursuit of Independence is probably the most direct 
cause…” 
● “...peace means that Taiwan is exempt from military involvement, directly as well as 
indirectly, in any aggression taking place anywhere in the world. Such a practice 
would include renouncing the use of force targeting anywhere inside the PRC 
territories or supporting the US invasion anywhere else in the world. Peace does not 
mean lack of military confrontation, though. Willingness to engage in military 
defense is the other side of peace commitment.” 
● “...no war. There has been peace in this sense since the advent of reform and 
opening in 1978. This peace is fragile because of provocations and threats on both 
sides. These might be eliminated by agreements met in cross-Strait negotiations, but 
these have been stymied since the end of the Ma regime by disputes in which China 
has set conditions for opening talks that Taipei under Tsai has refused in principle to 
meet.” 
● “Since China is unlikely to give up the goal of unification (actually it is annexation), 
peace consists of consecutive and successful deterrence. The deterrence mainly 
comes from (1) Taiwan’s defense capability, (2) China’s lack of military capability, (3) 
difficulty of landing battle if invading Taiwan, and (4) perhaps most importantly, US’ 
commitment in the region. China knows it is not time to fight against the US yet.” 
● “Peace means no violent confrontations between the two sides of the Strait. Taiwan 
and the PRC have been in at least a cold peace since 1979, when the shelling of 
offshore islands Kinmen and Matsu ceased. The "peace" has been made possible by 
the US normalization of relations with the PRC, in combination with the US policy of 
strategic ambiguity with respect to the defense of Taiwan.” 
● “The key is that all geopolitical stakeholders have been cautiously achieving the 
equilibrium over the years in the Taiwan Strait. The dynamic equilibrium which the 
stakeholders have consistently achieved over the years is instrumental in the 
peacemaking.” 
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● “Peace in the Taiwan Strait can only be achieved through Beijing, Washington, and 
other governments acknowledging if not recognizing the legitimacy of the ROC 
(Taiwan). Beijing has been either deterred from use of force or believes it too 
unnecessary to achieve its goal of One Country Two Systems”. 
● “Peace means 1) the absence of war; 2) the non-use of non-violent but coercive tools 
of influence; 3) a willingness by all sides to peacefully coexist and cooperate where 
possible.” 
● “The US has been thus able to deter China from invading Taiwan and in the early 
years prevent Chiang Kai-Shek from trying to retake China. This may not be the case 
indefinitely.” 
● “China lacks the capacity and confronts high costs if it chooses military means. US 
diplomacy and Taiwan pragmatism reinforced these facts.” 
● “...weaknesses in military capability of both CCP and KMT + US interposition of itself 
between them--"neutralization" of the Taiwan Strait.” 
● “There is the first and the second Taiwan Strait Crisis? “ 
● “The One China Policy, China's focus on domestic development,and Taiwan's 
restraint have kept the peace.” 
● “Peace doesn't mean the absence of war, but rather the absence of conflict. 
Therefore, peace would be a context in which the PRC abandons claims to Taiwan 
and renounces the possibility of using force against it to compel a solution.” 
 
● Question (3) THEORY: What international relations theory, if any, do you find most 
useful in explaining this China/US/Taiwan triangular relationship? Do you consider 
Offensive Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, Deterrence Model, Spiral Model, 
Balance of Power, or/ any other theories/models helpful in explaining this 
relationship? 
Selected Responses:  
● “The PRC’s perspective reminds me most of offensive realism: seeking regional 
primacy while presenting entanglements to suppress major powers in other 
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regions...Taiwan’s balancing act keeps it keenly attuned to the governing 
philosophies of the two great powers…” 
● “...constructivism (Taiwan is "part of China", a leftover piece of the Chinese civil war, 
and not an independent state--i.e. The Westphalian system "constructs" rights and 
recognitions for "states" in the inter-state system, and BOTH Taipei and Beijing have 
traditionally shared this "constructed" idea about what the confrontation is about) is 
one key. Deterrence Models are helpful to explain why the US role has worked to 
keep the peace since 1979, especially with the massive shift in the Taiwan-PRC 
balance of power since the 1990s…’ 
● “Balance of Power: The US changed the triangular relationship in the 1970s due to 
the goal of balancing Russia. Now, conflicts may occur when China breaks the 
balance of power. The power transition theory can explain the relationship between 
China and the US. It is not possible for the US to wait and see how China rises. 
Constructivism may also work. All players send signals and learn from how to interact 
with others in this relationship.” 
● “Relational IR that exposes the different relational cultures and contexts of different 
actors explains how they can misconceive the incentives of one another. Postcolonial 
IR suggests how Taiwan's political system features undecidability that undermines 
the validity of structural explanation.” 
● “No one theory captures the complexity of the Taiwan situation. Of all the options, I 
prefer defensive realism combined with the spiral model. However, I fear that China's 
motivation is changing from fear to greed, and that we are moving from a world of 
defensive realism to offensive realism.” 
● “We need a tailor-made one for us.” 
● “All theories are relevant, every single one of them, to one or more of the six 
dimensions of the cross-strait relationship: three domestic politics and three bilateral 
relations.” 
● “...balance of power and deterrence.” 
● “Balance of Power is the most explanatory one.” 
● “I don't think there is any theory that is of any use in this respect.” 
● “Realism with some constructivist aspects.” 
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● “I have little use for such stuff.” 
● “Realist. So time is running out.” 
● “Constructivism” 
● “Offensive realism and deterrence model, with balance of power for the US-China axis.” 
● Question (4) CHINA: Why has China wanted to alter this triangular relationship in 
the Taiwan Strait since Xi took power in 2012? If you agree that is the case, what is 
China's ideology toward Taiwan and China's Taiwan policy in practice? What costs 
do you think China considers acceptable to pursue the "One China Principle"  and 
unify Taiwan? 
Selected Responses:  
● “I understand the PRC’s goal has always been “reunification,” suggesting a 
consistent desire to alter the relationship. Of course, this desire remained largely 
shelved until Xi. “Xi Thought” encompasses the “China Dream,” including a raft of 
power and status markers, most relevantly “The Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese 
People.” In the Sino-historical cycle of “分久必合，合久必分,” the CCP would place 
itself squarely in the former and “naturally” expect to proceed to unification... It is 
hard to imagine a price such a government would not pay to achieve a treasured 
aim. Indeed, the longer Xi has to consolidate his power, the less resistance there will 
be within his government. Such a negative cycle would require at a minimum a 
leadership shakeup to change.” 
● “I see Xi's Taiwan policy as fundamentally a continuation of Hu Jintao's. The goals 
are (1) deter independence with the threat of military force, and (2) seek peaceful 
unification through economic integration and cultural exchanges. What's changed 
since 2012 is not Xi's rise but Chinese political elites' perceptions of their own rising 
power relative to the US--they think the US is in decline--and the growing gap in hard 
power between Beijing and Taipei, which is undeniable and irreversible. That leads 
them to believe they can press harder on the US to reduce its presence in the western 
Pacific, and on Taiwan to try to force unification. I think China's Taiwan policy in 
practice has been a mix of "hard" threats and "soft" inducements designed to 
accomplish these two goals. I think the likely costs to alter the status quo and forcibly 
unify Taiwan are still too high for current leaders to bear...The costs they are willing 
to bear to prevent a formal declaration of de jure independence by Taiwan leaders 
are much higher, because that would challenge the fundamental legitimacy of the 
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Communist Party. The only scenario in which I think China would attack Taiwan is if 
there is a declaration of independence.” 
● “To retrench the CCP at the core of China and Xi at the core of the CCP. Economic 
liberalization placed strains on the legitimacy of the party requiring a hardening and 
renewed focus on “core principles”. There’s nothing like a grievance to focus minds 
and the unresolved matter of Taiwan’s sovereignty is an important ox to gore in 
mobilizing Chinese citizens...The One-China Principle...That is China’s ideology. What 
costs..Anything up to but not including CCP rule of China. If the action or its potential 
fall-out jeopardizes the legitimacy of the party in China then it is likely to be 
rejected.” 
● “It is a common misperception of Xi's Taiwan policy. Having served in provinces 
across the Strait for 22 years, he knows Taiwan and is not eager to reunify Taiwan 
through force. Between 2012 and 2016, his emphasis was actually on "winning the 
hearts and minds of the Taiwan people.'" The Xi-Ma summit of November 2015 was 
for Ma's, but also intended for Tsai's consumption if she were to win the election of 
2016 and adopted a more moderate course. His position hardened, I believe, after 
the Trump and Tsai administrations seem to be coordinating their steps on China. 
And things spiraled downward ever since. Now I am very pessimistic because China 
would not back down if Taiwan is seen as ganging up with the US against China. 
With Xi's ascendance to his third term on his agenda, he has even less room to 
maneuver. Cost? Taiwan's value - domestic political, strategic, and economic - far 
outweighs any conceivable cost.” 
● “Xi would like to achieve cross-strait unification, which would, ceteris paribus, 
enhance his personal glory as well as the economic and strategic interests of the PRC. 
But offering economic inducements has not sufficed to interest Taipei in negotiating 
a unification agreement, inasmuch as Beijing has at the same time maintained its 
right to use force. The threat of force has scared Taipei away, but Beijing fears giving 
it up might unleash a drive for formal independence. Xi has stepped up threats 
(including overflights) since 2016 because the Tsai regime has expressed so little 
interest in peaceful reunification. So it's a downward spiral.” 
● “The Chinese Communist Party and the PRC have long sought to subordinate the 
ROC (Taiwan) under its One Country Two Systems formula for unification... In 
accordance with their Successor State Theory, the ROC ceased to exist in 1949. In 
this context, One Country Two Systems is a zero-sum game played out 
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internationally. Arguably, an increase in Taiwan's international legitimacy is 
perceived to be a decrease in CCP legitimacy, particularly in a domestic context.” 
● “China’s motivation: (1) Nationalism: pursue the greatness of China and Chinese 
people. (2) Diversionary Theory: because there are great pressures from domestic 
issues, especially rising inequality. China always thinks Taiwan is part of holy territory 
so that they are pushing for the goal. China is increasing its power, but at this 
moment, using force is not the priority. They are still spending a lot of resources and 
trying to “buy” Taiwan. Their budget is huge for sure. However, they might not be 
ready to take the costs of a potential military loss. Taiwan issue is not an emergency 
to the regime.” 
● “China's goal has been constant. Its means has changed as the party in power in TW 
has changed. During the Ma period, BJ had confidence that persuasion would 
stimulate progress towards its goal. With the DPP in power, it has suspended 
persuasion and shifted to "coercion without violence." Up until now, China is 
prepared to pay the cost of delaying unification in the hope that persuasion and/or 
pressure will work sooner or later. A trend toward TW's "permanent separation" 
would be unacceptable. Having to fight a war with the US is still unacceptable.” 
● “Beijing's approach is primarily bluffing but prepared for the worst...The maximal 
cost China could bear to keep one China nominally intact is a variable than a 
constant. The more the sunk investment in pushing for unification, the more bearable 
further investment in doing the same.” 
● “Xi sees the absorption of Taiwan as essential to the rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation. He is still constrained, however, by Taiwan's capabilities, the prospect of 
American involvement, and international opinion. I believe China is willing to pay 
the cost of killing millions of Taiwanese and becoming, for a period, a global 
pariah state, IF it thinks Taiwan will otherwise drift beyond its grasp.” 
● “China would argue it is not they who are altering it. If I could answer the PRC "cost" 
question, I would be the Director of National Intelligence for sure! Indeed, everything 
is context dependent. I think it boils down to the question of what course of action 
would be best for the maintenance of the CCP in power.” 
●  “China is stronger now and is asserting interests that it has long held but was not 
capable of enforcing. Xi believes that China has a strategic window of 
opportunity to advance its historic mission of "reunifying" Taiwan. Everything 
short of the collapse of the CCP.” 
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● “Xi is more patient than he seems. Looking impatient is a technique for exercising 
patience. Diplomatic isolation accompanied with economic incentives and 
disincentives aimed at different constituencies in Taiwan.” 
● “Any Leader of CCP wants to " take Taiwan back" in his mind, but in practice, keeping 
it in a dynamic equilibrium, better China can play the active part, is his best option.” 
● “Do you think your presumption is fair? A triangular relationship could not be altered 
unilaterally. I disagree with your perspective.” 
● “For China, this is not about cost”. 
● “Taiwan is a core interest for China” 
● “...because China thinks it can and at any cost (if pushed)” 
● “China has always sought to annex Taiwan, but the rhetoric and actions in Beijing has 
escalated since Xi took over. Taiwan is territory the PRC needs to break out of the 
bottleneck in the first island chain and for force projection into the Pacific. It is also an 
ideological tool to fuel domestic support for the CCP and justify a massive arms buildup. It 
is also part of an ideological battle pitting the Western-led liberal-democratic order, of 
which Taiwan is a prime example of success, against the kind of authoritarian revisionism 
proposed by China. Xi has backed himself into a corner over Taiwan, playing up his ability 
to "recover" territory which he claims belongs to China. Incentives and "peaceful" efforts 
have all failed and have in fact blown back, hence the harsher - and more military - 
approach to Taiwan.” 
 
● Question (5) THE US: Is the US's policy in the Taiwan Strait still to maintain the 
status quo? Has that changed and if so, how? What are the specific policy 
recommendations that you would offer the US? 
Selected Responses:  
● “Yes, US’ policy has been relatively stable. The US should pay more attention to 
China’s aggressiveness in all areas. Recently there are debates about strategic 
ambiguity. I think the US should discuss more on how to deter China’s ambition. So 
far, many people are still very naive toward China..” 
● “The US policy is one of strategic ambiguity designed to maintain the status quo. It 
shifts periodically with assessments of the military or rhetorical threats.” 
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● “It’s to deter aggression. If that means status quo to you then yes. Has that changed 
and if so, how? No.The present policy suite is working. A move from strategic 
ambiguity to strategic clarity would be my next logical step.” 
● “US policy toward Taiwan has not changed. That said, the Trump Administration has 
adjusted what it was willing to do to support Taiwan within the 3 Joint 
Communiques, 6 Assurances, and TRA.” 
● “1. still status quo; 2. only the Republican eagles can really break the ground: viewing 
the CCP regime fundamentally flawed.” 
● “The status quo in the Taiwan Strait is the existence of two legitimate 
governments. The primary policy recommendation is to consciously and carefully 
move toward a US One China, Two Governments policy. Along these lines, the US 
would seek a "soft balancing" of legitimacy on both sides. Focus would be on 
legitimacy, without taking any position on sovereignty. The initial step in 
implementing this policy would be a US-ROC (Taiwan) Joint Statement, 
negotiated at the most senior levels on both sides. But if necessary, can be signed 
by AIT and TECRO. Visits to Taiwan by the Undersecretary of State for Political 
Affairs should be routine... If necessary, the US side could include a unilateral 
statement regarding continuation of a US One China Policy.” 
● “No, Washington’s policies towards Taiwan are fundamentally circumstantial.” 
● “Yes. The status quo allows the US to have its cake and eat it too. We get formal 
relations with PRC, and informal (but still deep and substantial) relations with 
Taiwan. The US has to balance against whichever side is actively trying to change the 
status quo. In the 2000s, that was Chen Shui-bian, so the US used its leverage to 
prevent Chen from following through. Now, it is Beijing that is actively changing the 
SQ, so the US is responding by increasing arms sales and diplomatic visits. I'd 
recommend the US make it clear our policy seeks to balance PRC pressure and 
counter any attempt to unilaterally alter the SQ. If the PRC stops buzzing Taiwan with 
military aircraft, then we should promise no more high-level visits. “ 
● “The policy hasn't really changed. It's being managed by a dangerous crew that gets 
a charge out of pushing Beijing's buttons. American sympathy for Taiwan is real, but 
this policy of probing is not in Taiwan's interest.” 
● “It serves US interests insofar as Washington doesn't want to give Taiwan a reason 
to provoke China in a way that could drag the US into a war with China. It does not 
serve Taiwan well because it energizes the vocal but diminishing minority who say 
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that since Taiwan can't count on US backing, it might as well seek accommodation 
with Beijing.” 
● For the benefit of Taiwan, they should keep selling advanced weapons to Taiwan but 
with a reasonable price and help enhance the situation of Taiwan in international 
status. 
● If you refer to the one-China policy while supporting Taipei under various different 
circumstances, I agree that it has been effective by and large over the past few 
decades. In fact, Taipei has been strategically ambiguous in its ultimate relations 
with Beijing as well. However, whether such practices are achievable or even 
desirable remain to be seen. 
● “So far, the status quo is the basic policy, but there are signs of some seeking to turn 
Taiwan into an active part of the US anti-PRC/CCP coalition. Simple maintenance of 
liberal values of freedom, economics, justice, and electoral politics.” 
● “Continue to emphasize the importance of Taiwan's democracy and a commitment 
to its defense. Integrate Taiwan into the broader coalition of democracies to counter 
the rise of revisionist authoritarian states.” 
● “Trump's policy was to change, not maintain, the SQ. His prognosis was correct that 
China's rapid rise is becoming a threat to the US leadership role. But his prescriptions 
were wrong and failed to remedy the ills. Worse, he overplayed the "Taiwan card," 
putting Taiwan in harm's way. I hope China and the US under Biden will soon resume 
their "strategic dialogue" to clarify each other's true intentions and reduce 
unnecessary suspicions. Biden has a full agenda, especially at home. But if he handles 
China well, his jobs at other foreign policy issues will be a lot easier. Taiwan for sure 
will be at or near the top of the agenda. He'd better go well prepared.” 
“U.S. policy definitely remains maintaining the status quo; i.e., no formal 
independence for Taiwan, but no forced unification on the part of the PRC. That is the 
best we can do for the foreseeable future, since any active encouragement by the 
U.S. of Taiwan independence would likely lead to a PRC attack. The U.S. needs to be 
as clear as possible about its support for Taiwan short of doing anything to 
encourage Taiwan's moving towards independence.” 
● “The US' official policy is to maintain the "status quo" in the Taiwan Strait. However, 
as relations between China and the West sour, and as China challenges the 
international order, the value of democratic Taiwan has increased accordingly. 
Bolstering Taiwan's deterrence so that its people can decide for themselves what 
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their nation should look like is key to avoiding armed conflict over Taiwan. Ensuring 
the perpetuation of the "status quo" is, for all intents and purposes, ensuring the 
continued existence of Taiwan as a free, democratic and sovereign nation. It is very 
much in the US's interest that Taiwan remain so.” 
● “If the US policy is to maintain the status quo, it has failed...Officially, US policy has 
followed the Three Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. To that, you might 
say we have recently stressed Reagan’s Six Assurances, underlining the fact that 
beyond the official documents there are abiding cultural resonances between our 
countries. Underlining all of these is the principle that any unification is entered into 
freely, not by force. You might call this the US “bottom line” or “red line” and this has 
in no way changed. My recommendation would be that as the PRC increases its 
power, find efficient ways to counter it in coordination with allies and partners, very 
much including Taiwan.”  
● Question (6) TAIWAN; Will the growing Taiwanese identity necessarily develop 
into Taiwanese nationalism?  Will Taiwanese nationalism necessarily develop into 
de jure/official Taiwanese independence? This could lead to a direct conflict with 
China's "One China Principle" so how should Taiwan effectively deal with it? 
Selected Responses:  
● “The people of Taiwan have long maintained a cautious attitude toward the PRC’s 
power, an unwillingness to challenge it directly that has remained constant even 
while that power has grown exponentially. Local identity may temper some of that 
caution, but I do not believe it will overcome it. Absent a precipitous decline in PRC 
power, I do not believe local/national identity will develop to the degree of seeking 
de jure independence. It may however seek new means of ensuring its de facto 
independence, which would in turn trigger some level of conflict with Xi’s 
interpretation of the PRC’s “One China Principle.” In fact, the most recent round of 
escalation reflects just this cycle. If the PRC were to attempt an invasion now, 
however, it may substantially remove Taiwan’s opposition to the idea of 
independence.” 
● “Despite growing Taiwanese identity over the past two decades, the overwhelming 
majority of the population in Taiwan support some form of the status quo. The 
possibility of a nationalist movement on Taiwan will be affected less by a growing 
sense of Taiwanese identity and more by the perceived aggressiveness by China 
against Taiwan…” 
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● “The ROC (Taiwan) already exists as an independent sovereign state. Most on Taiwan 
supports the status quo. The US requires a more accurate representation of the 
status quo and extension of greater political legitimacy. Without a conscious move 
toward a more normal, stable, and constructive relationship between the US and 
Taiwan, based on a US One China Two Governments policy, the likelihood of a formal 
change to the ROC Constitution, freeze of the Law Government relations between the 
Taiwan Area and Mainland Area, and change of the name of the country are 
increasingly likely. In a Joint Statement, Taiwan need not endorse or even 
acknowledge a unilateral US One China reference.” 
● “Taiwan nationalism is already here to stay and President Tsai is leading it. There is 
no need to differentiate de jure/de facto Independence, because sufficient mini-steps 
have added up to a new brand of a new country. Neither Xi nor Tsai is interested in 
reaching out to each other to avoid a conflict. Neither the US. So a recipe for cross-
strait conflict in the near future, short of a direct US-China clash. Recommendation: 
US has to reassess 1) its overall policy toward China, be it one of confrontation (with 
or without regime change), competitive coexistence`, or accommodation; 2) Taiwan's 
value and role; 3) costs to be paid with each policy.” 
● “No change in the Constitutional and legal frameworks and practices is the best way 
to preserve the legal and de facto status quo. Continuing to be an effective sovereign 
democracy is the best way to deal with China ideologically. Taiwan will continue to 
seek effective political dialogues with China under the premises of Republic of China 
(Taiwan). In other words, PRC has to deal with the issue of "Republic of China 
(Taiwan)" before any sensible political dialogue becomes practicable.” 
● “Cautious steps to resist Chinese pressures. Coordinate carefully with the US. 
President Tsai has been exemplary in this regard. Keep reminding the world that 
Taiwan is a thriving democracy with a distinct culture (film, cuisine, couture) and a 
good international citizen which deserves inclusion in international fora. Emphasize 
that China's 1CP and Taiwan's were never the same, point out repeatedly that 
Taiwan has never accepted Beijing's definition.” 
● “Both Taiwanese nationalism and independence rely on a veiled reference to anti-
China disposition. Without relating to China negatively in various symbolic ways, 
nationalism lacks substance. The Taiwan-China binary does not work in daily lives. 
Nationalism requires constant self-cleansing in various creative ways in order to 
project the unwanted Chineseness on certain selected scapegoats. Fascism is the 
plausible solution.” 
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● “Yes, Taiwanese nationalism is emerging. Taiwan is a de facto independent state 
already, but for de jure status, Taiwanese must do more in international politics. The 
US is the most essential player. Taiwan must persuade the US to alter its stance on 
this issue. Also, it could be done by support from other major powers. The best way is 
changing the perception of China and its One China Principle in the world first.  No. 
Growing Taiwanese identity does not mean movement towards independence. 
Indeed, Taiwan people pragmatically understand that independence probably means 
war, which they don't want. Also, because of methodological problems, the strength 
of pure Taiwanese identity is actually not clear. There is a decent possibility that the 
dominant attitude is a mixed, Taiwanese-Chinese identity. This needs to be studied 
more.” 
● “Nationalism has already appeared, but is inhibited from moving toward 
independence by the mainland's threats. It already conflicts with the one China 
principle and Taipei would in my view be prudent to return to the Ma policy of one 
China two interpretations in order to reopen direct communications.” 
● “It appears to be heading in that direction. China will likely try to use intimidation to 
reduce this trend. Adhere to liberal values in Taiwan society. Repeat that Taiwan 
awaits China becoming an attractive partner with whom to reach a deal on 
reunification, whatever that deal might look like.” 
● “The Taiwanese identity will continue to grow, but it will not eclipse the survival 
instinct. The 1992 Consensus was, briefly, a convenient fiction. It has since been 
reinterpreted by Beijing such that Taiwan must reject it. It's useless.” 
● “The fundamentalist Taiwanese identity will cause the Taiwanese independence for 
sure, but the Chinese identity which co-exist with is the best cure for the conflict of 
both sides.” 
● “Taiwan nationalism is already the case. This does not de facto mean a move for 
taidu (Taiwanese independence). If it did, we would anticipate major military actions 
from Beijing.” 
● “Suppress Taiwanese independence movement to preserve peace. TI is difficult for 
this is culturally and emotionally important to China, particularly the leadership. 
● “You will be surprised how our Taiwanese can be so flexible as encountering a 
challenge of life or death.” 
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● “Self-identity is inherently related to nationalism. The form of nationalism that has 
developed in Taiwan is civic in nature, and is increasingly multinational, particularly among 
younger generations. Taiwan, furthermore, is characterized not by one but two forms of 
overlapping nationalisms: taidu (Taiwan independence) and huadu (ROC independence). 
Both are defined by what Taiwan is not - that is, the PRC - as well as a deep attachment to 
democratic norms. The two forms of nationalism, even if not acknowledged, are in direct 
contradiction with the PRC's "one China '' principle, which does not break the existence of 
Taiwan/ROC as an entity separate from the PRC. The two are therefore in direct conflict, 
and that conflict will remain as long as the PRC refuses to acknowledge that reality. 
Another alternative, highly unlikely, is that Taiwan would capitulate and accept Beijing's 
terms.” 
● Question (7) THE US/TAIWAN: Do the US and Taiwan have the same interests in 
the Taiwan Strait? If they are not entirely the same, what are the differences, and 
what can be done to resolve them? What could the US or/and Taiwan do to 
counteract but also prevent a war with China? 
Selected Responses:  
● The most salient US interests include: (1) An equitable international system, including 
access to “the commons” and freedom of navigation, particularly in and around the 
Taiwan Strait; (2) Peaceful resolution of disputes, this one in particular; (3) A healthy 
network of allies and partners that believes together we can deter or deny systemic 
disruption by the PRC; and (4) A healthy international system that encourages bad 
actors like Beijing to improve their behavior. I believe Taiwan wishes at a minimum 
to preserve its de facto independence and democratic form of government. To do so 
requires the support of the United States and other like-minded states. During 
ordinary times, pragmatism suggests that Taipei take steps to avoid unduly 
antagonizing Beijing, even if at times that means paying less attention to national 
defense. . However, the current trend is basically in the direction of Taiwan’s defense. 
For Taiwan, the Strait is key terrain and a likely invasion route. Thus, despite a lack of 
official relations, Taiwan’s position as a democratic supporter of the international 
system puts it in good alignment with US goals to uphold that system. Moreover, 
although Beijing has shown the inclination to cause trouble in the East and South 
China Seas as well as along the Indian border, Taiwan remains its primary strategic 
direction (see the US DOD Report to Congress on China for 2020). That places Taiwan 
in an especially critical position to judge and (with help) shape PRC decision making. 
Enhancing the ability to resist Chinese aggression has thus become a key common 
goal for the Taiwan Strait and beyond…” 
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● On some issues, interests align. On others, they may not. This is why a US-Taiwan 
Joint Statement is critical to aligning interests to domestic audiences on both sides of 
the Pacific Ocean. Would such an act trigger use of force? Short answer is no, as long 
as the US includes a unilateral One China statement... A US One China Two 
Governments policy is the ultimate compromise solution, and has been criticized in 
Green leaning Taiwan media as locking in the status quo. Beijing most certainly 
would oppose, to the point of perhaps withdrawing their ambassador from Wash DC. 
And maybe some military exercises. But because they know such a policy would 
make a new Taiwan constitution harder, and in fact would likely be opposed staunch 
Taiwan independence advocates, Beijing would likely not use force. After an initial 
US-ROC Joint Statement, the US side probably would need to negotiate a new basis 
for US-PRC relations to replace the outdated Three Communiques framework. 
● “The vast majority of Taiwan citizens reject de jure independence in the face of the 
PRC military threat. This could lead to a direct conflict with China's "One China 
Principle" [OCP] so how should Taiwan effectively deal with it? Tsai’s present course 
makes the most sense. Reject China’s OCP, govern the island moderately and deter 
any attempt to undermine the present sovereign state the island enjoys. 
● US and Taiwan interests are not identical. Taiwan is too small compared with the 
Mainland and too close to it geographically. As long as the US cannot overcome the 
"tyranny of geography" and the threat of "carrier killer" missiles, Taiwan would have 
to bear the brunt physically if anything goes wrong. And the US will remain intact 
with ego bruised and influence reduced for sure - but no physical pain. As a society 
more divided (for two decades) than the current America, Taiwan is hardly able to 
resist an onslaught from China. With so little will to fight, Taiwan is NOT a fortress as 
some American think it is. Whatever the US decides, it'd better see things more 
clearly as is. A political solution is always better than a military one. 
● Yes. The core interest is to ensure Taiwan is not part of China (CCP regime). For the 
US, the geopolitical position of Taiwan is essential. Should CCP take Taiwan, the US 
loses the status of hegemony in this region. And China will have a base for its navy 
toward the whole Pacific. Also, the economic partnership is important to both 
Taiwan and the US. Taiwan’s high-tech industries are particularly important in the 
relationships. The difference may be the desire of Taiwanese to become formally 
independent, or full diplomatic recognition. That takes time to persuade American 
elites. The best way to prevent a war is to have efficient power of self-defense. This 
could be done by the cooperation between the US and Taiwan. 
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● This situation has changed over time. Two questions are key. First, do Taipei and DC 
share the same or overlapping goals. Second, what is their approach to risk. In my 
view, there was a divergence of goals from 1995 through 2007. Also, Lee Teng-hui 
and Chen Shui-bian were more risk-accepting than Washington approved. From 2008 
through 2016, there was a convergence of goals and an approach that was more 
risk-averse. There have been signs that Trump's instincts (not goals) diverge from 
Taipei's, but he is not focused enough to act upon them. 
● (1) I am not sure how to answer the question about US and Taiwan interests, other 
than neither want to see the status of Taiwan resolved anyway but peacefully. I 
would say that both in the US and Taiwan different groups have different views. To 
help prevent a war with China over Taiwan the US should counsel friends in Taiwan 
not to make political movers that could trigger a conflict and assist Taiwan to 
enhance its self-defense. 
● The prevention of military conflict and keeping equilibrium of the trio game are the 
same interests. The intention of global domination of the US and the unilateral 
benefit are the differences. The US plays a moderate role in keeping peace in TS and 
Taiwan takes an active role to develop the Chinese identity with Taiwanese one at 
the same time. Additionally, use the " differ on the definition " part of "consensus" to 
keep flexible . 
● No: the US is interested in preserving peace and stability, and maintaining the status 
quo. The Taiwan interest is different--expanding Taiwan's diplomatic space, seeking 
formal recognition. It is not in the US interest to fight for Taiwan de jure 
independence. I think that's the right policy, because the US derives the most benefit 
from the current arrangement. 
● Neither the US nor Taiwan is a valid category to define its interests. Both suffer 
severe political cleavages. This question is highly biased in assuming that a united 
front between an integral Taiwan and an integral US is desirable. A triangle game 
cannot proceed with one party denied the potential to become an ally. 
● Their interests are close enough. Neither wants war. The most important factor is the 
fragility of US-China relations. If that relationship, contentious though it will remain, 
can be stabilized, Taiwan will be more secure. 
● Yes, for the moment. Drastic change in the U.S.-China relationship may lead to a 
different landscape though. 
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● Sometimes, yes; sometimes, no. Good communication is necessary. 
● Those interests are more aligned than they have been since 1979. 
● In my opinion they are the same on the one China question. 
● not necessarily the same; no easy answer to the latter 
● Yes, they do have the same interests 
● “Democracy underscores the shared interests of the US and Taiwan in the Taiwan 
Strait, more so since China has launched an ideological battle on the international 
order. As stated above, the US and international community have every interest in 
preventing a PLA attack against Taiwan, and therefore must continue to provide 
sufficient deterrence and assurances to Taipei. The US and partners (as well as 
Taiwan), must obviate the use of force as a possible option for Beijing by making it 
too costly and providing the necessary signaling to convince Beijing that such an 
outcome would be obtained.” 
 
● Question (8) PEACE SOLUTION: Is there any peace solution that would satisfy all 
three parties: China, the US, and Taiwan? Why does a long-lasting peace remain 
elusive and what do you think is the future of this triangular relationship? What 
are the general comments you would like to make about this relationship? 
Selected Responses:  
● If China were a democracy, and the CCP did not insist on exerting control over all 
independent spaces in Chinese society, then a peace deal could be possible. The 
problem is that the CCP will never give up on the ultimate goal of bringing Taiwan 
under the PRC, and for the CCP, that means exerting unchallenged control over 
politics and society in Taiwan. Until that day, I do not think a lasting resolution of the 
Taiwan issue is possible. The best that Taiwan and the US can do is to preserve 
Taiwan's current political system and substantial de facto independence. Any 
attempt to formalize that status will provoke an attack from the PRC. Any attempt to 
forcibly unify Taiwan with the PRC under CCP control will be resisted by the large 
majority of Taiwanese and provoke a response from the US. 
● The best solution for ensuring peace is a US One China Two Governments policy, in 
which the US moves toward a more normal, stable, and constructive relations with 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait. A more normal relationship with Taiwan does not 
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and should not imply inserting itself in any cross-Strait negotiations. Nor should the 
US support Taiwan independence (and shouldn't oppose it either as long as no one 
gets killed in the process).  
● Peace remains elusive because 1) China sticks stubbornly to its goal of unification 
under the one country, two systems formula AND 2) has been unwilling to adjust the 
goal or the formula to accommodate the long-standing opposition of the Taiwan 
public. Because of China's approach, and because, so far, Taiwan has shown 
resilience and the United States has shown resolve in supporting Taiwan, it's hard to 
imagine any peace solution. The outcome might be different a) if China were to 
modify its approach to unification to make it more palatable, OR b) if Taiwan leaders 
and the public lost their self-confidence and the US willingness to help Taiwan defend 
itself declined. 
● I am VERY pessimistic because I see only hawks within all three actors. No doves or 
moderate voices are around. None! And Xi's "rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" and 
Tsai's "special state-to-state relationship" cannot possibly coexist - not for long 
anyway. So, a clash is inevitable. Only one of them will go down in history as a "great 
man (or lady)," the other being a "sinner." The US is the only country that can 
possibly help with the situation. Biden is much better than Trump in navigating the 
treacherous waters. How he will manage, I don't know. 
● There can be no mutually satisfactory solution at present because the PRC’s demands 
for unification appear to be inimical to a fair, prosperous, and peaceful international 
and regional order. The United States and Taiwan simply cannot accept Beijing’s 
terms. That said, I would point out that a high degree of peace has existed since the 
1958 crisis. Should Xi’s demands and aggression diminish for any reason, I would 
expect this state of affairs to resume. Thus, I would say it is resolution of the dispute 
that is elusive, not “long-lasting peace.” 
● Avoid crossing the red lines of the other side: no unilateral changes of the status quo 
and no use of force. Someday, a significantly politically evolved China, or a fatally 
weakened US may bring about a consensus, but that may be a long time away. The 
US and China are becoming more equal in power, and Taiwan is not keeping up 
either militarily or diplomatically. So, Taiwan may be losing influence in its future. 
Catching up militarily is not likely, so better cross-strait diplomacy is likely to be its 
main instrument to preserve its autonomy. 
● A long-lasting peace could emerge if neither Beijing nor Washington fears the 
malicious use of Taiwan to rival each other. This would require a neutral Taiwan. 
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Taiwan could begin to attain minimal confidence and credits with both sides as a 
neutral by first refusing to support a US invasion elsewhere. This would enable 
Washington's support for Taiwan to permanently delay reunification with Beijing 
with clear support. Beijing would not worry that Washington's support for Taiwan 
arises from a military incentive. 
● “As presently constructed politically, no. China’s communist system is anathema to 
Taiwan’s democracy. For the foreseeable future every effort must be made to deter 
China from active military aggression. Buying time. 
● (1) Beijing is the prisoner of a dead man's formula (Deng XP). "One country Two 
systems" formula is dead on arrival. Beijing needs to come up with a better and 
*credible* offer than what they have held out to Taipei. (2) Having secured its 
democratic system, it is difficult to envision the people of Taiwan deciding to put 
themselves under the jurisdiction of the PRC as long as the CCP rules. (3) I worry that 
the prospects for miscalculation in all three capitals is increasing. 
● I don’t see China will give up the goal of unification in the near future. The current 
relationship (ambiguity to all) is not the most satisfactory to all parts but acceptable 
temporarily. The future of the relationship will be determined mostly by the US-China 
relations. In general, China is the major source of instability in the relationship. 
● To accommodate Taiwan's needs. A broader commonwealth or union under "One 
China" with two entities. A few scholars in China may even accept Taiwanese de jure 
independence. Hawks in China are in control now but there are quite a few liberals so 
there are various views around in reality. 
● Giving up putting pressure on Taiwan, allowing Hong Kong to have real autonomy, as 
well as Tibet and Xinjiang. Stop the United Front activities designed to bend other 
countries' policies toward Beijing. End "wolf warrior" diplomacy. 
● It's all about time. If China becomes politically pluralistic, a solution acceptable to all 
might be found. It needs to be managed by experienced professionals. Not cowboys. 
● Anyone who wants to take his benefit depends on his ability and the price he will pay 
once the price is higher than the benefit he will get， then he won't take any actions. 
● Cross-strait relationship is a subset of the U.S.-China relationship. So, the determining 
factor has always been the ongoing relations between the U.S. and China. 
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● US-Taiwan versus China. No triangle. It was triangular. It is mostly just US-Taiwan 
versus China starting from the Trump administration. 
● If China maintains on its current trajectory, long-lasting peace will remain elusive. 
The status quo is unsustainable in the long-term. 
● Well, it depends on the time frame you chose to scrutinize this issue, right? 
● seems no; no easy answer to the latter 
● I doubt it. 
● “As long as the CCP insists on unification, conflict will continue. Long-lasting peace 
will remain elusive as long as the CCP lays claim over Taiwan and refuses to 
acknowledge its right to self-determination. Enlightened leadership in Beijing, which 
recognizes how history has shaped the two countries destinies and explains to the 
Chinese public that China's greatness and security are not predicated on annexing 
Taiwan, would help reduce the ultranationalism that, for the time being, makes de-
escalation nearly impossible.” 
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Appendix II:  Abbreviations 
AIT American Institute in Taiwan (https://www.ait.org.tw/) (The U.S.’s de facto embassy to  
  Taiwan) 
CCP Chinese Communist Party (http://cpc.people.com.cn/) 
CSIS Center of Strategic and International Studies (https://www.csis.org/) (A Washington 
based think tank)  
CSPA Cross Strait Policy Association (A Taiwanese non-governmental organization) 
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
DDP Democratic Progressive Party (https://www.dpp.org.tw/) (A political party in Taiwan) 
ESC Election Study Center, National Chengchi University  
GTI Global Taiwan Institute (http://globaltaiwan.org/) (A Washington based think tank) 
KMT Kuomintang or Nationalist Party of China (http://www.kmt.org.tw/) (A political party in 
Taiwan) 
MAC Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwanese Government agency dealing with China)  
NCCU National Chengchi University (https://www.nccu.edu.tw/)  
NPC National People’s Congress (The Chinese legislative body) 
NTU National Taiwan University (https://www.ntu.edu.tw/english/) 
PLA People’s Liberation Army (The Chinese Army) 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
ROC Republic of China 
TAO Taiwan Affairs Office (Chinese Government agency dealing with Taiwan) 
TRA Taiwan Relations Act (https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479) 
TERCO   Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States 
(https://www.taiwanembassy.org/us_en/index.html) (Taiwan’s de facto embassy to the 
U.S.) 
UNLV University of Nevada, Las Vegas (https://www.unlv.edu/) 
UC University of California 
UVA University of Virginia (https://www.virginia.edu/)  
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Appendix III  
Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People’s Republic of China 
(Commonly known as the Shanghai Communiqué) , Shanghai, February 27, 1972. (Selected 
Sections) 
 
...The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United 
States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question 
obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of 
China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s 
internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military 
installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any 
activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,” 
“two Chinas,” and “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be 
determined.” 
The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the 
Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States 
Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of 
the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the 
ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In 
the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the 
tension in the area diminishes... 
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Appendix IV  
Taiwan Relations Act, January 1, 1979 (Selected Sections) 
TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT, PUBLIC LAW 96-8 96TH CONGRESS 
An Act 
To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the 
foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and 
other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan, and for 
other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled, 
Short Title 
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Relations Act”. 
Findings and Declaration of Policy 
Section. 2. 
1. The President- having terminated governmental relations between the United States 
and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the 
Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of this 
Act is necessary– 
1. to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and 
2. to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the 
continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of 
the United States and the people on Taiwan. 
2. It is the policy of the United States– 
1. to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and 
other relations between the people of the United States and the people on 
Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the 
Western Pacific area; 
2. to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and 
economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international 
concern; 
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3. to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations 
with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of 
Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; 
4. to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful 
means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of 
the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; 
5. to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and 
6. to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or 
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or 
economic system, of the people on Taiwan. 
3. Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States in 
human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately 
eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the 
human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the 
United States. 
Implementation of United States Policy with Regard to Taiwan 
Section. 3. 
1. In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States will make 
available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may 
be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. 
2. The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense 
articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in 
accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan’s 
defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection 
with recommendations to the President and the Congress. 
3. The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security 
or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the 
interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall 
determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the 
United States in response to any such danger. 
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Appendix V  
Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and Advance China’s 
Peaceful Reunification, Speech at the Meeting Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Issuance 
of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, January 2, 2019, Xi Jinping 
Comrades, my compatriots, and friends, 
 
Today, we are meeting here to solemnly commemorate the 40th anniversary of the issuance of 
the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress. As a new year begins, on behalf of the people on the mainland, I extend sincere 
greetings and best wishes to our compatriots in Taiwan. 
   
It has been 70 years since Taiwan and the mainland were separated. The emergence and 
evolution of the Taiwan question has, since China entered the modern times, been inextricably 
interwoven with the history of the Chinese nation. The Opium War of 1840 and ensuing wars of 
aggression launched by Western powers plunged China into an anguished state of turmoil and 
foreign threat, with its lands torn apart, and Taiwan fell under foreign occupation that was to last 
half a century. Wave upon wave, the Chinese people were engaged in an epic struggle to resist 
foreign invasion, liberate the Chinese nation, and realize the country’s reunification. Our 
compatriots in Taiwan made a huge contribution to this struggle. In 1945, together with peoples 
around the world, the Chinese people won victory in the War of Resistance against Japanese 
Aggression, a part of the global War against Fascism. Taiwan was thus recovered and returned to 
China. It was not long, however, before the two sides of the Taiwan Straits fell into a special state 
of protracted political confrontation due to the civil war in China and the interference of foreign 
forces. 
   
Since 1949, the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people have 
endeavored to pursue the historic mission of resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s 
complete reunification. Working with our compatriots in Taiwan, we have de-escalated tense 
confrontation across the Taiwan Straits, improved cross-Straits relations, and set out on a path 
of peaceful development and continually made breakthroughs in cross-Straits relations. 
   
Over the past 70 years, we have, responding to the longing of people on both sides of the Taiwan 
Straits, ended the absence of contact between the two sides. We have achieved overall direct 
two-way “three links” (mail, business and transport) and have initiated substantial exchanges, 
communication, and cooperation between the two sides. Cross-Straits exchanges and 
cooperation have steadily expanded and grown increasingly closer, and mutual affinity has 
deepened. Our compatriots in Taiwan have made a major contribution to the mainland’s reform 
and opening up and they in turn have also shared the mainland’s development opportunities. 
   
Over the past 70 years, we have, acting in a spirit of seeking common ground while setting aside 
differences and on the basis of the one-China principle, enabled the two sides to reach the “1992 
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Consensus” that “both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one China and will work together 
toward national reunification.” The two sides have thus initiated consultations and negotiation 
and promoted cross-Straits party-to-party exchanges. We have opened up a path for promoting 
the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and realized a historic meeting between 
leaders of both sides, thus elevating cross-Straits political interactions to a new height. 
   
Over the past 70 years, we have, keeping in mind the changes over time in the growth of cross-
Straits relations, proposed the policy of seeking a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question and 
the well-conceived concept of “one country, two systems”, and established the fundamental 
guideline of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems”. On this basis, we have 
formulated a fundamental strategy of upholding the principle of “one country, two systems” and 
promoting national reunification. With this we have responded to the call of our time, namely, 
to promote, in the new era, the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and unite our 
compatriots in Taiwan to strive for our country’s rejuvenation and peaceful reunification. 
   
Over the past 70 years, we have, holding high the banner of peace, development, cooperation, 
and mutual benefit, and on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, forged 
friendship and strengthened cooperation with other countries and consolidated the international 
community’s commitment to the one-China principle. More and more countries and people have 
gained a better understanding of National reunification endeavor and given their support to it. 
   
Over the past 70 years, we have, bearing in mind the overall and long-term interests of the 
Chinese nation, stood firm in safeguarding China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Rallying 
all the Chinese people around us, we have resolutely defeated all attempts to create “two 
Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” or “Taiwan independence,” and have achieved major victories 
in the fight against the separatist activities for “Taiwan independence”. 
   
As the evolution of cross-Straits relations attests, the historical and legal fact that Taiwan is part 
of China and the two sides belong to one and same China can never be changed by any force or 
anyone. We people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are Chinese and share a natural affinity 
and national identity built of kinship and mutual assistance, a fact that can never be altered by 
any force or anyone. The tide of our times — the cross-Straits situation moving toward peace and 
stability and cross-Straits relations continuing to move forward — is a tide that cannot be stopped 
by any force or anyone. The historical trend toward a stronger China, national rejuvenation, and 
reunification cannot be stopped by any force or anyone! 
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Appendix VI 
President Tsai issues statement on China's President Xi's "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" 
January 2, 2019 
My fellow citizens and friends from the media, good afternoon. 
This morning, China's President Xi Jinping delivered a speech commemorating the 40th 
anniversary of the so-called "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," proposing further exploration 
of a "one country, two systems" scenario for Taiwan. As president of the Republic of China, I 
want to explain our position. 
First, I must emphasize that we have never accepted the "1992 Consensus." The fundamental 
reason is because the Beijing authorities' definition of the "1992 Consensus" is "one China" and 
"one country, two systems." The speech delivered by China's leader today has confirmed our 
misgivings. Here, I want to reiterate that Taiwan absolutely will not accept "one country, two 
systems." The vast majority of Taiwanese also resolutely oppose "one country, two systems," 
and this opposition is also a "Taiwan consensus." 
Next, we are willing to engage in negotiations. But as Taiwan is a democratic country, all 
political consultations and negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait must be 
authorized and monitored by the people of Taiwan, and conducted on a government-to-
government basis by both sides. Under this principle, no individual or group has the right to 
represent the people of Taiwan to conduct political consultations or negotiations. 
The development of cross-strait relations, as I said very clearly in my new year's talk yesterday, 
requires that: China must face the reality of the existence of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 
and not deny the democratic system that the people of Taiwan have established together; 
second, must respect the commitment of the 23 million people of Taiwan to freedom and 
democracy, and not foster divisions and offer inducements to interfere with the choices made 
by the people of Taiwan; third, must handle cross-strait differences peacefully, on the basis of 
equality, instead of using suppression and intimidation to get Taiwanese to submit; fourth, it 
must be governments or government-authorized agencies that engage in negotiations. Any 
political consultations that are not authorized and monitored by the people cannot be called 
"democratic consultations." This is Taiwan's position, a democratic position. 
We are willing, on the basis of "consolidating democracy" and "strengthening national 
security," to conduct orderly, healthy cross-strait exchanges. I also want to reiterate that 
domestically, we need to set up a three-part security network for cross-strait exchanges 
comprised of security for people's livelihoods, information security, and an institutionalized 
democracy monitoring mechanism. 
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Cross-strait trade and economic relations should be mutually beneficial, and promote mutual 
prosperity and development. However, we oppose Beijing making "benefitting China" its core 
focus, using United Front economic means including financial inducements to attract Taiwan 
technology, capital, and talent to move to mainland China. We will vigorously promote 
strategies and measures that strengthen Taiwan to consolidate a Taiwan-centric, Taiwan-first 
path to economic development. 
Over the past two years, Taiwan has faithfully fulfilled its duty as a member of the regional 
community, actively contributing to cross-strait and regional peace and stability. We do not 
provoke, but uphold our principles. We have suffered many forms of suppression, but have 
never abandoned our fundamental position and commitments regarding cross-strait relations. I 
want to remind the Beijing authorities that a superpower must act with the demeanor and take 
the responsibility of a superpower, and international society is watching China to see if it can 
make changes and become a trustworthy partner. The "four musts" are the most basic and 
crucial foundations that will determine whether cross-strait relations develop in a positive 
direction. 
A so-called "spiritual union" should be built on mutual respect and understanding, with 
governments on both sides of the strait handling issues regarding the people's welfare 
pragmatically, such as the urgent swine fever epidemic we are now facing. Pressuring 
international corporations to change their designation for Taiwan won't bring about a spiritual 
union, nor will buying off Taiwan's diplomatic allies or circling Taiwan with military aircraft and 
naval vessels. 
Lastly, I want to reiterate that the results of the 9-in-1 elections absolutely do not mean that 
grassroots public opinion in Taiwan favors abandoning our sovereignty, nor do they mean that 
the people want to make concessions regarding Taiwanese identity. 
Democratic values are the values and way of life that Taiwanese cherish, and we call upon 
China to bravely move towards democracy. This is the only way they can truly understand 
Taiwanese people's ideas and commitments. Thank you. 
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“If you wish for peace, understand war.”   
 




“Pasola xmnx na mansonsou!”  
(May every time you breathe, you breathe smoothly) 
 
Joint Declaration by the Representatives of the Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan within the 
Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee 
 
 
